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Abstract
This dissertation studies whether and how economic interdependence promotes peace,
focusing on three intertwined strategic questions originating from states’ incentives
to hurt adversaries and disincentives to hurt themselves during international crisis
bargaining. States that can exert substantial economic pains on potential rivalries
also have strong incentives to bluff (i.e., to make claims on things they are not willing
to fight for). It is therefore puzzling (1) whether bluffing makes conflict either more
likely given there will be more incidents of crises or less likely given potential targets
are more willing to concede; (2) once in conflict, whether states should cut losses
in time or hold out longer in case the opponent has been bluffing and will quit
soon; (3) as trade shifts states’ power and bargaining leverage unevenly, declining
states can be incentivized to preempt (or, conversely, rising states can be incentivized
to procrastinate), resulting in either more or fewer conflicts even when information
asymmetry and concerns over bluffing are alleviated over time.
To address these puzzles, I use three game theoretical models to examine the re-
spective strategic interaction and then apply statistical analysis to test their empirical
implications. First, I tackle the theoretical foundation of commercial peace and reex-
amine the two competing theories in this field: costly signaling and opportunity costs.
Utilizing a crisis bargaining model, I theorize and demonstrate that the bargaining
environment allows the two mechanisms to operate simultaneously: the bluffing in-
centive does not increase the likelihood of war because bluffers exploiting information
asymmetry are simultaneously restrained by the coercive channel. Building on this
vi
understanding of two parallel mechanisms at work, the second chapter investigates
how coercion and information interact beyond the stage of conflict onset. Using a war
of attrition model, I show that states can intentionally choose to endure economic
losses to demonstrate resolve. Whether this strategy is attractive or not depends on
how much they value the disputed good, i.e., issue salience. As such, the effects of
economic ties on conflict termination are conditional. When the issue salience is high
enough, the signaling mechanism kicks in and incentivizes states to hold out longer.
Otherwise, states in conflict should opt to cut their losses in time as the coercive
mechanism dominates. Finally, I investigate how bilateral trade can affect the shift
of power over time. Using a stochastic game, I demonstrate a scope condition under
which trade can stoke, rather than restrain, conflicts. Specifically, when states’ rela-
tive efficiency of translating trade gains into military power is at the extremes, they
have smaller incentives to initiate conflicts. However, when their efficiency moves
closer to parity (bounded by existing military balance), increasing bilateral trade can
exacerbate commitment problems, leading to a higher likelihood of costly conflict.
To test the above theories, I use relevant statistical tools, including structural
estimation, survival analysis, and network analysis, to examine interstate trade and
conflict data and find supporting results. I conclude that while economic interdepen-
dence promotes peace in a one-shot crisis bargaining situation, the strategic inter-
actions become more involved as we account for the impact of time. Under certain
conditions, states can be incentivized to hold out longer in conflict despite strong
economic ties. As trade shifts power balance over time, countries can also willingly
endure short-term economic pains for the potential benefits of long-term settlements.
These findings further the existing theories in trade-conflict studies. They also hold
important implications for economic coercion, power competition, and contemporary
policy issues including the recent China-U.S. trade war.
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It is the spirit of trade, which
cannot coexist with war, which




The idea of peace via commerce has a long tradition. Kant (1795), for instance, claims
that the “power of money" is the most reliable force and the spirit of commerce
will drive states toward perpetual peace. Along with democratic government and
international institutions, interstate commerce is listed as one of the three key pillars
of liberal peace (Stein, 1993; Oneal and Russett, 1999b). Commercial liberalism hinges
on the idea that the more states trade with each other the higher the costs of economic
disruption.
With the advance of globalization, one can reasonably hope that the incidence of
war shall decrease over time as states’ economic interests become more interrelated.
However, some states seem to be more willing to wield their economic power and
risk military conflict despite having a heavier stake in maintaining normal economic
exchange. For instance, trade between the U.S. and China has increased by over 100
folds over three decades. Yet the political conflict between them has been simmering
in recent years, resulting in a prolonged trade war since 2017. Admittedly, there are
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other factors at play. But it is very concerning that economic interests of this size
cannot restrain their hostilities.
For scholars that examine commercial peace, incidences such as the recent China-
U.S. conflict raise questions of whether the pacifying effect of trade indeed holds and
if it does, how the mechanism works prior to and during conflict. In this disserta-
tion, I take a rationalist approach and examine three intertwined strategic questions
assuming states are rational and unitary actors.1 Specifically, I study how economic
dependence affects states’ (1) incentives to bluff, (2) calculation to hold out in conflict,
and (3) temptation to trade short-term losses for the benefits of long-term settlements.
I begin by reexamining the two primary theories, costly signaling vs. opportu-
nity costs, in chapter 2. Traditionally, the two have been pitted against each other.
Utilizing both a crisis bargaining model and the structural estimation method, I the-
orize and demonstrate that the bargaining environment allows the two mechanisms
to operate simultaneously.
Building on this understanding, I then investigate how the two mechanisms inter-
act beyond the stage of conflict onset in chapter 3. Using a war of attrition model, I
show that states plagued by worries of deception can intentionally choose to endure
economic losses to demonstrate resolve. Whether this strategy is attractive or not
depends on how they value the disputed good, i.e., issue salience.
Finally, I turn to the issue of commitment problems which have not been suffi-
ciently theorized and tested in the commercial peace literature. I argue strong com-
mercial ties can generate incentives for states to use force, rather than to restrain,
when states’ relative abilities of translating trade gains into military power are within
1This assumption is a necessary simplification for me to focus on the theory con-
struction. In the concluding chapter, I will discuss my thoughts on relaxing this
assumption.
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a mid-range. It should be noted that this scope condition holds even when concerns
over misinformation and deception are assumed away.
Though seemingly addressing three different questions, the above strategic calcu-
lations all originate from states’ incentives to hurt adversaries and disincentives to
hurt themselves during international crisis bargaining. States that can exert substan-
tial economic pains on potential rivalries also have strong incentives to bluff (i.e., to
make claims on things they are not willing to fight for). It therefore appears natural
to first consider whether and how bluffing rearranges states’ incentives during crises.




Costly signaling has been a popular explanation of war and peace in recent decades
(Fearon, 1994a; Schultz, 2001a; Slantchev, 2011). In times of crises, resolute states
seek to make their threats credible while the irresolute aims to cheat. To distinguish
their threats, resolute states impose substantial costs on themselves, thereby render-
ing the strategy of mimicking their moves unprofitable for irresolute counterparts.
Factors that deter bluffing (i.e. backing down on one’s threat), such as public an-
nouncements (Fearon, 1997) and force mobilizations (Slantchev, 2005), can facilitate
credible communication and hence promote peace. The commercial peace literature
adopts such a costly signaling perspective, adding to the list of factors by suggesting
that economic interdependence can promote peace because the willingness to en-
dure economic disruption can credibly signal resolve in the first place (Morrow, 1999;
Gartzke, Li and Boehmer, 2001).1
1Stein (1993) refers to the pacifying effect of democracy as republican liberalism,
economic interdependence as commercial liberalism, and international institutions as
institutional liberalism. Throughout the dissertation, I use commercial liberalism,
commercial peace, and trade-conflict studies interchangeably. In addition, I refer to
economic dependence as one side’s potential economic costs should the relation be cut
off. That is, the higher the dependence, the more costs a country will have to suffer.
I refer to economic interdependence, which the literature typically operationalizes by
the lower level of the dependence within a dyad Oneal and Russet (1997); Gartzke,
Li and Boehmer (2001), as both sides being highly dependent upon each other.
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However, in the case of economic dependence, the costly signaling explanation
remains incomplete. Instead of solely hurting the challenger, economic coercion hurts
the target as well. As such, a costly signal also rearranges the target’s commitment
because the target becomes more likely to acquiesce (Morrow, 1999). This in turn
generates strategic incentives for some irresolute types to bluff (cf. Gartzke and Li,
2003). Given that bluffing is typically argued to increase the likelihood of war (Fearon,
1995; Ramsay, 2008; Wolford, 2014), it is unclear why increasing economic costs would
not incentivize deception, encourage conflict escalation, and ultimately increase the
odds of war.
Explaining whether and why this incentive to coerce and deceive stokes or re-
duces conflict is critical to the further development of commercial liberalism. Above
all, this question speaks to the overarching theme of trade’s pacifying effect and
the ongoing debate between the opportunity costs and costly signaling theories in
the field (Gartzke, Li and Boehmer, 2001; Dafoe and Kelsey, 2014). Building on a
crisis bargaining model, I argue economic dependence can still promote peace de-
spite producing a higher likelihood of deception and uncertainty. This is because the
bargaining environment of economic dependence allows states to inform and coerce
simultaneously.2 Existing theories have pointed out one aspect of this simultaneous
effect: self-inflicted costs improve credibility and hence generate coercive pressure.
My model addresses the other aspect: when states impose costs on an opponent, the
coercive effect parallels the informational one. Irresolute states are attracted to initi-
2Some studies suggest states can inform only when their threats can become more
credible (Gartzke and Westerwinter, 2016; Whang, McLean and Kuberski, 2013).
Some others adopt a broader interpretation and argue actions that reveal a lack of
resolve also have informational value (Dafoe and Kelsey, 2014). I adopt the latter
interpretation here because in the context of economic interdependence, states can
either increase or decrease their dependence on an opponent. That is, if rising depen-
dence informs, I believe decreasing dependence also has informational value.
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ate a challenge exactly because they anticipate the target is more likely to concede to
avoid costs. As such, when the target stands to suffer more, it will infer that the chal-
lenger is less resolved, all else equal. Yet despite this information, the target is more
inclined to concede because it stands to suffer more irrespective of the challenger’s
lack of resolve.3 In this scenario, the probability of escalation and war is invariably
reduced due to this increased likelihood of concession. Without this parallel coercive
effect (i.e. if trade’s pacifying effect is purely informational), the impact on conflict
would be reversed.
My argument that economic dependence allows states to inform and coerce simul-
taneously can help unify the two primary theories in commercial liberalism. While
opportunity costs emphasize the coercive nature of economic dependence, signaling
highlights its informational function. I demonstrate that commercial liberalism works
via the coercive and informational channels simultaneously. Therefore, while it is im-
portant to show how each mechanism operates, it may be misguided to debate which
theory dominates.
In addition, this chapter speaks to a broader literature of inter-state crisis bar-
gaining. While the mainstream wisdom indicates that increasing uncertainty stokes
conflict (Reed, 2003b; Slantchev, 2004), some studies have contended that uncertainty
also rewards prudence (Bas and Schub, 2016) and may result in a more peaceful out-
come depending on the source of uncertainty (Fey and Ramsay, 2011), whether there
is ongoing concern over commitment problems (Wolford, Reiter and Carrubba, 2011;
Bas and Schub, 2017), and prior optimistic/pessimistic beliefs (Arena and Wolford,
2012). My study adds to the latter caution and shows that the mechanism of eco-
3But if we hold constant the target’s costs, its perception of lower challenger resolve
does suggests a lower (higher) likelihood of concession (escalation).
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nomic dependence can promote peace even when it renders states less certain of an
opponent’s resolve.
This chapter proceeds as follows. I first discuss the transplantation of the costly
signaling theory to the commercial peace literature. I then present a model which
demonstrates how the bargaining environment of economic dependence differs from
the conventional models, leading to divergent results. These implications are then
tested by a structural estimation method that allows belief updating. The final section
concludes with implications and limitations.
2.1 Costly Signaling and Commercial Peace
Theories of commercial liberalism generally agree on the pacifying effect of economic
interdependence (Oneal and Russet, 1997; Gartzke, Li and Boehmer, 2001; Hegre,
Oneal and Russett, 2010; cf. Barbieri, 1996). Two primary explanations have been
proposed. The opportunity costs theory focuses on the coercive aspect of economic
dependence and reasons that ex post economic costs generate ex ante incentives to
avoid conflict. Trade losses due to conflict add to the costs of war, thereby reduc-
ing hostility between states while promoting cooperation (Polachek, 1980; Polachek
and Xiang, 2010). Trade can be a vehicle for communication and creates a secu-
rity community where shared identity suppresses the use of force (Oneal and Russet,
1997; Oneal and Russett, 1999a). Lastly, trade can become a cheaper substitute for
conquest (Rosecrance, 1986; Gartzke, 2007; Brooks, 2007). In short, economic de-
pendence’s effect is coercive: it constrains belligerents by rearranging their ex ante
incentives.4
4Throughout this dissertation, I assume conflict does disrupt commerce and inflict
economic costs on both sides. For studies questioning this assumption, see Mor-
row, Siverson and Tabares (1998); Barbieri and Levy (1999); Ward and Hoff (2007).
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The costly signaling theory, however, contends that if economic disruption only
invokes opportunity costs, then its impact on conflict should be indeterminate (Mor-
row, 1999). That is, although the challenger suffers economically, the target also bears
proportional costs and consequently will be more likely to acquiesce. Morrow argues
that if trade does promote peace, it should operate by allowing states to communicate
their unobservable resolve. With a broader range of costly signals, states can com-
municate more peacefully and credibly (Morrow, 2003). Gartzke, Li and Boehmer
(2001) further develop this costly signaling rationale by arguing that mutual economic
dependence help states tell different opponents apart: states that are willing to suffer
the costs of disruption are resolved and hence distinguishable from their unresolved
counterparts.
Here the reasoning resonates with the wisdom of conventional costly signaling
theories. These theories propose several signaling mechanisms, including tying hands
which may involve domestic and international audience costs (Fearon, 1994a; Schultz,
1998; Sartori, 2002), sinking costs such as troop mobilization (Fearon, 1997; Slantchev,
2005, 2011), and generating autonomous risks that are beyond one’s control (Pow-
ell, 1990; Slantchev, 2011). These models agree that a more costly or risky threat
indicates the challenger is more resolved. The costly signaling theory in commercial
liberalism shares this insight in highlighting that the willingness to bear economic
costs helps reveal private information (Morrow, 1999, 2003).
However, the bargaining environment of economic dependence also differs from
the conventional models. Specifically, aside from inflicting costs on oneself, it allows
challengers to impose costs on an opponent, thereby exploiting the latter’s vulner-
For recent studies supporting this assumption, see Long (2008); Glick and Taylor
(2010). See also Gowa (1994); Mansfield and Bronson (1997); Mansfield, Milner and
Rosendorff (2000); Anderton and Carter (2001).
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ability (Hirschman, 1980; Keohane and Nye, 1977; Wagner, 1988; Barbieri, 1996;
Peterson, 2014). As such, the incentive to bluff may not be categorically eliminated
simply by threatening to cut off trade (Gartzke and Zhang, 2015). Instead, this in-
centive can grow stronger as the level of dependence rises: as a target becomes more
vulnerable, resolute states can step-up their demand and irresolute ones may be in-
centivized to initiate a challenge. In return, the relatively dependent target states
should downgrade the credibility of the threat and resist more. Therefore, the same
costly signaling mechanism may also contain countervailing forces that stoke conflict
and bloodshed.
This incentive to coerce and deceive and its impact on the prospect of peace have
not received much attention in trade-conflict studies. However, it is critical to the
further development of the literature not least because it can undermine the over-
arching theme of trade’s pacifying effect. In addition, recent studies also emphasize
imposing costs is a more common practice than inflicting costs on oneself, thereby
casting doubt on the underlying logic of costly signaling (Dafoe and Kelsey, 2014).
Lastly, it also addresses one area that the opportunity costs theory has overlooked
— the issue of incomplete information, which formal theories have identified as a key
cause of conflict (Fearon, 1995; cf. Powell, 2006). In other words, the emphasis on
vulnerability can be more convincing if it also confronts and explains how the effect
of coercion interact with information asymmetry.5
In the following section, I present a crisis bargaining model to study how economic
dependence affects the choice of bluffing and consequently the likelihood of conflict.
5Addressing the dual functions of commercial ties also lines up with recent de-
velopment in trade network studies, where scholars find the role of trade structures
to be multidimensional (Gartzke and Westerwinter, 2016). States can costly signal
their resolve via third-party trade, which may constrain or amplify their bargaining
leverage and vulnerability (Kinne, 2014; Peterson, 2018).
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I find that heavier economic dependence of the target increases both the likelihood
of deception and concession. This generates two countervailing forces: (a) the risk of
further conflict escalation is reduced because the target become less likely to resist
and (b) the odds of conflict initiation rise because it becomes more lucrative to exploit
others’ vulnerability. I then discuss how this mechanism affects the odds of bloodshed
and its connections with existing theories.
2.2 The Crisis Bargaining Model
Two states, 1 and 2, compete over a disputed good owned by State 2. One can
interpret this as State 1, the challenger, seeking a policy or territory concession from
State 2. State 1 moves first by choosing whether to challenge State 2 (denoted as
C or C̃), who then moves by choosing whether to escalate the conflict (denoted as
E) or not (denoted as Ẽ). If she6 concedes, the game ends. If she escalates, State
1 then chooses whether to follow through his initial threat by fighting (denoted as
F ) or back down from his earlier commitment (denoted as F̃ ). The structure of the
game is shown in Figure 2.1.7
Before I specify the payoffs, a number of notations are in order. Let vi, where
i ∈ (1, 2), denote each side’s valuation of the disputed good. Write the likelihood of
State 1 winning the good by force as p. Denote the military and economic costs of
6Here and throughout the dissertation, I follow the convention in game theory and
refer to the first mover as he and the second mover as she.
7The structure of the game follows closely with the classical crisis bargaining model
(Fearon, 1997; Slantchev, 2011). Our models differ mainly in the specification of
payoffs. To model economic interdependence, I assume both sides suffer economic
losses once a conflict is escalated. In comparison, the sunk-cost and tying-hands
models assume only the initiator suffers costs. Fearon’s model allows the costs to vary
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Figure 2.1: A Crisis Bargaining Model With Economic Interdependence.
conflict as ci and bi respectively. Finally, let ri represent the audience costs, which
State 1 will suffer if he backpedals and State 2 will suffer if she immediately caves. 8
In the status quo, no state gains or loses anything. That is, each side gains 0. If
State 2 concedes immediately, then she loses the good and suffers the audience costs
(−v2− r2) while State 1 wins the good for free. If State 2 escalates the conflict, then
the economic costs are invoked for both sides. If State 1 follows through his threat
with force, then the good is allocated by the costly lottery of war where both sides
pay the additional military costs as well. That is, the payoffs for fighting can be
written as (pv1− c1− b1,−pv2− c2− b2). If, however, State 1 backs down, then both
sides avoid the fighting costs and only suffer the economic costs. The payoffs for this
outcome can be written as (−b1 − r1,−b2).9
8I include the parameters of audience costs (r1 and r2) in line with studies of
audience costs and crisis bargaining (Slantchev, 2011, p.15). Setting either or both
parameters to zero does not affect my results. In particular, consult Appendix A.1.2,
where I derive the comparative statics. Results hold when either or both r1 and r2
are set to 0.
9Some readers have indicated the possibility of states suffering lower economic
losses if they back down on the brink of war. That is, the payoffs for BD should
instead be (−mb1 − r1,−mb2), where m ≤ 1. The main implications of the model
(specifically, the comparative statics) do not change if I modify these payoffs. In
addition, I also consider the possibility of states issuing a limited challenge where the
economic costs of War and BD are restricted. See Appendix A.1.3.
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The sources of uncertainty reside in each side’s valuation of the disputed good.
State 1 observes his valuation of the good but is uncertain of his opponent’s (v2).
Analogously, State 2 knows v2 but is unsure of v1. Each side knows the cumulative
distributive function of the opponent’s valuation, denoted as F1 and F2 respectively.
For instance, F1(x) denotes the probability that State 1 values the disputed good at
a value lower than x.
2.2.1 Equilibrium
The solution of the game is that of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). For ease
of interpretation, write v∗1 and v∗2 as the benchmark that state 1 and 2 are resolved.
Specifically, if v1 > v∗1, state 1 prefers war to concession (F̃ ). If v2 > v∗2, state 2 prefers
war to concession (Ẽ). Mathematically, v∗1 = (c1−r1)/p and v∗2 = (c2+b2−r2)/(1−p).
In addition, write v̂1 and v̂2 as the benchmark for state 1’s and 2’s escalation strategy.
That is, if v1 > v̂1, state 1 provokes; otherwise, he opts to not provoke. If v2 > v̂2,
state 2 further escalates the conflict; otherwise, she concedes. Finally, denote state
2’s belief that state 1 is resolved after observing a challenge as α. By Bayesian rules,
α = (1− F1(v∗1))/(1− F1(v̂1)). The equilibrium is as follows.
Proposition 1. Different types of the two states play by the following rule:
• State 1 chooses to challenge if his valuation of the disputed good is greater than
v̂1, and restrains if it is not.
• State 2 escalates the conflict if her valuation of the disputed good is greater than
v̂2, and concedes if it is not. State 2 updates her belief that State 1 is resolved
to α when she sees a threat being issued.
12
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The solution of the proposition’s comparative statics is a bit involved and is therefore















Recall v̂1 denotes the benchmark of State 1 issuing a challenge. A higher (lower)
value of v̂1 means the requirement is more (less) stringent, i.e. fewer (more) types of
State 1 find the choice attractive. It, therefore, captures the probability that State 1
is bluffing. Analogously, v̂2 denotes the likelihood of State 2 conceding to a threat,
where a higher (lower) v̂2 means it takes a higher (lower) valuation for State 2 to
resist. α denotes the belief of State 2 that State 1 is resolved after observing his
threat.
The above comparative statics have a number of critical implications. First, they
confirm the conventional wisdom that self-inflicted costs increase the credibility of
threats. They also show that the informational and coercive functions are intertwined:
a target is coerced (becomes less likely to resist) because the threat becomes more
credible. To see this, observe when b1 increases, both α and v̂2 increase. A higher
value of α means State 2 believes the threat is more likely coming from a resolved
type. A higher value of v̂2 means States 2 is less likely to resist the threat.
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Second, the results reveal another drastically different mechanism: imposing costs
on a target induces concession even when the threat’s credibility drops. To see that,
observe when b2 increases, α decreases while v̂2 increases. The former suggests that
State 2 downgrades the credibility of the threat (because more irresolute types, i.e.
a lower benchmark of v̂1, are attracted to challenge her) while the latter suggests
that State 2 is less likely to fight back. In this regard, economic vulnerability rewards
the bluffer even when the credibility of his threat drops. To put it differently, higher
trade dependence of the target means a relatively higher chance of successful bluffing
because target states give in more readily despite their being more suspicious of the
challenger. As such, a larger proportion of potential bluffers, who originally viewed
the disputed good as not worth fighting for and chose to maintain the status quo,
are now willing to initiate a conflict exactly because they anticipate this shift of
bargaining advantage. Therefore, I have the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. The more dependent the target state’s economy (b2) is on the chal-
lenger, the more likely will the target concede to a challenge.
Hypothesis 2. The more dependent the target state’s economy (b2) is on the chal-
lenger, the less likely will the target perceive the threat to be credible.
Given that we should expect more challenges initiated by an irresolute type, I
have an additional hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. The more dependent the target state’s economy (b2) is on the chal-
lenger, the more likely will the challenger back down from his provocation.
Third, even when it becomes more lucrative for State 1 to bluff, the likelihood of
war is still reduced. This pacifying impact can be attributed to both the informative
and coercive functions of economic dependence. The likelihood of war can be written
14
as
Pr(War) = F1(v1 > v̂1) · F2(v2 > v̂2) · F1(v1 > v∗1|v1 > v̂1)
which can be simplified as F2(v2 > v̂2) · F1(v1 > v∗1). Note that the latter part is
a constant. Hence, the likelihood of war can be evaluated directly by F2(v2 > v̂2).
Observe when either b1 or b2 increases, v̂2 increases as well, resulting in a lower F2(v2 >
v̂2). In other words, the possible increase in the probability of war is ultimately
overwhelmed by the target’s tendency of concession.
Intuitively, there are two opposing forces affecting the odds of war: (a) the pool
of conflict onset expands as more potential challengers are incentivized to initiate a
conflict and (b) the likelihood of escalation decreases (otherwise, bluffers would not be
incentivized in the first place).10 While (b) reduces the odds of war, (a) may increase
them. The latter’s impact is restrained because it is inflated by unresolved types,
which by definition will back down once their bluff is called. As such, the effects of
(a) become inconsequential and the odds of bloodshed are ultimately reduced as the
target becomes more likely to concede. Therefore, I have the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. The more dependent the target state’s economy (b2) is on the chal-
lenger, the less likely will the conflict end up in war.
Importantly, the effects of b1 and b2 link the model with the existing theories of
commercial peace. b1 resonates with the theory of costly signaling (Morrow, 1999;
Gartzke, Li and Boehmer, 2001; Reed, 2003a): State 2 is coerced by an informative
10This result is driven by the setup and assumptions of the model. In particular,
I assume the economic losses cannot be unbounded (b2 < r2 + v̂2, please refer to
Appendix A.1.2 for a more formal treatment). Also, I do not consider the impact
of time. However, if the game is played repeatedly, then targets can have a stronger
incentive to resist in order to build up a tougher reputation. In the final section of
this chapter, I address this as well as other limitations.
15
threat because self-inflicted costs improves credibility. Analogously, b2 echoes the
reasoning of opportunity costs (Polachek and Xiang, 2010; Dafoe and Kelsey, 2014):
State 2 concedes to a threat that capitalizes on her economic vulnerability (even
though it is less credible). Each theory underscores either the informational or coer-
cive function of economic dependence. My model showcases they should instead be
united because the bargaining environment allows both functions to work at the same
time: informative threats bear coercive impacts and coercive threats can compensate
for the lack of credibility.
To sum up, my model suggests economic dependence still promotes peace despite
a higher likelihood of deception because target states’ economic vulnerability simul-
taneously encourages deception and concession. Challengers deceive exactly because
they anticipate targets to concede more willingly. As such, the odds of war reduce
even though the credibility of threat also drops. Granted, no observer can know a
priori whether a challenger is bluffing or not. As such, it is extremely difficult to
differentiate whether a concession by the target is driven by the credible revelation of
resolve or by bluff success. However, if the empirics do indicate higher levels of eco-
nomic dependence are correlated with a higher likelihood of concession and deception
simultaneously, that will provide substantial support to my theory.
2.3 Research Design
To test the above hypotheses, I apply the structural estimation method for signaling
games (Whang, McLean and Kuberski, 2013; Whang, 2010), which has the advan-
tage of estimating all four pairs of relationship in the hypotheses simultaneously
(i.e. economic dependence’s relationship with concession, deception, belief updating,
and the likelihood of war). I choose this approach because of the need to model
16
strategic interaction (Signorino, 1999; Smith, 1999; Sartori, 2003).11 Moreover, con-
ventional empirical approaches to estimate belief updating (Hypothesis 2 ) would
require a monumental effort to sift through how leaders interpret and revise their
beliefs throughout each conflict process, which can be further complicated by the
fact that historical records tend to bias against bluff success (bluffs uncalled are less
likely to be recognized and recorded). Before such data are available, the structural
estimation represents at least a compromise for us to gain some traction to estimate
Hypothesis 2 systematically.12
While details of the structural estimation method can be involved, the underly-
ing rationale is not. Intuitively, it is similar to the maximum likelihood estimation,
which searches for the parameters of a probability density function that maximizes
our likelihood of observing the sample data. Analogously, the structural estimation
requires us to write out and maximize the joint probability function of observing the
data. The catch is we have to incorporate all outcomes of the strategic interaction
simultaneously. Specifically, as shown in Figure 2.1, we observe one of four different
outcomes for a crisis: SQ (status quo), CD (concession by the target), BD (backing
down by the challenger), and WAR. For each outcome, we specify a set of variables
(X) as well as their respective parameters (β) that contribute to each player’s payoff
(βX). These payoffs contribute to the likelihood of observing each outcome by an
underlying probability function: Pr(y|β,X), where y ∈ {SQ,CD,BD,WAR}. Using
11For a debate concerning the use of structural estimation, see Carrubba, Yuen and
Zorn (2007) and Signorino (2007).
12The structural estimation method assumes leaders rationally calculate and update
their beliefs. That is, the estimation of belief updating is what rational leaders should
do. That could be a step from reality. Also, it assumes the data for estimation are
accurate. For discussions over issues concerning trade data, see Barbieri, Keshk and
Pollins (2009); Boehmer, Jungblut and Stoll (2011); Keshk, Reuveny and Pollins
(2010).
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Table 2.1: Structural Estimation Model Specification.
Player Outcome Variables
1 SQ Economic Dependence of State 1, Alliance, Contiguity,
Major Power Status of State 1, Major Power Status of State 2
1 CD Power Ratio
1 BD Economic Dependence of State 1, Democracy of State 1
1 WAR Power Ratio, Contiguity, Defense Pacts of State 1
2 CD Economic Dependence of State 2, Democracy of State 2
2 WAR Power Ratio, Contiguity, Defense Pacts of State 2
this information, we can write up the joint likelihood function of observing the out-
comes. Finally, we use the maximum likelihood estimation method to estimate the
underlying probability function and the parameters that contribute to each outcome
(for details, see Whang, 2010).
2.3.1 Model Specification
The structural estimation method requires that we specify the variables of interest
in each node when a player has to make a choice. Since there are four outcomes and
two players, there are eight payoff functions to specify. However, State 2’s payoff for
remaining at the status quo cannot be estimated and is therefore omitted (Whang,
2010; Whang, McLean and Kuberski, 2013). Also, her payoff when State 1 backs
down from his threat is normalized to 0. As such, I only need to specify six payoff
functions. That is, I need to specify which variables affect State 1’s payoffs over SQ,
CD, BD, and WAR. I also need to specify which variables affect State 2’s payoff over
CD and WAR.
The details of model specification are shown in Table 2.1. I include each side’s
economic dependence in their own decision node, given that the focus of this article
is to examine economic dependence’s impacts on a state and its opponent’s strategic
choices. That is, State 1’s dependence is included in the functions where he has to
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choose whether or not to change the status quo, whether or not to back down when
the opponent resists his threat. Similarly, State 2’s dependence is included in her
choice over concession or conflict escalation.
I include major power status for both states in the status quo function for State
1 given major powers tend to interact more with and are less likely to be challenged
by other states.13 For State 1’s payoffs when 2 concedes, I add power ratio because
extracting a concession from a stronger opponents tends to be more lucrative. I use
the democracy level to capture audience costs (Fearon, 1994a; Schultz, 2001b) when
State 2 concedes immediately or when State 1 backs down from his threat. Both
states’ payoff functions for war are estimated by power ratio, contiguity, and their
number of defense pacts.
2.3.2 The Dependent Variables
To test the hypotheses with the structural estimation method, I need a dataset that
captures all four different outcomes: SQ, CD, BD, and WAR. I use a version of the
Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data (Gibler, Miller and Little, 2016), which
applies a strict reading of the coding rules to revise the original dataset. This revised
dataset drops 251 cases that do not meet MID coding rules, merges 72 MIDs, and
makes major changes to 234 disputes and minor changes to 1009 disputes. Given the
model introduced here bears implications for disputes that can potentially disrupt
13Note that I include it only in the conflict initiation stage because when it comes to
the brink of war the power ratio variable can better capture the idea of being powerful
and strong. That is, while it may be unattractive (or attractive) to challenge a major
power, when a war breaks out what matters is the power difference, instead of the
reputation of being a major power.
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normal economical exchange, I find this version of data appropriate for testing the
hypotheses.14
Using this revised dataset, I code the four outcomes by consulting the originator,
outcome, and hostility level variables. I code an outcome as status quo if the hostility
level is 1 (i.e. no militarized action), concession when a target (i.e. a state which is
not an originator of dispute) yields to a threat, war when one state’s hostility level
reaches 5. When the target does not comply and the initiator does not follow through
with war (including stalemate cases), it counts as backing down. 15
The unit of analysis is directed dyad-year. Due to missingness, the sample size
varies as I include different dependent and independent variables. For the main model,
there are 1041 observations from 1960 to 2010.16
2.3.3 The Independent Variables
The key independent variable is economic dependence, which I operationalize by
two steps. First, I follow one conventional operationalization and generate a rough
measurement of dependence using dyadic trade divided by a state’s GDP (Oneal and
14I also use the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data to generate a different set
of dependent variables. Results are shown in Table 2.2 Model 2. More details can be
found in the Appendix A.7.
15Following one of the choices by Whang, McLean and Kuberski (2013), I also
generate a different version of the status quo data by the political affinity between
states using UN general assembly voting. Results are shown in Table 2.2 Model 3.
More details can be found in the appendix.
16The sample starts from 1960 because I use World Development Indicator’s GDP
data. When I operationalize dependence by trade share, instead of trade divided by
GDP, the sample extends to 1870. Summary statistics can be found in the Appendix
A.2.
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Russet, 1997).17 Second, I weigh this variable by a state’s vulnerability to economic
coercion. There are two aspects to consider here: (a) larger economies tend to be more
influential; (b) all else equal, states that are more integrated to the global economy
have more alternatives and are hence less vulnerable to economic coercion. As such,
they tend to value a given trade relationship less (Hirschman, 1980; Barbieri, 1996;
Crescenzi, 2003a; Dorussen and Ward, 2010; Peterson, 2011, 2014).
In line with the recent development of network analysis, I use the tnet package
in R to generate the closeness measurement as a proxy of states’ economic vulnera-
bility (Opsahl, Agneessens and Skvoretz, 2010; Kinne, 2012, 2014; Peterson, 2018). I
choose to weigh trade networks by trade volume, instead of trade dependence.18 Not
using trade dependence can potentially bias the measurement toward big economies.
However, this is a desirable tradeoff as my primary goal of generating the vulnerabil-
ity measure is to use it to weigh the economic dependence measurement. This way,
the weighted variable can strike a balance between the size and integration level of
an economy.19 That said, I also rerun the model basing on trade networks weighted
17Some studies also highlight the importance of financial flows (Gartzke, 2007;
Mousseau, 2013). For the purpose of this study, I follow the convention of using trade
dependence. Hegre (2009) points out measuring trade dependence as dyadic trade
divided by a state’s GDP masks the importance of trade to smaller countries. To
mitigate this concern, I also use the trade share (dyadic trade divided by a state’s
total volume of trade) measurement Barbieri (1996). Results are shown in Table 2.2
Model 4. More details can be found in the appendix.
18Weighing by trade dependence can better capture the aspect of integration
(Kinne, 2012). One can also generate separate measures to capture different charac-
teristics of trade networks (Gartzke and Westerwinter, 2016; Peterson, 2018). How-
ever, my goal here is to generate a single measure to proxy economic vulnerability.
Following Kinne (2012), I standardize the measures by the number of states in the
global trade network each year.
19Ideally, one may want to separate and interact the dependence and vulnerability
variables. However, my theory focuses on their aggregate impact (parameter bi in
the bargaining model) and is incognizant of the conditional effects. In addition, the
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by economic dependence. Most models show similar patterns, though in some cases
results turn less significant. Using an alternative centrality measure, the eigenvector
centrality, I only have comparable results for the trade share measurement.20
To be a desirable proxy for states’ economic vulnerability, the closeness measure-
ment should demonstrate a number of attributes. First, it should be able to capture
the influence of international and domestic events. Second, as mentioned previously,
bigger and more influential economies typically should be less vulnerable.21 Last, as
highlighted by Kinne (2012), it should not be biased against small yet highly inte-
grated economies.
Weighing trade networks by trade volume can produce such a measurement. As
an illustration, I plot the closeness values and rankings of two pairs of countries in
Figure 2.2.22 The first pair consists of big economies (the U.S. and China), while
the second pair consists of relatively small ones (Belgium and Bahamas). First,
the closeness measurement appears to capture the influence of both international
structural estimation method is already a complicated and interacted model. More
layers of interaction can dramatically complicate the interpretation and in some cases
preclude the convergence of estimation.
20Depending on the data, adjusting the weighing scheme can produce more signif-
icant results. See the appendix for details. I would like to thank two anonymous
reviewers for their suggestions on alternative weights and centrality measurement.
Further studies can compare and investigate the effects of different centrality mea-
sures.
21One concern of using trade volume is its time trend. To mitigate this, I use trade
data in constant 2005 U.S. dollars. Another concern of using trade volume is we
may have big economies that are relatively isolated. To address this issue, I use the
closeness measurement that accounts for the possibility of disconnected components.
See Appendix A.4 for details.
22For each year, all states in the system are ranked from the highest to lowest
values. In the appendix, I also present a similar plot using networks weighted by
economic dependence. The rankings are similar. However, the difference in closeness
values between large and small economies could be large.
22
and domestic events quite well. As is demonstrated in Figure 2.2 (a) and (c), we
can see that the general trend for the past century is toward more integration and
globalization. In addition, the two world wars have a dramatic influence on the
closeness measurement as the countries’ values drop sharply in both periods. In
terms of domestic events, take the Chinese economy as an example. Looking at
the period after World War II, we can see the Chinese economy taking a tip in the
1960s (the Cultural Revolution) and then steadily improving its status since the 1980s
(the Reform and Opening-up led by Deng Xiaoping). Second, the measurement also
showcases bigger economies (under similar levels of integration) are generally more
influential and less vulnerable. For instance, the economies of the U.S. and Belgium
are both open and well-integrated (Figure 2.2 (b) and (d) show that they are both in
the top ten list most of the time). Still, the U.S. economy is consistently regarded as
being relatively less vulnerable than Belgium’s.
Finally, the measurement does not bias much against small and highly integrated
economies. Figure 2.2 (d) shows that the rankings of Belgium, bar the two world
wars’ periods, have been consistently in the top ten. If we compare the values of
Belgium’s closeness measure against those of the U.S. (Figure 2.2 (c) and (a)), we
can see that they do not differ much. Similar patterns exist for other relatively small
and highly integrated economies such as Singapore, Japan, South Korea, etc.23 In
comparison, small countries with a limited level of integration (e.g. the Bahamas in
Figure 2.2 (d)) are becoming comparatively more vulnerable over time.
In this regard, I believe weighing trade networks by trade volume can capture the
afore-mentioned dual aspects of economic vulnerability (economic size and integra-
tion). I then proxy the level of economic dependence by taking the product of trade
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Figure 2.2: Value and Ranking of the Closeness Measure. x-axis denotes time, while
y-axis denotes the value or ranking of the closeness centrality measure in a given year. In
the upper (lower) panels, the yellow solid line denotes the rankings of the U.S. (Belgium)
over time, while the grey dashed line denotes China (Bahamas) thereof.
dependence and the exponential of the negative value of closeness (trade dependence
* exp(-closeness)). Though a simple operationalization choice, I find it reason-
able in that the exponential is bounded24 and it captures the core idea that as a state
becomes less vulnerable in its trade network it values a given trade relationship less.
24The closeness measurement is between 0 and 1.87. When taken the exponential
of the negative value of closeness, the measurement is bounded between 0.15 and 1.
That is, for the most integrated economy, it will discount the value of a given trade
relationship by around 85 percent. In Appendix A.12 and A.13, I consider and show
results for an alternative weighing scheme.
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As for the controls, I follow some conventional choices. I use Polity IV (Marshall,
Jaggers and Gurr, 2002) to proxy audience costs. I also use COW’s data on alliance
(v 4.1, Gibler, 2009), contiguity (Stinnett et al., 2002)25, major power status, and
power ratio (v 5.0, Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972) to measure the relative military
strength and the costs of war.
2.4 Results
The coefficient estimates for the model are shown in Table 2.2 Model 1. Each row
indicates the effect of a variable on a state’s payoff for one corresponding outcome.
A positive (negative) value indicates the variable increases (decreases) the respec-
tive payoff. The main row of interest (highlighted) is "CD2:TradeDepend2", which
represents the effect of State 2’s economic dependence on her payoff of concession.
The result is positive and highly significant, suggesting as a target becomes more
dependent she finds the choice of concession to be more attractive.
The impact on payoffs is not equal to the probability of outcomes. This is because
while it directly affects a state’s choice on one corresponding outcome, it also indi-
rectly affects the other’s strategic calculation. To demonstrate both the direct and
indirect impacts of the target’s economic dependence, I plot four pairs of relation-
ship in Figure 2.3. Specifically, I plot the impacts of the target’s dependence on the
probabilities of the challenger being irresolute (deception), the likelihood of the tar-
get’s concession, the odds of war, and the degree of belief updating. Note that these
are not conditional probabilities and only represent states’ strategic consideration.
Also, the graph is plotted by holding the other variables at certain values. Therefore,
25Correlates of War Project. Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2016. Version 3.2.
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Table 2.2: Structural Estimation Results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Model ICB SQ by Affinity Trade Share
SQ1:TradeDepend1 −0.34 3.19 0.15 0.15
(−3.44, 2.75) (−4.70, 11.08) (−1.95, 2.24) (−0.18, 0.48)
SQ1:Alliance −0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01
(−0.13, 0.07) (−0.07, 0.15) (−0.06, 0.08) (−0.05, 0.06)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.55∗∗∗ −0.23 −0.56∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗
(−0.77, −0.32) (−0.64, 0.17) (−0.78, −0.34) (−0.44, −0.18)
SQ1:Major1 −0.003 0.27 0.36∗∗∗ −0.10
(−0.12, 0.12) (−0.06, 0.60) (0.16, 0.55) (−0.23, 0.03)
SQ1:Major2 −0.04 0.14 0.12∗ 0.03
(−0.16, 0.09) (−0.12, 0.41) (−0.002, 0.24) (−0.03, 0.09)
CD1:Constant −0.74 −0.11 −0.55∗∗ 0.51
(−5.17, 3.69) (−3.26, 3.03) (−0.99, −0.10) (−0.81, 1.83)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.17 0.18 −0.15 −0.24
(−3.59, 3.93) (−2.59, 2.96) (−1.26, 0.96) (−1.10, 0.62)
BD1:Constant 0.32∗ −1.03∗∗∗ −0.22∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(−0.04, 0.69) (−1.71, −0.34) (−0.46, 0.03) (0.25, 0.63)
BD1:TradeDepend1 0.14 −4.62 0.03 −0.54∗∗
(−3.83, 4.12) (−20.06, 10.81) (−5.02, 5.09) (−1.04, −0.03)
BD1:Democracy1 0.02∗ 0.01∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗
(−0.001, 0.03) (0.001, 0.03) (−0.04, −0.02) (−0.001, 0.02)
War1:Constant 0.13 −0.25∗ −0.07 0.04
(−0.39, 0.64) (−0.54, 0.04) (−0.37, 0.24) (−0.44, 0.52)
War1:PowerRatio 0.12 0.20 0.04 0.08
(−0.10, 0.34) (−0.07, 0.48) (−0.14, 0.22) (−0.03, 0.19)
War1:Contiguity −0.45∗ −0.36∗∗ −0.48∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗
(−0.92, 0.03) (−0.70, −0.02) (−0.71, −0.25) (−0.50, −0.06)
War1:Defense1 −0.0004 0.002 0.003 −0.003∗∗
(−0.003, 0.002) (−0.001, 0.01) (−0.001, 0.01) (−0.01, −0.0004)
CD2:Constant −0.06∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗
(−0.12, 0.003) (−0.17, −0.15) (−0.01, −0.003) (−0.13, −0.11)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.60∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗
(0.35, 0.85) (1.20, 1.23) (0.01, 0.05) (0.01, 0.16)
CD2:Democracy −0.001 0.01∗ 0.0003∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(−0.004, 0.002) (−0.002, 0.03) (−0.0000, 0.001) (−0.002, −0.002)
War2:Constant 0.27 1.08 0.42∗ 0.21
(−1.42, 1.97) (−0.54, 2.69) (−0.06, 0.90) (−0.15, 0.56)
War2:PowerRatio 0.67 −0.43 0.42 0.12
(−0.66, 2.00) (−2.28, 1.42) (−0.16, 1.00) (−0.32, 0.56)
War2:Contiguity 0.18 −0.37 1.38∗∗∗ −0.16
(−0.50, 0.86) (−1.04, 0.30) (0.98, 1.78) (−0.39, 0.06)
War2:Defense2 0.02 0.04∗ −0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(−0.01, 0.04) (−0.004, 0.08) (−0.03, −0.01) (0.004, 0.02)
Observations 1041 800 3256 2170
Log-likelihood -830.64 -599.07 -1496.83 -2048.66
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Figure 2.3: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values. y-axis in panel (a) and (b) denotes unconditional probabilities of concession and
backing down respectively. y-axis in panel (c) denotes the differences between posterior
and prior probabilities (beliefs): negative (positive) values indicate the target downgrade
(upgrade) her belief on the likelihood of the challenger being resolute. y-axis in panel (d)
denotes conditional probabilities of war.
the following interpretation focuses primarily on the general pattern, instead of the
substantial changes of probabilities.
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The direct impact of economic dependence is plotted in Figure 2.3 (a). As a
target’s economic vulnerability deepens, it becomes more likely to concede. This
impact indirectly rearranges the challenger’s incentives. Specifically, more irresolute
challengers are attracted to issue a threat, meaning when their threats are resisted
they would be more likely to back down. As such, the likelihood of deception rises as
the target’s dependence increases, as shown in Figure 2.3 (b).
In contrast to these two pairs of positive relationship, trade dependence’s impacts
on the credibility of a threat and war are both negative. Figure 2.3 (c) shows the
change of belief. The value of belief updating is composed by deducting the prior belief
of the challenger being resolute from the posterior belief. The negative values indicate
the target always downgrades the credibility of a threat that exploits her economic
vulnerability. Moreover, as this vulnerability increases, the threat’s credibility drops
further. Despite this lack of credibility, the pacifying impact of dependence still
persists. As shown in Figure 2.3 (d), the odds of war are invariably reduced as the
target’s dependence deepens.
The confidence intervals of all four pairs of relationship widen as the level of
trade dependence rises. This can be attributed to the nature of the data — I do not
have many cases where a state’s trade is heavily dependent upon a specific country.
Therefore, the estimation for higher levels of dependence is less certain. However,
these pairs of relationship do offer support to the four hypotheses derived earlier. In
short, economic dependence decreases the likelihood of war despite a heavier cloud of
deception. This is because the bargaining environment allows states to inform and
coerce simultaneously. When states are informed a threat is less credible, they do not
resist more under the context of economic dependence because the exact informational
mechanism is coupled with a coercive counterpart.
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2.4.1 Robustness Checks
To make sure that the results are not driven by arbitrary choices of either data or op-
erationalization, I perform a number of robustness checks. I use (a) the International
Crisis Behavior data to generate an alternative set of dependent variables, (b) the
UN general assembly voting data to generate a different status quo variable, (c) the
trade share measurement to proxy economy dependence, (d) the dependence mea-
surement without weighing the trade network, (e) alternative weights and centrality
measurement for the trade networks. I show some of the results in model 2 to 4 in
Table 2.2.26 The general pattern is confirmed by most results: a target’s economic
dependence simultaneously encourages deception and concession. Relatedly, it also
promotes peace despite a lower credibility of threats.
2.4.2 Dual Functions of Economic Interdependence
Combined with the existing wisdom in commercial peace literature, the above results
suggest inflicting or enduring economic costs on oneself signals resolve and can con-
vince irresolute adversaries to quit, while imposing costs on an opponent can test
the target’s determination and nudges it toward acquiescence despite possible lack of
credibility. This does not necessarily indicate leaders should or will ignore the nega-
tive impact on credibility.27 One practical way to complement economic coercion is
to increase the publicity. China, for instance, publicly destroyed 35 tons of Philippine
bananas in March 2016 in response to the latter’s claim of the South China Sea dis-
26More details and plots can be found in the appendix.
27Nor does it suggest economic coercion will always succeed. What I have argued is
about the marginal effect: with higher economic costs targets are relatively more likely
to concede. Since some targets are resolute and economic costs are not unbounded
(see Appendix A.1), coercion failure and further escalation are always possible.
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pute in the International Court of Arbitration.28 If China were only concerned about
the coercive effect, then this publicity is meaningless.
More broadly, when states flex their economic muscles, the strategic calculations
are not solely about either coercion or signal. First, imposing and enduring economic
costs are two sides of the same coin. That is, when a challenger seeks to coerce, its
target can endure the costs to signal resolve. For instance, when South Korea agreed
to install the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in 2017, China
rallied nation-wide support to divert its tourists and boycott South Korea’s stores
and products. By some estimates, Chinese sanctions cost South Korea around 0.5
percent of its GDP, much higher than Beijing thereof (around 0.02 percent).29 To be
sure, the coercive effects are substantial: South Korea companies and citizens eagerly
urged the government to end the spat.30 However, Seoul chose to endure the economic
and political pressure. This in turn convinced China that South Korea was resolute
on the issue and prodded Beijing to blink latter that year31.
Second, states typically evaluate the informational and coercive impact concur-
rently. Consider Britain’s reaction toward U.S. coercion during the Suez Crisis. If the
impact of denying London’s access to IMF were purely coercive, then Britain should
not have retreated, at least not immediately. Indeed, Britain’s capacity and willing-
ness to endure the economic disruption was genuine: when Macmillan was informed
on the threats of the balance of payments, he convinced himself that Britain was
28http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/976372.shtml, accessed on 17 Sep 2018.
29See https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-07/
chinas-rapprochement-south-korea, accessed 17 Sep 2018.
30See https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-koreas-companies-eager-for-
end-to-costly-spat-with-china-1509544012, accessed 17 Sep 2018.
31See https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/world/asia/china-south-
korea-thaad.html, accessed 17 Sep 2018.
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‘pretty well armed for Suez.’ In late October, the prime minister told his colleagues
that he expected to lose $300 million and his government’s policy was to see things
through (Turner, 2014, p.119). On the eve of British retreat, there was no immediate
need for Britain to draw the Fund. In fact, pressure on sterling had eased, which
might have been further improved if the Canal were captured (Fforde, 1992).
Although this does not suggest the coercive effect was immaterial, it does showcase
it was not the only factor in play. In particular, the recognization of U.S. true intention
played an important role. Prior to the crisis, British leaders mistakenly believed that
they would have U.S. support (without which they also firmly believed would end the
military course). Even after Eisenhower’ clear correspondence and the deployment
of the Sixth Fleet, they still retained the belief that the U.S. would not oppose. At
worst, the U.S. would ‘lament publicly and do nothing’ (Steed, 2016, p.67). The
misinformation was further amplified by Downing Street’s inclination to interpret
‘what they wanted to hear’ from their American counterparts’ statements (McCourt,
2014, p.70). U.S. warnings were read as a possible acceptance of a fait accompli, if
delivered speedily. Although denying IMF access did not bear immediate coercive
impact, the willingness of U.S. to publicly threaten the economic exchange with a
critical ally updated the prime minister prior belief and convinced him that Amercian
goodwill ‘could not be obtained’ without an immediate cease-fire and retreat (Turner,
2014, p.123).32
32In fact, some studies suggest Macmillan may have intentionally made false state-




I have argued that the bargaining environment of economic interdependence allows
states to inform and coerce simultaneously. This is important because the field has
been interpreting the two as opposing mechanisms: states can either inform or coerce,
but not both. Focusing on target states’ vulnerability, I argue neither mechanism can
dominate. Specifically, if commercial peace works solely via the signaling channel,
then a higher level of economic dependence can indicate a less credible threat, re-
sulting in more conflict escalation and bloodshed. I argue this is not the case in the
context of economic dependence because a coercive channel parallels the informa-
tional one. The exact factor that indicates a lower credibility also constrains, leading
to a lower likelihood of escalation and bloodshed. Analogously, if economic depen-
dence only coerces, then imposing economic losses on oneself makes little sense as it
would only drain away one’s bargaining leverage. Therefore, instead of debating the
merits of either theory, we should interpret the opportunity costs and costly signaling
theories as two parallel mechanisms.
My theory also reveals the nuances of the informational mechanism: credibility
itself does not dictate states’ decision over conflict escalation. It also depends on the
sources that generate the uncertainty and propel the belief updating process. In the
context of economic dependence, self-inflicted costs increase the credibility of threats,
resulting in a lower likelihood of conflict escalation. In this scenario, higher (lower)
credibility is associated with less (more) conflict. In contrast, the association between
credibility and conflict is reversed when it comes to imposed costs: imposing economic
pains on a target forces it to concede, despite a lower credibility.
That said, additional research is still needed. To begin with, the structural esti-
mation method is an indirect way of testing the information updating process. While
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it reveals how states should rationally revise their belief, it is still a step away from
what they do in reality. Further research, such as an experimental design, can pro-
vide a closer look at the informational mechanism. Second, given states and leaders
typically seek to impose asymmetrically higher costs on an adversary while reducing
or avoiding costs on themselves (Dafoe and Kelsey, 2014; Gartzke and Westerwinter,
2016), an important question in order is how does imposing asymmetric costs affect
the prospect of peace?33 That is, there are two opposing forces: (a) reducing one’s
economic pains reveals lack of resolve, incentivizes resistance, and stokes conflict and
(b) imposing higher economic costs on a target induces concession and suppresses
conflict. Exactly how do the two forces interact is beyond the scope of this chapter.
However, if we consider both the coercive and informational functions of economic
ties, the effects of asymmetric dependence on conflict are not monotonic and deserve
further investigation (Crescenzi, 2003b).
Third, other factors such as time and reputation have been abstracted away in
this chapter. However, it is critical to study how they interact and modify states’
strategic calculations. For instance, when North Korea stepped up its nuclear am-
bitions in late 2017, China imposed substantial sanctions against the regime.34 In
response, Kim Jong-un effectively dialed back its hostile stance against the U.S. and
South Korea. Although no observers can be sure of the reasonings in Kim’s mind,
my theory suggests he would question Chinese leaders’ resolve. Although he bowed
to the immediate economic pressure, he would likely continue his nuclear ambitions
33Relately, asymmetric costs also work in tandem with vulnerability. Future studies
can model and examine how third parties affect the strategic interactions as well
as how outside factors such as alliance interact with states’ interdependence and
economic vulnerability.
34See https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-finally-feels-the-
sting-of-international-sanctions-1519923280, accessed 17 Sep 2018.
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while expecting China easing the pinch over time. The crisis bargaining model in this
chapter focus on the short-term immediate effect of coercion and cannot address the
trade-off between short-term concessions and long-term benefits. Relatedly, reputa-
tional effects can kick in as we consider the impact of time: leaders may intentionally
choose a suboptimal strategy in order not to invite future coercion from other states
(Crescenzi, 2007; Peterson, 2013). That said, this chapter suggests when examining
these further extensions (asymmetry, time, and reputation) we should consider the
coercive and signaling mechanisms jointly.
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Chapter 3
Binding Time verse Timely Retreat
The previous chapter suggests without considering the impact of time, the effects
of increased economic dependence is always peace-promoting. When we incorporate
the time factor, however, it is not clear whether and how trade can affect conflict
duration/termination. On the one hand, economic dependence may have little impact
— a conflict broken out means the failure of trade’s restraining effect. Alas, conflict
outbreak can also be an exercise of economic statecraft. States opt to enter conflicts
believing in their power to coerce or to endure coercion, which may suggest either
shorter or longer conflict duration. These contradictory predictions are puzzling and
call for further investigation. Addressing states’ calculation beyond the conflict onset
stage is also critical to the development of a coherent theory, as conflict initiation
is intimately tied to its termination (Wagner, 2000; Ramsay, 2008). To further the
current studies of commercial peace, we need to explain whether and how economic
dependence affects states’ decision over conflict termination, which feeds back to their
calculation over conflict initiation in the first place.
One simple explanation is states that suffer asymmetrically higher economic costs
have lower bargaining leverage; as this asymmetry increases the disadvantaged states
will have to quit conflicts faster. However, this theory appears to miss important parts
of states’ incentives during crisis bargaining. As mentioned in the chapter 1, when
South Korea agreed to install the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
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system in early 2017, China organized a nation-wide embargo against South Korean
products and companies. It was estimated that China’s retaliation cost South Korea’s
economy .5% of its GDP, around 25 times that of China’s own costs. But later
that year, it was China who blinked first and abruptly changed course to patch up
the relationship. As another example, during the recent trade war with the U.S.,
China suffered proportionally higher costs.1 Alas, Chinese leaders have not changed
their offer ever since early 2017 and believed that Trump was ‘either misinformed or
bluffing’ (Nathan, 2019).2 If bargaining leverage is purely predicated on abilities to
endure costs, then the fact that states suffering asymmetrically higher costs refuse to
budge and states facing proportionally lower losses blink first are rather puzzling.
In this chapter, I use a war of attrition model (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Powell,
2017) to formalize the relationship between economic dependence and conflict dura-
tion. The model suggests under the bargaining environment of interdependence the
optimal timing for states to quit conflicts is dictated by their relative economic costs,
i.e. the ratio of the two sides’ economic costs. This is because essentially there are two
countervailing forces at work: (a) longer conflicts mean more economic disruption,
which incentivizes states to cut losses in time and (b) holding out a bit longer could
bring potential higher rewards in that an adversary is more likely to quit after an
additional round of economic attrition. The strategic calculation ultimately comes
1By June 2019, the U.S. has imposed tariffs on $250 billion worth of imports from
China. In comparison, China has imposed on $110 billion worth of imports from
the U.S. Measured in terms of aggregate welfare loss, China also suffered more. See
Robinson and Thierfelder (2019).
2At the time of writing, China and the U.S. reached a limited deal to halt the
trade war. But China did not concede to America’s demand for long-term economic
changes. See Mauldin, Wei and Leary (2019).
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down to comparing both sides’ costs and weighing the trade-off between biding one’s
time and retreating timely.
More importantly, the model suggests that economic dependence can have both
coercive and informational effects and these effects are contingent on issue salience,
i.e. how much states value a disputed good. For low salience issues, the incentive
to cut losses in time dominates: as states’ relative economic costs rise they quit
conflicts earlier. In contrast, for high salience issues, the incentive to bide one’s time
dictates: states hold out longer despite suffering more. This is because by holding
out a bit longer, states can signal to an opponent about their determination and
nudge the adversary to quit earlier. This incremental possibility of winning the good
is attractive when the issue salience is high enough, resulting in a weaker incentive
to quit.
The study closest to mine is Krustev (2006), which also uses an attrition model and
shows that economic losses can remain high resulting in shorter conflicts. However,
our studies differ in several important aspects: (a) he assumes complete information
while I assume incomplete information, (b) he assumes symmetric economic costs
while I relax this assumption, and (c) he argues economic disruption shortens conflicts
while I argue it is contingent on issue salience — the effect of costly signaling can kick
in and prolong conflicts when the stakes are high enough. In the following section, I
will argue in detail why making the assumptions of (a) and (b), which leads to the
argument in (c), is more appropriate and tallies better with the existing wisdom on
trade and conflict.
In this regard, this chapter contributes to both the economic interdependence lit-
erature and formal studies of conflict. In the former field, this chapter furthers the
research on conflict duration informing the previous studies on asymmetric depen-
dence and conflict initiation. More broadly, this chapter extends the scope condition
37
of a game theoretic wisdom, i.e. states can use self-imposed costs to signal resolve
(Fearon, 1995; Schultz, 2001a; Slantchev, 2011) and hence have incentives to hold
out longer in conflicts (Smith and Stam, 2004; Langlois and Langlois, 2009; Fearon,
2013), and shows that it also applies in the context of economic interdependence.
The chapter proceeds as follows. I first review the related work in both trade-
conflict studies and formal models related to attrition. I apply a war of attrition
model with economic interdependence to derive two relevant hypotheses, which are
then tested with survival analysis. Finally, I conclude with the implications and
limitations.
3.1 Trade and Conflict Duration
Trade-conflict studies focus on economic interdependence’s impact in suppressing
conflict initiation and promoting peace (Oneal and Russet, 1997; Hegre, Oneal and
Russett, 2010; cf. Barbieri, 1996). Two primary theories have been proposed: (a)
the opportunity costs theory argues potential costs of economic disruption restrain
states (Polachek, 1980; Polachek and Xiang, 2010) and (b) the costly signaling theory
contends additional economic costs can help signal resolve and facilitate credible
communication (Morrow, 1999; Gartzke, Li and Boehmer, 2001). Regardless of the
specific mechanism, both theories agree the pacifying effect of commerce is often
limited to cases of symmetric dependence: asymmetry can undermine the commercial
peace either because it galvanizes coercion (Barbieri, 1996; Peterson, 2014) or that it
sabotages credible communication (Gartzke and Westerwinter, 2016).
Meanwhile, formal theories of conflict show that conflict initiation is inherently
related to its termination (Wagner, 2000; Ramsay, 2008). For instance, if incomplete
information stokes conflict (Fearon, 1995), then scholars need to explain how the
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convergence of previously private information can help facilitate conflict termination
(Powell, 2004a; Smith and Stam, 2004; Slantchev, 2003b; Wagner, 2000). Analogously,
if economic interdependence and symmetry do promote peace, then scholars need to
explain whether and how they affect states’ calculation over how long to persist in
conflict.
Unfortunately, this critical question has been insufficiently investigated. To my
knowledge, only Krustev (2006) examines the relationship between economic inter-
dependence and conflict duration. The article uses a war of attrition model, which
has been gaining popularity in recent studies of conflict (Acharya and Grillo, 2015;
Powell, 2017). Under the rationale of attrition, states bide their time hoping the
adversary will cave in a step sooner (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Belligerents care-
fully weigh each sides’ costs and incentives to quit, juggling between cutting losses
in time and holding out for the possibility of winning the prize. This logic helps
explain why states delay negotiation (Langlois and Langlois, 2009). It also explains
why weak states enter and endure in conflicts they have little chance of winning.
Slantchev (2003a) synthesizes this idea by arguing states’ bargaining power resides in
their ability to impose and endure costs.
The choice of applying the logic of attrition to study economic interdependence
and conflict duration is appropriate. Typically, belligerents endure substantial eco-
nomic losses during conflicts (Long, 2008; Glick and Taylor, 2010). While minimizing
their own sufferings, states intentionally exacerbate opponents’ economic difficulties
(Slantchev, 2003a; Dafoe and Kelsey, 2014). This underlying reasoning tallies well
with the logic of attrition: by biding time and enduring an additional round of costs
states trade for the potential reward that the adversary will concede in the near
future.
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That said, the study by Krustev (2006) is still lacking in two aspects. First, it
assumes symmetric dependence and hence cannot address the question of how asym-
metry affects conflict duration. This question is critical not least because the existing
literature has argued that asymmetry stokes conflict (Barbieri, 1996; Peterson, 2014).
In other words, for conflicts that actually break out and endure, one should typically
expect asymmetric dependence. Relatedly, assuming symmetry also deviates from
the reality that states seek to impose asymmetric costs on their adversaries (Dafoe
and Kelsey, 2014).
Second, the model in Krustev (2006), essentially the same one in Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991, 119-126), has one substantial limitation even when we assume asymmet-
ric costs. The model predicts resolved states cave in faster than unresolved ones: all
else equal, states with a higher value of the disputed good quit faster than their coun-
terparts who value the good less.3 This is questionable in that by definition we expect
resolved states to be willing in bearing costs and holding out longer. The model’s
deficiency can be attributed to its assumption of complete information, which both
deviates from the canonical rational explanation of war (Fearon, 1995) and weakens
Krustev (2006)’s critique against the costly signaling theory in commercial liberalism.
To further the trade-conflict studies, a model that can incorporate both asym-
metric costs and incomplete information is in order. There are many other attrition
models to choose from. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) introduce an attrition model
with incomplete information. Fearon (1994b) builds on the model to show how relative
audience costs matter in interstate crisis bargaining. Langlois and Langlois (2009)
show that states can use relatively higher costs to showcase their determination and
3See the course note by Levin (2004).
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hence compel opponents to concede. Powell (2017) adds a third player into the model
and demonstrates how cost ratio affects decisions over conflict intervention.
At least two relevant lessons can be gleaned from these formal studies. First,
relative costs matter more than absolute costs. This idea is intuitive. For instance, a
state can suffer a lot when confronting a major trade partner. However, if the partner
suffers proportionally more, then the former will be motivated to hold out longer given
the opponent is under heavier pressure to quit. Relatedly, this suggests the process of
globalization does not necessarily shorten conflicts. Although deeper integration can
increase costs for all belligerents, states do not necessarily have stronger incentives
to quit. If an opponent’s costs increase at a faster pace than mine, then it makes
sense to hold out longer since the opponent’s pressure to quit also increases (and
probably at a faster pace). Again, this is a question that current literature of economic
interdependence and conflict duration cannot address.4
Second, incomplete information plays an important role in the above-mentioned
models. After all, if one buys into informational explanations of war (Fearon, 1995),
then they should expect problems of asymmetric information to persist in and possibly
be solved (or sufficiently mitigated) by the conflict process (Slantchev, 2003b). In the
above models, states are not sure of an opponent’s true resolve. As such, they use
the attrition mechanism to gauge it: states willingly endure asymmetrically higher
costs are more likely to be determined. In other words, imposing (bearing) costs is a
means to test (signal) private information.
These two lessons address nicely the limitations in the existing literature of eco-
nomic interdependence and conflict duration. In the next section, I adopt a war of
attrition model that incorporates both asymmetric costs and incomplete information.
4Specifically, the relative costs in Krustev (2006) are constant, always equal to 1.
Therefore, the importance of asymmetric costs is overlooked.
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I focus on how economic dependence, in combination with incomplete information,
affects states’ intentionally choices over quitting conflicts.
3.2 The Attrition Model
Two states, 1 and 2, compete over a disputed good, which could be issues like territory
or policy concession. Time proceeds in a continuous fashion and each player decides
how long to hold out. So long as they fight, the normal economic interaction between
the two is disrupted and each player suffers economic costs in proportion to their
economic dependence on the opponent bi, where i ∈ (1, 2).5 If one player gives up,
the other wins the good, allowing her to reap a payoff of θi.
The private information in the model is θi, capturing the valuation (of which the
opponent is uncertain) each state places on the disputed good. This is interpreted as
the issue salience; states with higher valuation of the disputed good are more willing to
suffer the costs and hold out longer. Write θi’s cumulative distribution function as Pi
and its density function as P ′i . I further assume Pi follows an exponential distribution:
Pi(θi) = 1−exp(−θi/σi), where σi captures the variance of the distribution. One can
interpret σi as the level of uncertainty: a higher value of σi represents a wider range
of distribution. As such, the opponent is less certain of his estimation of θi.
5Other forms of costs, such as military casualties, are also important. I do not
directly model the impact of military costs for two reasons. First, I choose to simplify
given my focus on economic attrition. Introducing the impact of military costs can
further complicate the relationship. For instance, battlefield losses (or victories) can
update states’ expectation of winning over time (Reiter, 2009). Second, I want to
speak to cases where there is little or low prospect of direct military conflict but
economic losses are substantial.
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Write state i’s choice of timing as ti and his opponent’s choice as tj, his payoff ui
can be written as the following function
ui =

−tibi, if tj ≥ ti
θi − tjbi, if tj < ti
where if state i quits earlier than j, his payoff is negative (−tibi). Holding out longer
than the opponent allows him to collect the good and only pay economic costs up till
his opponent quits (θi − tjbi). This is the basic war of attrition model in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991, 119-126), which is also utilized by Krustev (2006). In contrast to
the latter (which assumes symmetric dependence, i.e. bi = bj), I differentiate each
side’s economic costs. I also add the assumption of incomplete information (θi). In
the previous section, I have argued these two assumptions are more appropriate and
tally better with the existing literature. In the following section, I demonstrate how
these two assumptions lead to more nuanced results.6
3.2.1 Equilibrium
The solution of this game is that of pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Player
i’s strategy si is a mapping from its own type θi to a choice of timing ti. The ex ante
payoff for player i is






6I do not claim building an innovative model there. As mentioned previously, there
are many attrition models involving both incomplete information and different costs.
My aim is to introduce a model to the field of economic interdepedence. My model
and solutions follow closely with both Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, 219) and Powell
(2017). For an attrition model that incorporates bargaining over time, see Langlois
and Langlois (2009). The main implication, i.e. willingly endure costs can signal
resolve and increase opponent’s likelihood of acquisition, still holds. Their model
further shows that the attrition rationale can incentivize states to keep on fighting
without offering a serious bargaining deal.
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where Pr(tj ≥ ti) denotes the probability that player j holds out longer than i. Write
Φi(ti) as the inverse of si. That is, it maps from the choice of timing ti to the type θi
(Φi(ti) = θi). The above function can be rewritten as








To maximize this payoff, a given type θi needs to choose a ti such that the marginal
benefits equate the marginal costs. That is, he chooses a ti such that the first order
condition (FOC) of Ui equals 0.










Analogously, we have a similar equation after maximizing player j’s payoff. Af-
ter rearranging terms and solving the differential equation, we have the following
equilibrium7
Proposition 2. In the economic attrition model, the optimal time8 for state i to hold






where A is an arbitrary positive constant and α = bi/bj, β = σj/σi.
7Some readers may be concerned that the equilibrium does not directly address
conflict initiation directly. However, if a factor moves the optimal timing of conflict
duration toward 0 (which means states either do not initiate conflicts or cave in
immediately), then it indicates this factor may also suppress conflict initiation. For
a formal treatment, see Fearon (1994a).
8Assuming the type that values the good at 0 quits immediately. This assumption
is intuitive and does not affect the comparative statics even if relaxed.
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3.2.2 Cost ratio, issue salience, and asymmetric dependence
The first implication of Equation (T1) is intuitive and straightforward: the higher
a state values the disputed good (θi), the longer it tends to hold out. This stands
in stark contrast to the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in Krustev (2006).
Specifically, the latter equilibrium implies states with a higher valuation of the good
quit at a faster pace than those with a lower valuation.9 The primary driver is the
assumption of complete information, which when relaxed reverses the results.
That said, Equation (T1) presents us with a more nuanced relationship between
cost ratio and conflict duration, which can be examined by α’s comparative statics






A(αβ + 1)2 ((αβ + 1) ln θi − 1) (CS1)
This equation suggests the impact of cost ratio is contingent on how much states
value the disputed good, i.e. issue salience. If state i does not value the good much




contrast, if he values the disputed good high enough (θi > e1/(αβ+1)), then he will
hold out longer as the relative costs increase (∂si
∂α
> 0).
This is because high issue salience can compensate for the costs of attrition. By
holding out longer, a high salience type can ratchet up the opponent’s belief that she
is more likely to be facing a determinant opponent and hence nudge her to quit a
bit earlier. This increased possibility of winning the good generates strong enough
9See fn. 3. Specifically, the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium predicts Gi(t) =
1− e−b/θj , where Gi(t) denotes the survival rate of i up till time t and b = bi = bj. If
θj > θi, then Gj < Gi.
10Here and throughout the chapter, I focus on individual states’ choices. Ideally,
one would prefer also testing the implications on overall conflict duration, which are
more intricated and may also require more involved modeling (see fn. 5 and fn. 11).
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incentives for the high salience type exactly because the issue is so valuable to him.
In comparison, a low salience type does not value the good much. The incremental
benefit of holding out longer (i.e. tricking an opponent into believing that he values
the good more) is not worth the price of economic disruption. In this case, the
incentive to cut losses in time dominates. Therefore, I have the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 5. All else equal, states are less likely to quit a high salience conflict
(θi > e1/(αβ+1)) as their relative economic costs increase.
Hypothesis 6. All else equal, states are more likely to quit a low salience conflict
(θi < e1/(αβ+1)) as their relative economic costs increase.
Before discussing the impact of asymmetric dependence, allow me to emphasize
that cost ratio, α = bi/bj, is not equal to asymmetry. For instance, if α < 1, then
increasing α can move the relationship toward symmetry. If α > 1, then increasing α
reduces symmetry. Again, the impact of asymmetry is contingent on issue salience.
For low salience types, if they are the relatively independent party (α < 1), then
increasing asymmetry (reducing α) nudges them to hold out longer. If they are the
relatively dependent party (α > 1), they tend to give in earlier as the asymmetry
increases. In contrast, the effect for high salience types is reversed. As they suffer
proportionally higher costs (α > 1), increasing asymmetry means the signaling im-
pact grows stronger and these types become more willing to hold out. If they suffer
comparatively less (α < 1), then increasing asymmetry means the signaling impact
is weaker.
Therefore, asymmetry can either prolong or shorten conflicts, depending on both
sides’ issue salience. As an illustration, imagine a situation where a high salience
type faces a low one. If he suffers more than the opponent (α > 1), then increasing
asymmetry encourages both sides to hold out longer. In contrast, if the high salience
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type suffers relatively less (α < 1), then increasing asymmetry means both sides
will quit earlier. As this incentive grows stronger, states may choose not to initiate
conflicts in the first place. Such a result ties back to the possibility that asymmetry
can constrain states and depress conflict initiation (Crescenzi, 2003b).
To empirically examine these nuanced effects of asymmetry would require an in-
volved model that incorporates several layers of interaction.11 However, given the
primary driver here is cost ratio, testing Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6 should give
sufficient support or contradiction to the above-mentioned rationale.
3.3 Research design
To test the hypotheses, I apply survival analysis on interstate conflict duration. The
unit of analysis is state-conflict. This is because (a) implications derived from the
formal model are monadic and (b) the two primary factors, cost ratio and issue
salience, vary within a dyad. In particular, states can value the same issue quite
differently and hence have divergent incentives regarding conflict termination. In
terms of estimation method, I choose the Cox proportional hazard model, given its
flexibility as compared to parametric models and its popularity within the political
science community (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).
3.3.1 Dependent variable
The dependent variable is states’ conflict duration, defined as the days elapse before a
state quits a conflict. I use the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data (1918-2015),
which record international crises with ‘high probability of involvement in military
11An additional challenge is how we define the cutoff point of 1 (i.e. two states
suffer exactly the same costs) empirically given states value the same economic tie
quite differently.
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hostilities’ (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000; Brecher et al., 2017). Although the data
cover a smaller range of conflict than alternative ones such as the Militarized Interstate
Dispute (MID) data, I find it a reasonable choice to test the conditional effect of issue
salience.12 Within each crisis, I measure how long states hold out by the number of
days between the perception of a crisis triggered and its termination for each state.
For robustness checks, I also rerun the estimation using the MID data, with similar
results for models with time interaction.
Given my focus is on a state’s intentional choice to quit, the concern about cen-
sored observation is substantial. Typically, within a dyad if one state quits, then the
crisis ends and we cannot observe the counterfactual of when the other state will quit.
With this in mind, I use the form of a crisis’ outcome and states’ evaluation of the
outcome to capture censorship. Specifically, a state is coded as intentionally quitting
if (a) the outcome is compliance or (b) the outcome is voluntary agreement or tacit
understanding but the state is not satisfied with the outcome. The rest of the cases
consist of outcomes where we cannot observe whether a state will voluntarily choose
to quit because (a) states win the bargain (i.e. reach a deal they are happy with) and
(b) a crisis ends due to unilateral action, imposition, intervention, or the crisis fades
out. I code these cases as censored.13 This way, I compile a list of days before a state
quits a crisis, with the censorship status of each observation. As an illustration, I
present the Kaplan–Meier plot in Figure 3.1, which shows that on average states are
more likely to quit high salience issues (panel (a)). In addition, they are more likely
12The current dataset includes 476 international crises. It may be desirable to
include more low salience conflicts. However, they are typically less recorded. One
may suggest using event data, but identifying duration and salience of each specific
event is no less challenging. Given the focus on testing the contingent effect of (high)
issue salience, I find the choice of using ICB appropriate.
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Figure 3.1: Plots of Kaplan–Meier Survival Curve. The x-axis denotes days in conflict
while the y-axis denotes the probability of survival. The cost ratio variable in panel (b) is
dichotomized by 1 (i.e. cost ratio greater than 1 counted as high).
to quit if they suffer relatively more (panel (b)), though the difference tapers off as a
conflict prolongs.
3.3.2 Independent variables
The first key independent variable is the ratio of economic costs. Trade partners value
the same amount of trade differently. Recent studies suggest there are at least three
important factors to consider. First, states that are more integrated into global trade
networks can more easily find alternative markets and are therefore less vulnerable
to economic coercion (Maoz, 2009; Dorussen and Ward, 2010; Peterson, 2011). In
line with recent development of network analysis, I use the closeness measurement to
proxy how integrated a state is in the trade networks (Kinne, 2012, 2014; Zeng, 2019).
Second, the restraining effect of trade varies across different commodities. Dorussen
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(2006) shows that the pacifying effect of trade is stronger for manufactured goods but
weaker for goods that are easily appropriable. Goenner (2010) shows that strategic
goods such as energy, non-ferrous metals, and electronics can even stoke conflict.
Third, the impact of import and export also differ. Kleinberg, Robinson and French
(2012) argue that leaders could be more sensitive to concentration of export markets
than import suppliers thereof. Chatagnier and Kavaklı (2017) show that competition
in export markets can increase the likelihood of conflict. Akoto, Peterson and Thies
(2019) show that states that can easily replace lost imports with domestic products
can better endure economic coercion.
Taking all three factors into account, I use the United Nations’ Comtrade data
(1962-2014) to categorize different commodities. I follow Goenner (2010) and identify
strategic commodities as including energy, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, electronics,
nuclear materials, and armaments.14 In the main model, I use four types of commodity
(imports and exports of strategic vs. nonstrategic commodities). For each type
of commodity, I generate closeness measurement accounting for the possibility of
disconnected network by country-year using the tnet package (version 3.0.14) in R.
I weigh the trade value of the above four types of commodity by their respec-
tive trade network closeness measures. Specifically, I follow Zeng (2019) and take
the product of trade value and the exponential of the negative value of closeness
(trade*exp(-closeness)). This way, I can capture the idea that states that are
more integrated in global trade networks of a given commodity would value the re-
spective commodity’s trade relatively less. By aggregating these weighted values, I
obtain a measurement of each state’s potential economic costs with each trade part-
14In the appendix, I rerun the estimation using a more refined measure by differ-
entiating whether a nonstrategic commodity is a manufactured product or not. I use
the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) four-digit level data given its























Figure 3.2: Density Plots of Economic Costs and Cost Ratio. The x-axis denotes the
values of the respective variable while the y-axis denotes its density.
ner. I then take the ratio of a state’s economic costs and the target’s economic costs to
generate a measure of cost ratio.15 Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the economic
costs and cost ratio variables. The left panel plots economic costs for all possible
trade partners, which have lots of values that are 0 or close to 0. This skewness is
reduced in the cost ratio variable.16
The other key independent variable is issue salience, which is used to interact with
cost ratio to test the conditional effects in the hypotheses. There are two possible
15To avoid dividing 0, I add the smallest positive floating-point number
(double.eps) to the denominator. This operationalization aims at capturing α (i.e.
b1/b2) in Proposition 2. For robustness check, I try adding 1 instead of double.eps
and the results are substantially similar.
16In the appendix, I list the trade partners with 0 economic costs. I also rerun
the models using a different version of Comtrade data that fills unreported or under-
reported trade with partners’ reports.
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proxies in the ICB data: the gravity variable measures the gravest threat an actor
perceives during a crisis while the issue variable identifies the most important initial
issue area perceived by an actor. I choose the gravity variable because it varies within
a dyad. That is, in a given crisis, gravity can capture how two sides value the same
issue differently while the issue variable cannot. As an illustration, for the crisis
between Russian and Georgia in 2004, the gravity variable show that Russia saw the
crisis as a limited military threat while Georgia saw it as a territorial threat. In
comparison, the issue variable cannot capture this variation and assigns both sides as
dealing with the same military-security issue.
The gravity variable has 8 different values, which the codebook caution should not
be viewed as a true scale. To address this limitation, I recode this variable into two
levels. The high salience issue involves threats to existence or grave damage (value
5 and 6), threats to regional or international system (4), and territorial threats (3).
The low salience issue encompasses the rest (value 0, 1, 2, and 7). The ICB codebook
also stresses that territorial threats could vary in the seriousness. Hence, it is possible
that some of these threats might not be salient enough. That said, I also rerun the
estimation without counting territorial threats as high salience and the results are
substantially similar.
As for control variables, I include those that affect both economic costs and conflict
duration and/or are strongly suggested by the attrition model. I code whether both
states are democracies by using the Polity IV measurement (Marshall, Jaggers and
Gurr, 2002) given democratic peers can communicate more credibly (Fearon, 1994a;
Schultz, 1999) and tend to trade more with each other (Gartzke, 2007; Mousseau,
2013). If both states’ polity scores are higher than 5, the joint democracy variable is
coded as 1. Otherwise, it is coded as 0. I control for geographic distance using direct
contiguity data (v 3.2, Stinnett et al., 2002) given states trade and fight less often
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with distant counterparts. I control for a state’s power by using the Composite Index
of National Capability (CINC) score (v 5.0, Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972) given
powerful states tend to be more capable of shouldering economic costs and holding
out in conflicts. I control for the number of outside alliance pacts a state has from
the Formal Alliance dataset (v 4.1, Gibler, 2009) given they can affect both sides’
calculation of costs and expectation of winning. I calculate both the power ratio and
defense pact ratio variables by the contest success function.
3.3.3 Time varying covariates
It is problematic to assume the independent variables stay the same throughout a
conflict. For instance, a state’s level of democracy or power may change over time.
Such possibilities are often overlooked in empirical studies. However, ignoring or im-
properly coding the time-varying covariates can seriously bias the results (Therneau,
Crowson and Atkinson, 2017). Given these time-varying covariates are coded by year,
I first generate a data frame that codes the duration variable by yearly increment. I
then merge all independent variables with the data frame. This way, I have a dataset
with independent variables varying by year. For robustness check, I rerun the model
without varying the cost ratio variable over time (using cost ratio 1 year prior to the
conflict).
3.4 Results
Before presenting the main results, I would like to address two potential concerns.
First, some readers may raise the concern of potential dependence within a dyad.
Specifically, should one side quits, the other side’s duration is automatically censored.
To address this concern, I include an additional clustered term by each crisis. This
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adjustment reduces the confidence of the coefficient estimates, but does not change
the main results much. Second, it is worth mentioning that the proportional hazard
assumption which the Cox model relies upon is violated.17 To correct for the violation,
I use a log transformation of time to interact with the variables that violate the
assumption. I select the best fitted model by the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) value18 and show the results in Table 3.1.19
The coefficient estimates for the Cox model represents the log hazard rate, i.e.
the risk of a state quitting intentionally. Typically, we exponentiate the coefficient
estimates and obtain the ratio of hazard when increasing the respective variable by
1 unit. A positive (negative) coefficient results in a ratio larger (smaller) than 1,
indicating an increase (decrease) in the risk. For instance, the coefficient estimate
17The proportional hazard assumption maintains that the relative hazard (i.e. the
conditional probability of states quitting a conflict) is constant over time. I use both
the rank transformation and the ‘km’ transformation of time to run the Schoenfeld
residual test. Using non-transformed time would falsely lead to results suggesting
the proportional hazard assumption holds. See Park and Hendry (2015) for why the
choice of time transformation is critical when testing the assumption, especially when
there is a substantial amount of data being censored or when there are influential
outliers. Both appear to be the case for my data. See the appendix for details. In the
main model, interacting with time does not improve the results of the Schoenfeld test.
This suggests additional caution is needed when interpreting the results. That said,
this potential problem does vary across different model specifications. For instance,
when I rerun the model replacing contiguity with minimum distance, the Schoenfeld
test after time interaction suggests the main variables of interest do not violate the
assumption.
18The log transformation is written as log(time+lam), where lam is a tuning pa-
rameter. Conventional approaches usually assume lam=0. In my model, I allow lam
to vary across different models. Using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) or log
likelihood gives similar results.
19Unlike this conventional approach, Therneau, Crowson and Atkinson (2017) pro-
pose using their time transformation (‘tt’) function, which can correct the bias of
‘looking into the future.’ I also include the results for using this time transformation,
which presents similar, though less significant, results.
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Table 3.1: Cox Regression Results with 95% Confidence Interval, 1962-2014
Days before Quitting
Adjusted Models Original Models
(1) (2) (3)
Cost Ratio 0.236 0.363 0.329
(−0.601, 1.073) (−0.442, 1.168) (−0.487, 1.144)
Salience 0.889∗ 0.770† 0.825†
(0.006, 1.772) (−0.073, 1.613) (−0.009, 1.658)
Cost × Salience 3.008∗ −0.303 −0.953†
(0.290, 5.726) (−2.973, 2.368) (−1.923, 0.016)
Time × Cost Ratio × Salience −0.811∗∗
(−1.402, −0.219)
tt(Cost × Salience) −0.148
(−0.709, 0.413)
Joint Democracy −1.063 −1.156 −1.129
(−3.159, 1.034) (−3.484, 1.172) (−3.401, 1.144)
Contiguity 6.173∗ −2.684† 0.494
(1.422, 10.924) (−5.400, 0.031) (−0.311, 1.299)
Power Ratio −0.272∗∗ −0.222∗ −0.251∗∗
(−0.464, −0.080) (−0.416, −0.028) (−0.438, −0.064)
Defense Ratio −0.362 −0.364 −0.351
(−1.278, 0.553) (−1.340, 0.613) (−1.307, 0.605)




Adjusted Method Time Interaction tt No
BIC 765.99 807.04 808.93
Observations 667 667 667
Log Likelihood −363.568 −384.089 −389.356
Wald Test 50.870∗∗ (df = 9) 43.360∗∗ (df = 9) 29.780∗∗ (df = 7)
Note: †p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
for power ratio in model 1 is -.27. This means as the variable increases by 1 unit,
the hazard becomes exp(-.27) = .76 that of the previous value, i.e the hazard is
reduced by around 24%. This result appears reasonable in that we typically expect
more powerful states to hold out longer.
For variables that involve interaction with time, the interpretation and confidence
interval are less straightforward. As such, I follow Licht (2011)’s advice and use the





























Figure 3.3: First Difference When Increasing Cost Ratio by 1%. First difference
represents the percentage changes in hazard rate, i.e. the conditional probability of a state’s
quitting the crisis. The left panel plots the first difference for different salience types, while
the right panel plots only the high salient issue with the 95% confidence interval.
rate. Specifically, I calculate the percentage change in hazard rate by the following
function
%∆hi(t) = (e(Xj−Xi)(β1+β2ln(t)) − 1) ∗ 100
where %∆hi(t) represents the percentage changes of hazard rate over time, Xj−Xi the
change of variable X from Xi to Xj, β1 the coefficient estimate of variable X without
time interaction, β2 the coefficient estimate of variable X with time interaction, and
t the time variable.20 For the bootstrap process, I draw a sample of the coefficient
20This is taken from Equation (8) in Licht (2011), where the last step of the deriva-
tion appears to miss the negative sign of Xi. Also, for time variable t I use time+lam,
where lam is a tuning parameter selected by the BIC criterion. See fn. 18.
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estimates from the multivariate normal distribution suggested by the Cox model and
calculate the respective first difference from day 1 to day 600. I repeat this process
100 times and obtain the 95% confidence interval.
Following this method, I plot the first difference of increasing the cost ratio by
1% in Figure 3.3.21 The left panel is fitted by Generalized Additive Models (GAM)
smoothing. It suggests for low salience issues, states become slightly more likely to
quit (conditional on the fact that they have not quit at a specific time). This result,
though not statistically significant, does offer suggestive evidence for Hypothesis 6.
For the high salience type, the impact decreases and ultimately reverses sign over
time. The right panel plots the mean and 95% confidence interval of the resampling
results. It shows that after around 200 days, the impact of cost ratio for high salience
types has been reduced to around -1%, meaning as the cost ratio increases by 1%, the
conditional probability of a state’s quitting a crisis in the 200th day drops by around
1%. This corroborates with the main implication of my attrition model: for issues
that are salient enough, states are less likely to quit a conflict as they suffer relatively
higher costs (Hypothesis 5).22
Ruhe (2018) suggests that if the hazard rate changes sign overtime, scholars should
also plot survival curves for correct interpretation of time-varying effects. Given the
first difference (i.e. the percentage change in hazard rate) changes sign, I follow Ruhe
21For illustration purpose, I plot the results for the first 600 hundred days given
the KM plots in Figure 3.1 shows that the survival rates do not change much after 2
years into conflict. Given the pattern does not change, I also only plot the results for
the first 600 days for the survival curves.
22Strictly speaking, the effect kicks in after a certain amount of time, which is
driven by the time interaction. One can interpret the results as due to stronger effect
of uncertainty at the beginning of a conflict. As a conflict persists, states can better
gauge each other’s resolve. That said, model 3 which does not include time varying
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Figure 3.4: Survival Curve When Switching Cost Ratio from .5 to 2. The top (bottom)
two panels plot the survival curves for different types of salience using model with (without)
time interaction. The dyad is set as a contiguous joint democracy with other covariates held
at their medians.
(2018)’s advice and plot the survival curves in Figure 3.4. I choose to compare the
difference when the cost ratio is held at .5 vs. 2 while the other covariates are held
constant. The top (bottom) two panels plot the survival curves for models with
(without) time interaction. The x-axis represents days, while the y-axis represents
survival rates, i.e. conditional probabilities that a state still has not quit at a given
time. Curves higher along the y-axis indicate higher survival rates.
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These plots showcase the impact better: for low salience, increasing the cost ratio
reduces survival rates, i.e. states become more likely to quit. This impact is reversed
for high salience types who choose hold out longer when facing higher costs. Returning
to the economic attrition rationale, this is because as the issue salience becomes high
enough, states benefit more from an opponent’s quitting first. As such, they have
a stronger incentive to utilize their own suffering to signal resolve. Combined with
Figure 3.3, these plots offer strong support for Hypothesis 5.
One might be concerned that it is issue salience rather than cost ratio that drives
the results. If we compare Figure 3.1 (a) with Figure 3.4, we will observe the im-
portance of the conditional effects. In Figure 3.1 (a), states are more likely to quit
high salient conflicts. However, if we compare the top two panels of Figure 3.4, we
see that conditioned on a level of cost ratio, the effects are reversed — states are less
likely to quit high salient crises, particularly when they face higher costs. In other
words, without accounting for cost ratio, we would falsely conclude states will give up
disputed goods they value highly faster than goods they do not care about as much.
In addition to the above-mentioned results, I perform a number of robustness
checks. I rerun the estimation by (a) excluding the control variables, (b) using re-
fined economic costs by further distinguishing whether a nonstrategic commodity is
manufactured good or not, (c) using filled Comtrade data from Center for Interna-
tional Development (2018), (d) using economic costs 1 year prior to each conflict
instead of allowing it to vary over time, (e) replacing the contiguity variable with
minimum distance, (f) excluding territorial threats from high salience issue, (g) using
a different operationalization of cost ratio, (h) excluding cases involving the U.S., (i)
using the MID data. Most results are substantially similar to the main model’s. The
models using ‘tt’ function for adjustment present different results for 2 out of 3 ro-
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bustness checks when using the MID data, though the models using time interaction
present similar results as the main model’s.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I formalize the relationship between economic interdependence and
conflict duration by a war of attrition model. The formalization reveals that the
strategic calculation during economic attrition comes down to the trade-off between
cutting losses in time and biding time for greater rewards. As such, the impact of
economic dependence is contingent on issue salience. States that deem the issue
salience high enough have an incentive to hold out longer even when their relative
economic costs rise. This is due to the underlying attrition mechanism: by holding out
longer, they demonstrate to adversaries that they are more likely to be determinant.
Therefore, their chances of winning the disputed good (i.e. the opponent’s odds of
quitting) increase. As the relative economic costs rise, this informational effect looms
larger, resulting in stronger incentives to hold out. This is an important result which
reveals a different mechanism that current research has overlooked and bridges the
existing trade-conflict studies with formal theories of conflict.
The attrition mechanism can help explain puzzling cases where relatively weaker
states hold out against stronger counterparts. Coming back to the China-South Korea
conflict over THAAD, the theory offered here can help explain why China blinked. By
enduring substantial economic losses, South Korea signaled to China that it valued
the issue highly. In comparison, China did not really regard the issue to be worth
fighting. After six months of attrition, China had a better idea of South Korea’s
determination; the latter’s willingness to endure costs suggested it was more likely
to be of a high salience type (otherwise, most likely it would have quit already).
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Given China’s own valuation of the dispute is limited, it ultimately (and rationally)
chose to cut the losses in time. Analogously, in the trade war with the U.S., one
primary reason China believed Trump was bluffing could be attributed to the latter’s
reluctance to endure costs (e.g. the billions of dollars of aid to U.S. farmers).23
Relatedly, asymmetric dependence can either prolong or shorten conflicts. For in-
stance, if a relatively smaller and more dependent state values an issue high enough,
then it can have an incentive to hold out longer as the asymmetry and its eco-
nomic losses increase since the signaling effect becomes stronger. Additionally, if the
relatively stronger and less dependent counterpart does not value the issue much,
then increasing the asymmetry means its negligible losses drop further, resulting in a
stronger incentive to hold out. Under this condition, rising asymmetry leads to longer
conflict duration. Analogously, if the issue salience is flipped (i.e. the more dependent
state values the issue less), then increasing asymmetry can shorten conflicts.
This chapter also contributes to our understanding on asymmetric dependence
and conflict initiation. Specifically, if under some conditions higher asymmetry incen-
tivizes states to quit earlier, then as this incentive grows stronger it can also suppress
conflict initiation in the first place. In contrast to the current understanding that
asymmetry sabotages the pacifying impact of economic interdependence, the chap-
ter indicates the specific conditions deserve further investigation (Crescenzi, 2003b;
Zeng, 2019). In this regard, the chapter also complements the existing research on
commercial liberalism which has proffered two primary theories of trade’s pacifying
effect: the opportunity costs theory emphasizes the restraining impact of prospective
23Granted, there are other factors at play. In particular, leadership turnover in
South Korea and the potential thereof in the U.S. also played a key role. Zeng (2019)
also notes the signaling effect in the THAAD conflict. However, the mechanism
depicted here is more nuanced: states consistently revise their beliefs over time and
the signaling effects are conditional.
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economic disruption, while the costly signaling theory highlights the signaling bene-
fits of self-imposed costs. I show that both theories can be supported, depending on
the specific bargaining environment.
That said, I do not offer a comprehensive theory here. The above implications
on conflict initiation and asymmetry are not directly tested. The coercive effect
(Hypothesis 6) only has suggestive evidence, probably due to the lack of low-intensity
conflicts recorded in the data. Relatedly, I do not address exactly how selection bias
can kick in for conflict initiation — although I do not expect selection bias to affect
conflicts that have already broken out. I leave out the investigation of various reasons
for states to quit — military costs, battlefield outcomes, and leadership turnover to
name a few. Lastly, regime type may further complicate the relationship in that it
both affects the level of uncertainty and how responsive leaders are to economic losses.
These are all important avenues that future work can pursue.
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Chapter 4
Trade and Shifting Power
The previous chapters have demonstrated how bluffing and attrition incentives can
complicate the relationship between trade and conflict. However, they do not directly
challenge the pacifying effects of increased bilateral trade on conflict initiation. But
history is replete with cases where increasing bilateral trade can stoke (as well as
reduce) conflict,1 the relationship between the U.S. and China being a prominent
recent example. Commercial interests and the related restraining effects were clearly
behind the U.S. policy toward China in the 1990s. Yet in recent years we witness more
tensions simmering on both sides, particularly as their trade talks stall. A special
report by the Economist laments trade can no longer anchor the two’s relationship
and indicates that many strategists on both sides agree the likelihood of a limited
conflict has become higher.2 If trade promotes peace by increasing opportunity costs,
1In this chapter, I focus on bilateral trade to investigate the theoretical foundation
of commercial liberalism. See footnote 8 for extradyadic factors that could weaken
trade’s restraining effects. I focus on costly conflicts which involve the use of force.
And the interpretations are probabilistic. See footnote 4 for examples. Finally, my
discussion assumes countries as unitary actor and does not address the complexities
of how domestic politics affect attitudes toward free trade (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009;
Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2016) or how economic competition can give rise to military
conflict (Chatagnier and Kavaklı, 2017).
2For details, see https://www.economist.com/special-report/2019/
05/18/trade-can-no-longer-anchor-americas-relationship-with-china
and https://www.economist.com/special-report/2019/05/18/americas-
military-relationship-with-china-needs-rules, accessed on 15 Oct 2019. A
recent study by the United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney points
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then the profits of peace and potential economic losses of conflict are clearly much
higher nowadays. The two countries’ trade volume in 1990 was 3.6 times larger than
in 1980. In contrast, their bilateral trade has expanded by over 100 folds from 1980
to 2010.3 With such a dramatic increase in bilateral trade, if the rationale of peace
via trade holds we should generally expect a lower likelihood of costly conflict (i.e.
conflicts that involve the use of force).4
to a higher likelihood of China using “limited force to achieve a fait accompli victory"
in the Indo-Pacific region. See https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/averting-
crisis-american-strategy-military-spending-and-collective-defence-in-
the-indo-pacific, accessed 15 Oct 2019. That said, a different interpretation
of the recent China-U.S. trade conflict is that it is consistent with the existing
literature’s argument that trade can increase the probability of non-violent conflict
while reducing the likelihood of costly conflict (Pevehouse, 2004). This interpretation
is not consistent with the above-mentioned reports and studies which suggest the
two’s likelihood of costly conflict has become higher. Another potential dissent is
that the likelihood becomes higher because of the reduction of trade. But this cannot
explain the security concerns that policymakers had toward China which gave rise to
the trade conflict in the first place. See the following discussions for details.
3Measured relative to the U.S. GDP, the increase from 1980 to 2014 is over 20
folds. The increase in 1990 relative to 1980 is slightly over 2 folds. Data source and
calculations can be found in the replication files.
4What I stress here is the likelihood becomes higher, instead of whether a war will
definitely break out or not. For a prominent example where costly conflict did happen
against the backdrop of increasing trade, refer to the First World War where German
fought against her major trade partners (Britain, France, Russia, and the U.S.). For
an example where war did not happen, see the relationship between the U.S. and
Japan in the 1980s. As a sidenote, the former example is often used to challenge
the rationale of liberal peace. Explanations of this outlier include countries that
initiate the war traded little (Gartzke and Lupu, 2012), rising tariffs stoked hostility
(McDonald and Sweeney, 2007), and pre-war substitution process reduced trade costs
(Gowa and Hicks, 2015). These studies focus on reduced costs. In comparison,
my study focuses on the beneficial aspect and offers a different explanation where
increased costs are associated with more conflict because the long-term benefits of
using force also become higher.
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It is puzzling why the earlier relatively small increase of bilateral trade restrained
while the later massive amount of increase cannot. In essence, this puzzle concerns the
scope conditions of bilateral trade’s pacifying effects, which are critically important for
the theoretical development of commercial liberalism. It is also of vital importance to
global peace because the results can only be disastrous if two great powers such as the
U.S. and China cannot manage their rivalry despite extraordinarily strong commercial
interests. One key reason for the recent conflict, as pointed out by the above report,
is that concerns about security “mattered less when China exported tennis shoes and
televisions rather than microchips." Projects such as Made in China 2025 worry the
U.S. in that China’s improvement in manufacturing capacity and technology can be
transferred into expanded military power.5 At the core of this growing tension from
tennis shoes to microchips is the connection between trade, wealth, and power.
One possible explanation is that different commodities have varying effects on
conflict. Goenner (2010) shows that goods such as energy and non-ferrous metals are
highly elastic (i.e. easier to find alternative markets) and are therefore less likely to
reduce conflict (because the opportunity costs are weighted down). Akoto, Peterson
and Thies (2019) suggest intra-industry trade improves a state’s resilience toward
economic coercion. Meanwhile, military power is also pointed out as an important
moderator. Dorussen (2006) suggests the pacifying effects of trade are weaker for
goods that are easily appropriable by force, such as chemical and metal industries.
5One of the key issues in the two countries’ trade talk is whether China will
eliminate the subsidies that the Chinese government provide for the Made in China
2025 industries. See https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/made-in-
china-2025-the-industrial-plan-that-china-doesnt-want-anyone-talking-
about/, accessed 15 Oct 2019. A recent column by the New York Times also
claims, “We could look the other way when trade was just about toys and solar
panels, but when it’s about F-35s and 5G telecommunications, that’s not smart."
See https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/opinion/china-trump-trade.html,
accessed 15 Oct 2019.
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Goenner (2010) further indicates that strategic goods that can be plundered are more
likely to stoke conflict, in particular, commodities such as energy, non-ferrous metals,
and electronics.
These studies are important in emphasizing the need for disaggregating trade
data. However, they do not directly explain why more bilateral trade can be peace-
promoting when a country is making tennis shoes but conflict-stoking when it is
producing microchips. After all, microchips are not more elastic (or easier to plunder)
than tennis shoes. More importantly, most trade-conflict studies have focused more
on the coercive impact of trade rather than the beneficial aspect, i.e. commerce
can enrich and empower states over time (Gowa, 1994; Gerace, 2004). In particular,
as a country consumes and produces more commodities with “dual use",6 she also
becomes more capable of and efficient in translating the benefits from commerce
into military power (Fuhrmann, 2008; Goenner, 2011). As such, if states can more
efficiently empower themselves via trade, then a stronger bilateral trade relationship
can encourage the rising states to challenge their stronger yet declining (or staggering)
counterparts. To slow or reverse this potential shift of bargaining power, the latter
can be incentivized to coerce and demand more concessions or even risk the outside
option (i.e. war).
Such a rationale has been famously laid out by the power transition theory (Or-
ganski, 1958; Gilpin, 1981; Kugler and Lemke, 1996), which argues that if states
can benefit more from a bilateral trade relationship, then they may create security
6Dual use commodities are those that have both civil and military applications.
Many countries apply restrictions on both the commodities and country origins
of the traders. For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce is responsible
for screening exports of dual use items as well as their shipment to certain coun-
tries. For details, see https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/licensing/forms-
documents/doc_download/91-cbc-overview, accessed 15 Oct 2019.
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dilemmas with their trade partners (Grieco, 1988, 1990). Formal studies show this
is essentially a commitment problem: with shifting bargaining power states cannot
credibly commit to not exploit opponents in the future. Therefore, peaceful and
Paretto-efficient deals today cannot be sustained (Powell, 1999, 2006; Fearon, 1995,
2004). This line of reasoning is elided in trade-conflict studies. However, it points to
an important scope condition under which bilateral trade can increase the likelihood
of costly conflict.
To fill this lacuna, I use a formal model to tease out the scope condition linking
bilateral trade with a higher likelihood of costly conflict. Specifically, I find that
bilateral trade can increase the odds of costly conflict when the two countries’ relative
level of efficiency in translating trade gains into military power is within a mid-range,
bounded by their relative military capacities. To be clear, I define efficiency as the
marginal effects of bilateral trade on a country’s military power — the potential
or realized increase of military power resulting from a unit’s increase in bilateral
trade. Roughly speaking, this term captures the idea that countries consuming and
producing more dual use products are more capable than those focusing on primary
goods in translating gains from trade into military power (see more details in the
empirical section). I use the term relative efficiency to refer to the efficiency ratio of
two countries (i.e. the efficiency of state A divided by thereof state B). The above
condition suggests when the relative efficiency is neither too small nor too large,
increasing bilateral trade can exacerbate commitment problems, thereby rendering
fighting a better option for both sides. The intuition is that increasing bilateral trade
can either expand or shrink the gap of military power between two states, depending
on their relative efficiency. When this gap expands, states will have fewer incentives
to fight. However, when the gap shrinks, it could give rise to a dangerous situation
where both sides find it optimal to fight.
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To fix ideas, it helps to think of the effects of a unit’s increase in bilateral trade
on the likelihood of costly conflict and how these effects change as we gradually
increase the level of relative efficiency. There are three implications of the above
theory, which suggests the effects of bilateral trade are contingent upon the relative
efficiency and that these conditional effects follow an inverted-U curve. First, when
the relative efficiency is low, the marginal effects of a unit’s increase in bilateral trade
are negative. The smaller the relative efficiency, the lower the likelihood of costly
conflict. Second, as the level of relative efficiency increases, the pacifying effects of
bilateral trade decrease. The negative association between a unit increase of trade
and the likelihood of costly conflict diminishes toward zero and ultimately turns
positive as the relative efficiency increases and reaches the mid-range. Finally, as the
relative efficiency increases further and travels out of the mid-range the association
becomes negative again. Using countries’ strategic trade data to proxy their efficiency
in translating trade gains into military power, I test the above hypotheses on both
the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) and the International Crisis Behavior (ICB)
data. I find strong support for the first two hypotheses and suggestive evidence for
the last one.
This chapter makes a number of contributions. First, it provides an explicit scope
condition for bilateral trade’s pacifying effects. For the majority of dyads, commit-
ment problems may not be an issue at all and increasing bilateral trade should be
peace-promoting. However, the chapter shows that for some dyads the impact could
be the opposite: more bilateral trade can increase the likelihood of costly conflict. Sec-
ond, it furthers the trade-conflict studies by demonstrating the need and importance
of considering the interplay between trade and power shifts. Relatedly, it bridges
the literature of commercial liberalism with the power transition theory and formal
studies of commitment problems. Power transition theory highlights the importance
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of economic causes of war and formal studies of commitment problems show how
shifting bargaining power can render fighting a better option. This chapter brings
both insights to the attention of trade-conflict research. Finally, it has important
implications for studies of major power competition. For example, consider the re-
cent rise of China. With the advance of globalization and China’s economic progress,
the relative efficiency between China and the U.S. is shifting toward the condition
where increasing bilateral trade can stoke costly conflict. This study suggests that
holding the existing military balance constant, the best way to avoid costly conflict
is to encourage technology competition and innovation which can propel the relative
efficiency to travel out of the danger zone in a peaceful manner.
4.1 When Bilateral Trade Does (or Does not) Pacify
Trade-conflict studies show that stronger economic ties can help promote peace (Oneal
and Russet, 1997; Hegre, Oneal and Russett, 2010). This is because interstate conflict
disrupts normal economic exchange, thereby generating ex ante incentives for states
to avoid the opportunity costs (Polachek and Xiang, 2010). In addition, stronger
economic ties can alleviate the problems of incomplete information, as states that are
willing to endure (or risk) higher costs can better signal their resolve (Morrow, 1999;
Gartzke, Li and Boehmer, 2001). Both opportunity costs and signaling theories are
predicated on the assumption that costly conflict brings economic losses, which has
received more empirical support in recent decades (Anderton and Carter, 2001; Long,
2008; Glick and Taylor, 2010).7 Therefore, it appears reasonable to assume all else
7For studies that challenge the pacifying effects of trade, see Barbieri (1996);
Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny (2004); Kim and Rousseau (2005). For studies that
question the economic costs of conflict, see Morrow, Siverson and Tabares (1998);
Barbieri and Levy (1999); Ward and Hoff (2007).
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equal as the bilateral trade volume increases, the costs of conflict also increase and
the prospect of peace will be improved.
However, strong bilateral economic ties do not always restrain states and promote
peace. There are two relevant scope conditions in existing studies that could help
explain the puzzle.8 First, asymmetric dependence may lessen or even reverse the
pacifying effects of commerce. If one side will suffer more economic losses, then the
opponent has stronger incentives to exploit its restraint and demand more at the
bargaining table. As such, asymmetric dependence exacerbates economic vulnerabil-
ity and intensifies the exertion of coercive policies (Barbieri, 1996; Crescenzi, 2003a;
Peterson, 2011). Relatedly, it could sabotage credible communication and compound
the problems of incomplete information (Gartzke and Westerwinter, 2016). Second,
different commodities can have heterogeneous effects. Some goods have weaker paci-
fying effects because they are easily appropriable (Dorussen, 2006) or that they are
highly elastic and states can find alternative markets for them more easily (Goenner,
2010). From a slightly different angle, Goenner (2010) argues strategic goods that
can be easily plundered can stoke conflict.
These two scope conditions, however, cannot fully explain why trade has stronger
pacifying effects when the gap between countries’ manufacture and technology ca-
pacity is larger. As this gap becomes smaller, it is conceivable that the economic
dependence can also become less asymmetric. The existing studies of different com-
modities’ heterogeneous effects cannot explain why some manufactured goods (e.g.
microchips and 5G equipment) that are neither easily appropriable nor highly elastic
8Existing studies have identified a number of other scope conditions of trade’s paci-
fying effects, including third-party trade (Crescenzi, 2003a; Peterson, 2011; Kinne,
2014) and the overall trade networks (Dorussen and Ward, 2010; Kinne, 2012; Peter-
son, 2018). These factors, however, are not directly related to this chapter’s focus on
bilateral trade.
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can give rise to potential costly conflict. After all, the costs of disrupting trade of
these goods are most likely higher given the lack of close substitutes. Finally, given
their focuses, these studies also cannot capture one critical force that drives the great-
power competition rationale. Trade enriches countries and helps increase economic
and technology efficiency, but with different rates. These asymmetric rates of benefits
appear to be one of the driving forces behind the above tension of power competition.
4.2 Trade, Wealth, and Power
To capture this underlying tension and further the trade-conflict studies, we need to
strengthen the link between trade, wealth, and power. Instead of focusing solely on
the costs and coercive effects of trade, some earlier studies have highlighted the pos-
sible beneficial aspect. Specifically, trade gains can translate into military spendings,
which increase the attractiveness of costly conflict as states expect a higher likelihood
of winning by force (Gowa, 1994; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993). Meanwhile, the oppo-
nents also benefit from the dyadic trade relationship. The “relative gains" argument,
therefore, argues if a state gains more from the bilateral trade relationship, they can
build up a stronger military power, thereby creating security dilemmas (Grieco, 1988,
1990).
The argument that uneven gains from trade can stoke conflict resonates with the
above-mentioned scope condition of asymmetric dependence. However, it is unclear
why uneven gains would not tilt the playing field further, rendering it less necessary
or profitable for states to use force. For instance, if the stronger party can more
efficiently channel her gains into military power, then it can augment the existing
deterrence effect resulting in fewer incidences of conflict. Formal studies show that
states do not care about the opponent’s military power per se. Instead, they worry
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about what the adversary can do with the power: the risk of being forcefully taken
away what they have (Powell, 1991). Powell famously coins it as the shadow of power
(Powell, 1999). Essentially, it is a commitment problem: as the bargaining power
changes over time states cannot credibly promise to not exploit an opponent in the
future. As such, peaceful and Pareto-efficient deals today cannot be sustained.
The change of bargaining power over time is elided in trade-conflict studies, as
the two primary theories in the field (i.e. opportunity costs and costly signaling)
are modeled without explicitly accounting for the potential shift of power. Yet, it
is critically important if we seek to strengthen the link between trade, wealth, and
power. First, since there is a time lag between gaining from trade, spending more
on arms, and improving military power (Monteiro and Debs, 2016), states can be
incentivized to use force today to avoid unfavorable bargaining situations tomorrow.
Second, the shift of bargaining power is further compounded by the fact that economic
costs due to conflict do not last forever. While one may argue about factoring in the
long-term impact on market and development, a strong case can be made about the
phoenix effect: states tend to bounce back to pre-conflict development level (Cerra
and Saxena, 2008; Kugler et al., 2013; Miguel and Roland, 2011).9 As such, economic
disruption due to conflict can be tolerable when the potential benefits of long-term
settlements are attractive enough. In other words, states can have the incentive to
trade short-term economic losses for the potential benefits of long-term settlements.
The importance of how expectations about future economic dependence affect
states’ strategic calculations is highlighted by a couple of recent studies. The trade
expectations theory (Copeland, 2015) argues if states have positive expectations of
9Note that trade disruption largely brings material losses, instead of human capi-
tals. As such, the recovery rates are expected to be higher and faster. See Barro and
Sala-i Martin (2004); Serneels and Verpoorten (2015).
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future trade, then they will strive to keep the benefits of commerce and avoid the
opportunity costs of economic disruption. However, if states have negative expecta-
tions, namely they will be cut off from trade and investment, then to avoid future
economic decline and loss of bargaining power, they will find the use of force today
more attractive. Building on this rationale, Monteiro and Debs (2016) show that
stronger states may fear weaker states’ economic growth and impose constraints on
the latter’s access to markets and resources, resulting in economic hold-up problems.
If stronger states cannot credibly commit to grant weaker ones the access, then weaker
states may find war a better choice to eliminate the hold-up.
This focus on commitment problems and shifting bargaining power also parallels
the power transition theory, which highlights the impact of different rates of economic
growth (Organski, 1958; Organski and Kugler, 1980; Gilpin, 1981; Kugler and Lemke,
1996). Rising states are incentivized to revise the international status quo by the use
of force, especially after they have risen. Meanwhile, declining states are disinclined
to accept the revision. As such, the likelihood of costly conflict rises. Foreseeing this,
declining states may also be incentivized to launch preventive wars. Granted, power
transition theory remains to be strengthened, especially in terms of the concept of
satisfaction (Debs and Monteiro, 2014; Sample, 2018). However, it showcases that
the economic causes of war are inherently bound with the (potential) use of force. If
states’ military power changes at different rates, then commitment problems could
kick in and peaceful Pareto-efficient deals today may not be attractive for one or both
parties tomorrow.
In the context of economic interdependence, there are two possible mechanisms
that can generate such commitment problems: (a) states may become more reliant on
an adversary economically in the future and hence worry about having to concede on
important issues due to increased vulnerability and (b) economic benefits from trade
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can translate into military power which increase a state’s capacity to enforce long-
term settlements. Monteiro and Debs (2016), as mentioned previously, have made
important contributions in theorizing how states’ worries about economic coercion in
the future can make fighting attractive today. In this chapter, I focus on the second
mechanism: whether and when can bilateral trade generate incentives to fight for fear
of unfavorable military situations in the future.
The aforementioned studies suggest in examining this mechanism we need to in-
corporate three moving parts together: (a) commerce can enrich and empower states
over time; (b) states differ in their efficiency in translating trade gains into military
power; (c) the prospect shift of military power due to the change of bilateral trade
can affect the current likelihood of costly conflict. To account for these three parts, I
introduce a commitment model which builds on Fearon (2004).10 This model is useful
in that it teases out the underlying commitment problems and provides an intuitive
scope condition of bilateral trade’s pacifying effects.11 It also resonates with Fearon
10One main theoretical challenge of modeling the effects of economic forces is that
they are most likely slow and incremental. This stands in stark contrast to the con-
dition of large and rapid shifts identified by Powell (2006). Indeed, Powell stresses
that power shifts due to different rates of economic growth are unlikely to satisfy
the requirement of being large and rapid (Powell, 1999, 2004b). Recently, however,
Krainin (2017) shows that the sufficient condition identified by Powell can be ex-
tended. Specifically, small and slow shifts in the distribution of power can also cause
preventive wars. Moreover, since my focus is not on the size of power shift that gen-
erates the commitment problem but on the marginal effects of bilateral trade, the
different conditions identified by Powell and Krainin are less of a concern here.
11Powell (2004b) shows if the aggregate of the outside option of one state (i.e. war)
today and the other thereof tomorrow is greater than what they can bargaining over
in one period, then the dyad will resort to the inefficient use of power. Krainin (2017)
relaxes the inefficient condition by considering slower but persistent shifts in the more
periods. If we add the parameter of bilateral trade in both conditions, more trade
will exacerbate the commitments problems only when it increases one state’s capacity
of winning, a result similar to the scope condition I identify in the following section.
See Appendix A for details.
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(2018)’s argument that the pacifying effects of economic interdependence are not
monotonic and that the specific scope condition is bounded by the existing military
balance.
4.3 The Commitment Model
Two states, 1 and 2, bargain over a disputed good over time. Time proceeds in a
successive manner, with each period denoted as t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . . Each period the
disputed good produces some benefits normalized as 1. Both states discount future
payoffs at a rate of 1 − δ. There can be two kinds of stage, peace or war, for each
period. The game begins with a peace period, where Nature randomly chooses one
state to make an offer. For simplicity, let state 1 be the first mover chosen by Nature
and assume he proposes µ for himself and 1− µ for state 2. If the opponent accepts
it, the two divide the benefits as proposed. If the opponent rejects it, neither state
gets any benefits and the game proceeds to a war stage. At the war stage, state 1
can choose to fight or back down. The former choice results in war while the latter
allows the two states to return to a peace period with state 2 reaping the benefits of
the disputed good for one period.
When the two states fight, the disputed good is assigned by the costly lottery of
war, with three possible outcomes: state 1 wins with probability α, state 2 wins with
probability β, and stalemate with probability 1−α−β. The former two outcomes end
the game with the winner keeping the good in all future periods while the stalemate
outcome allows the two states to return to a peace period (with no one winning the
good) and resume bargaining. The outcomes of the costly conflict are determined by
the contest success function of the two sides’ military power. Specifically, denote the
existing military power asmi, where i ∈ 1, 2. In addition, each state can translate part
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of the wealth from trade into military power. Write the bilateral trade as b and each
state’s efficiency of translating gains from trade into military power as ei. Finally,
write a positive term that affects the likelihood of stalement as φ. The probabilities
of the three outcomes can be written as follows.
α = m1 + be1
m1 + be1 +m2 + be2 + φ
β = m2 + be2
m1 + be1 +m2 + be2 + φ
1− α− β = φ
m1 + be1 +m2 + be2 + φ
(4.1)
Regardless of the outcome, both states have to pay economic and military costs
when a war breaks out. The military costs are one-period losses written as ci. The
economic costs, proportional to the bilateral trade b, can last ri periods.
Finally, at a peace period Nature randomly introduces a shock σ > 0 to state 1’s
probability of winning. For simplicity, assume further the probability of stalemate is
exogenous to the shock. When there is a positive shock, state 1 wins the war with
probability α + σ, loses with β − σ. When the shock is negative, state 1 wins with
α− σ and loses with α + σ. Write the probability of a negative shock as ε.12
4.3.1 War Equilibrium
The solution of this game is of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). Given my interest,
I focus on the war equilibrium.
Proposition 3. If conditions (R1) and (R2) below are satisfied, then there is a war
MPE where state 1 always demands all the disputed good and state 2 rejects when the
12The likelihood of random shocks captures the status of rising or declining power
and relates to the power transition theory. If ε is increasing (decreasing), we can view
state 1 as a declining (rising) power, as he expects more negative (favorable) shocks
in the future.
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shock does not favor state 1 (σ < 0) and accepts when it does (σ > 0).
D1 ≡ −b
1− δr1




1− δ + δε > 0 (R1)
D2 ≡ −b
1− δr2
1− δ − c2 +
β + σ
1− δ > 0 (R2)
Proof. Write state 1’s payoff as V p1 at the peace stage and V w1 at the war stage.
Similarly, write state 2’s payoffs as V p2 and V w2 . The Bellman equations can be
written as follows.
V p1 = ε(0 + δV w1 ) + (1− ε)(1 + δV
p
1 )
V w1 = −b
1− δr1
1− δ − c1 +
α− σ
1− δ + γ(0 + δV
p
1 )
V p2 = ε(0 + δV w2 ) + (1− ε)(0 + δV
p
2 )
V w2 = −b
1− δr2
1− δ − c2 +
β + σ








1− δ − c1 +
α− σ
1− δ ) + (1− ε)
1− (1− ε)δ − εγδ2
V w1 = −b
1− δr1
1− δ − c1 +
α− σ






1− δ − c2 +
β + σ
1− δ )
1− (1− ε)δ − εγδ2
V w2 = −b
1− δr2
1− δ − c2 +
β + σ




To prove that the above MPE can be supported, consider the following one-step
deviations. First, if state 1 chooses to demand anything less at a peace stage, his
payoff will only be reduced given state 2’s strategies. Second, if state 1 chooses not
to fight at a war stage, then his payoff is 0. This deviation is not desirable if V w1 > 0,
which gives us R1. Third, if state 2 chooses to reject the deal when the shock favors
state 1, then her payoff is reduced since she is gets nothing at the peace stage and
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fights at a lower probability of winning at the war stage. Finally, if state 2 chooses to
accept the deal when the shock favors her, she gets 0. This deviation is not desirable
if V w2 > 0, which gives us R2.
4.3.2 Comparative Statics
How does bilateral trade affect the two conditions of the war equilibrium? To examine





1− σ(1− ε)(1− δ)
1− δ + δε
∂α
∂b












Recall the main focus of this chapter is to investigate the scope condition of
economic interdependence’s pacifying effect. To put it differently, I seek to study when
does a larger b lead to a higher likelihood of costly conflict. If ∂D2
∂b
> 0, then we know
∂β
∂b
> 1− δr2 > 0. Additionally, if ∂D1
∂b








δr1 > 0. From Equation (4.1) we know
∂α
∂b
= m2e1 −m1e2 + φe1(m1 + be1 +m2 + be2 + φ)2
∂β
∂b
= m1e2 −m2e1 + φe2(m1 + be1 +m2 + be2 + φ)2
(4.5)
If both equations are positive, then we have the following condition for bilat-











When this condition is satisfied, increasing bilateral trade by one unit can further
exacerbate the commitment problems. Intuitively, Equation (F1) reveals there is
an opening window for costly conflict to break out: when the two sides’ relative
efficiency of translating gains from trade into military power is neither too small nor
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too big.13 When the condition is satisfied, increasing trade can shrink the existing
gap in military power. As this gap becomes smaller, rising countries become more
optimistic and declining (or staggering) states find it more compelling to use force.
As such, the effects of bilateral trade are contingent upon both sides’ efficiency in
translating trade gains into military power.
To fix ideas, I focus on examining the effects of a unit’s increase in bilateral trade
on the likelihood of costly conflict (the predicted effects of increasing trade are shown
toward the end of the empirical discussions). That is, the increase of trade of held
constant at a unit while the level of relative efficiency is increased from a low value
toward the higher end. The theory suggests the effects on costly conflict are negative
when the relative efficiency is small. As the relative efficiency increases and reaches
the above scope condition, a unit increase of biltaral trade is associated with a higher
likelihood of costly conflict. Finally, as the relative efficiency increases further, the
effects become negative again. That is, as the relative efficiency increases, the effects
of increasing bilateral trade by a unit follows the shape of an inverted U.
13Strictly speaking, this conditional impact is further conditioned by the existing
military balance. It is conceivable for some extreme values of military balance, the
condition is unlikely to be met. This would suggest the following discussions on the
theory’s implications and empirical examinations should further consider the condi-
tional effects of existing power gap. I choose not to take this route because empirically
it further complicates the model (requiring four-way interactions) without much value
added — under the much complicated model one can pick a value of military balance
that satisfy the condition showing similar conditional effects. Relatedly, the primary
theoretical implication that when the relative efficiency is within a mid-range, more
bilateral trade can stoke conflict still holds. Finally, in the empirical section I focus on
examining dyads where commitment problems are possible to kick in. I also control
for the existing power ratio to alleviate the above concerns.
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Hypothesis 7. When the two sides’ relative efficiency of transtranslating trade gains





), a unit’s increase of bilateral
trade is associated with a reduction of the likelihood of costly conflict.
Hypothesis 8. The negative association identified in Hypothesis 7 diminishes toward
zero as the relative efficiency increases and will be reversed (a unit’s increase of
bilateral trade is associated with an increase of the likelihood of costly conflict) if
Equation (F1) is satisfied.
Hypothesis 9. The positive association identified in Hypothesis 8 diminishes toward
zero as the relative efficiency increases further and will ultimately be negative again







To test the above hypotheses, I need a sample of countries where it is possible for
commitment problems to kick in. That is, of all the country pairs in the world, we
know some dyads are definitely unlikely to be concerned about the opponents getting
too stronger in the future and hence not willing to maintain the peaceful status quo
today. For instance, big and powerful countries typically will not be worried by
small and distant countries posing military threats in the future. Relatively smaller
countries will not be concerned about the above commitment problems unless they
are historical rivals.
Therefore, I choose a sample of undirected dyad years where the countries are
rivals, or (both) major powers, or contiguous.14 I identify the rivalry status using
the updated Peace and Rivalry data by Goertz, Diehl and Balas (2016). The peace
14I choose not to use directed dyad because the theory allows both declining and
rising powers to initiate conflict. See also footnote 12.
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scale from the data has five different values 0 (serious rivalry), .25 (lesser rivalry),
.5 (negative peace), .75 (warm peace), and 1 (security community). I code a dyad
year as a rivalry if the peace scale is either 0 or .25. In addition, within a given year,
the relationship can turn from peace to rivalry (or vice versa). Given my purpose,
I use the peace scale at the end of the year. That is, if a dyad is turning from
peace to rivalry (rivalry to peace), I identify that dyad year as a possible sample
where countries should (not) be worried about opponent’s threats in the future. For
major power status and contiguity, I use the Direct Contiguity Data (Version 3.2) by
Stinnett et al. (2002) and the major powers data by the Correlates of War project.15
For comparison, I construct three samples of data: one with just rivals, one with rivals
and major-power dyads, and one with rivals, major powers, and contiguous states.
The hypotheses in the previous section require testing: (a) the conditional ef-
fect of relative efficiency and (b) whether this conditional effect first increases from
negative to positive (Hypothesis 8) and then diminishes from positive to negative
(Hypothesis 9). Therefore, I specify a logit model with the following formula.
logit(Pr(Costly Conflict)) = β0 + β1Trade + β2Relative Effeciency
+ β3Trade× Relative Effeciency
+ β4Relative Effeciency2





where the probability of costly conflict is predicted by the interaction between bilateral
trade and relative efficiency as well as the interaction between bilateral trade and the
quadratic term of relative efficiency (plus the control variables). Roughly speaking,
15Correlates of War Project, 2017. “State System Membership List, v2016." Online,
http://correlatesofwar.org.
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Hypothesis 7 suggests β1 should be negative. Hypothesis 8 suggests β3 should be
positive. And Hypothesis 9 suggests β5 should be negative.
4.4.1 Dependent Variable
Given my theory, I need an outcome variable that captures costly conflict between
states. Therefore, I choose to use the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data.
Given the potential issues with the MID data, I use a version of MID data by Gibler,
Miller and Little (2016) which revise the original data by dropping cases that do not
meet the MID coding rules and make hundreds of either major or minor changes to
the disputes. Using this dataset, I code a dyad year as experiencing costly conflict
when the hostility level of a dispute is above or equal to 4 (use of force). In the
robustness checks, I also use the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data (Brecher
et al., 2017). This dataset has a variable (viol) that captures the extent of violence
by an actor. When the value is above 1 (no violence) for either actor, I code the dyad
year as experiencing a costly conflict. To avoid spurious correlation by time, I lead
this variable by 1 year (equivalent to lagging the covariates by 1 year).
4.4.2 Independent Variables
My key independent variables are dyadic trade and the relative efficiency of translating
trade gains into military power. For dyadic trade, I use the data by Barbieri and
Keshk (2012), which reports dyadic trade data from 1870 to 2014. Many trade conflict
studies use trade divided by GDP to captures a state’s economic dependence. This
is reasonable since their focus is on capturing the economic losses. Given my theory
focuses on the beneficial aspects of dyadic trade (translating trade gains into military
power), I choose to use dyadic trade data for my main models. That said, I also rerun
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the model using trade divided by GDP and the results are substantially similar. Given
the skewness of the dyadic trade data, I log transform the trade variable.
In terms of the relative efficiency variable, I need a variable that can proxy states’
capacity, not the actual policies, to translate trade gains into military power. That
is, this efficiency variable need to be able to capture how much does a country’s
military power change in response to a unit’s increase in bilateral trade. Broad
concepts that captures a country’s national power or “economic potential for war"
are not appropriate since they include other factors such as labor force that are
not correlated with bilateral trade (Gerace, 2004). Additionally, they also miss how
embedded a state is in the global trade networks, especially for the types of goods
that can directly affect a state’s military power.
In comparison, recent trade conflict studies have demonstrated the usefulness of
using disaggregated trade data. Commodities that are strategically important can
serve as a proxy to measure the efficiency variable. Given strategic goods often have
dual uses, countries that consume and produce more strategic goods can more effi-
ciently utilize the gains from trade (Fuhrmann, 2008; Goenner, 2010). For instance,
countries that can produce more and better electrical machinery are also more ca-
pable of producing advanced weaponry than states that can only produce primary
products. Goenner (2010) identifies strategic commodities as including energy, non-
ferrous metals, chemicals, electronics, nuclear materials, and armaments. Under each
of these categories, Goenner further identifies subcategories that are important to
economic and military securities.
Using Gonner’s categorization and the UN Comtrade data, I identify and aggre-
gate each country’s strategic import and export by year. I then weigh the import
and export values by their respective trade network centrality measurements follow-
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ing Zeng (2019).16 Finally, I add these weighted import and export values by year
to proxy a country’s efficiency. For each dyad year, I divide the larger value of the
two countries’ efficiency by the smaller one (plus 1 to avoid dividing 0). I choose this
intentionally because I have undirected dyadic data. I then log transform this ratio
in the same way as the dyadic trade data. This measurement is used to proxy the
relative efficiency variable. In the robustness checks, I also weigh efficiency by the
wealth of each country, proxied by their GDP per capita.
For control variables, I use the National Material Capabilities (v5.0) data by
Singer, Bremer and Stuckey (1972) and construct a power ratio variable in the same
way as the relative efficiency variable. I also control for the differences between the
two countries’ growth rates. Specifically, I use the GDP growth rate data from the
World Development Index and take the absolute value of the differences between
a dyad. I control for these two variables as power ratio may affect how likely the
relative efficiency variable satisfies Equation (F1) and differences in economic growth
may also affect the relative efficiency of translating trade gains into military power.
That said, in the robustness checks I also exclude these two controls and the results
are substantially similar.
4.5 Results
Table 4.1 presents the results of logit regression. Model 1 uses only the rival sample,
Model 2 adds the sample of both countries being major powers, and Model 3 adds the
sample of contiguous dyads. We see that the coefficient estimate for the dyadic trade
16Specifically, Zeng (2019) uses the closeness measurement and weighs the trade
networks by trade volume. I use the import or export values of strategic goods to
weigh the respective trade networks. That said, I also rerun the models without
weighing by the centrality measurement and the results are substantially similar. See
the appendix for details.
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variable is negative and statistically significant across all three models, providing
strong support to Hypothesis 7. In addition, the interaction term of dyadic trade and
relative efficiency is positive and significant, adding support to Hypothesis 8. Finally,
the interaction term of dyadic trade and the square of relative efficiency is negative
and across the models, providing additional evidence for Hypothesis 9.
Table 4.1: Logit Regression with 95 Percent Confidence Intervals: 1962-2014
Costly Conflict
(1) (2) (3)
log Trade −0.555∗∗∗ −0.841∗∗∗ −0.655∗∗∗
(−0.796, −0.315) (−1.068, −0.614) (−0.827, −0.483)
log Trade × Efficiency 0.669∗∗∗ 1.048∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗
(0.274, 1.064) (0.662, 1.434) (0.509, 1.075)
log Trade × Efficiencŷ 2 −0.180∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗ −0.250∗∗∗
(−0.329, −0.031) (−0.448, −0.145) (−0.355, −0.145)
Efficiency −0.285 −0.917 −0.723
(−1.825, 1.255) (−2.419, 0.585) (−1.738, 0.293)
Efficiencŷ 2 −0.079 0.115 0.184
(−0.617, 0.459) (−0.411, 0.640) (−0.157, 0.524)
Power ratio 1.294 −0.041 10.824∗∗∗
(−0.622, 3.209) (−1.926, 1.845) (9.269, 12.379)
GDPgr difference 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.007, 0.023) (0.006, 0.023) (0.023, 0.036)
Constant −0.732 −0.215 −2.370∗∗∗
(−1.698, 0.234) (−1.152, 0.722) (−3.028, −1.713)
Observations 3,359 3,929 21,027
Log Likelihood −1,698.800 −1,743.778 −3,526.798
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,413.600 3,503.556 7,069.595
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
That said, interpreting the regression results only by the coefficient estimates
could be misleading (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). As such, I plot the marginal
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effects of dyadic trade in Figure 4.1 using the results from Model 2. This figure shows
the marginal effect of increasing the value of dyadic trade by 1 million U.S. dollars
when increasing the relative efficiency from its lowest value to the highest. The y-
axis denotes the odds ratio of costly conflict, which is a monotonic transformation
of the probability of conflict. When the odds ratio is greater (smaller) than 1, more
dyadic trade increases (decreases) the likelihood of conflict. I find strong support
for Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8: more dyadic trade is pacifying when the relative
efficiency is small and this effect diminishes and is reversed when the relative efficiency
increases. However, I only find suggest evidence for Hypothesis 9: the marginal effect
seems to be diminishing toward zero as the relative efficiency rises to its higher-end



























Figure 4.1: Marginal Effects of Relative Efficiency. This figure shows the effects when
increasing bilateral trade by 1 million US dollars from Model 2, with 95% confidence inter-
vals. Note that the x-axis denotes the relative efficiency and the y-axis the odds ratio of
costly conflict. The increase of bilateral trade is held constant at 1 million US dollars.
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To more substantially demonstrate the effects of dyadic trade, I switch gears and
plot the impact of increasing bilateral trade on the probability of costly conflict in
Figure 4.2 using the results from Model 2. Holding all other covariates at their
means, I plot the effect of increasing dyadic trade from its lowest to highest values
when the relative efficiency is low (with a value of 1) in the left panel; when the
relative efficiency is around its 75th percentile (with a value of 1.6) in the middle
panel; and when the relative efficiency is around its maximum (with a value of 3.5)
in the right panel. As we increase dyadic trade from its minimum to the maximum,
the probability of conflict decreases from around .25 to around .1 when the relative
efficiency is small. In comparison, when the relative efficiency is held around a mid-
range, more dyadic trade can increase the likelihood of costly conflict from around
.2 to almost .4. Finally, there is some suggestive evidence that when the relative
efficiency is sufficiently high, increasing bilateral trade can reduce the likelihood of
costly conflict.
In addition to the above models, I perform robustness checks by: (a) including
yearly fixed effects; (b) without leading the outcome variable; (c) using the ICB data;
(d) excluding the control variables; (e) using the operationalization of trade divided
by GDP instead of dyadic trade; (f) weighing efficiency by states’ GDP per capita;
(g) using efficiency without weighing by trade network centrality. The results are
substantially similar and are shown in the appendix.
4.6 Conclusion
I have argued and shown that bilateral trade can enrich and empower both countries,
exacerbate commitment problems, and ultimately increase the likelihood of costly

























































Figure 4.2: Predicted Probabilities of Costly Conflict. This figure shows the probabili-
ties when increasing the level of bilateral trade from Model 2, with 95% confidence intervals.
Panel (a) shows the results when the relative efficiency level is low; panel (b) when the rela-
tive efficiency is around its 3rd quartile; and panel (c) when the relative efficiency is around
its maximum. The other covariates are held at their means.
translating trade gains into military power. Specifically, when the relative efficiency
is within a mid-range bounded by existing military balance, more bilateral trade is
associated with a higher likelihood of costly conflict. When the relative efficiency is
either too small or too large, the predictions of commercial liberalism still hold: more
bilateral trade can enhance the prospect of peace.
This theory is important because it helps reconcile the existing commercial peace
rationale with cases that it struggles to explain, which is partly due to the focus on
the costly aspect of trade and the neglect of shifting bargaining power. If trade only
adds to the existing costs of conflict, then increasing trade should invariably lead to a
lower likelihood of costly conflict either via the coercive or signaling mechanism (Zeng,
2019). By introducing the connection between trade, wealth, and power over time,
this chapter shows that the benefits from trade should not be neglected because they
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can exacerbate commitment problems and overwhelm the coercive restraint, resulting
in a higher likelihood of costly conflict. Additionally, the chapter also helps align the
commercial peace theory with recent empirical advances on disaggregating trade and
studying its heterogeneous effects. It is worth pointing out that while some argue
strategic commodities can have smaller pacifying effects, some argue it could be the
opposite — more strategic trade can stoke conflict. This chapter offers a theoretical
explanation and shows that the effects of strategic trade are not monotonic and are
contingent upon opponents’ strategic trade.
The results in this chapter also have implications on another scope condition of
trade’s pacifying effects. Following a similar logic, it stands to reason that when
asymmetric dependence is at the extremes, states will find it less necessary or prof-
itable to fight. Under this condition, more bilateral trade can enhance, rather than
dampen, the prospect of peace. That said, an additional complication is that in-
creasing bilateral trade can amplify or lessen the existing asymmetry. In particular,
if reduced asymmetric dependence lowers a state’s bargaining power in the future,
then it may find the use of force today a more attractive option (Monteiro and Debs,
2016).
The chapter focuses on bilateral trade. Future studies can explore how third-
party trade generates commitment problems (Peterson, 2011). In addition, although
the possibility of destroying or capturing an opponent’s strategic commodities is not
formally examined here, it is another important mechanism that may restrain trade’s
pacifying effects (Dorussen, 2006; Goenner, 2010). For instance, Japan’s occupation
of Southeast Asia during the Second World War was in part due to the concern
of securing strategic resources. That being said, although formal studies generally
theorize costly conflict as bargaining breakdown due to either private information or
commitment problems, the latter has not received much attention in trade-conflict
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studies. This chapter suggests such neglect could be problematic even when we assume




This dissertation explores the three important factors that could complicate the paci-
fying effects of economic dependence: deception, attrition, and commitment prob-
lems. Chapter 2 examines how economic dependence affects bluffing behavior and
interstate conflict. The analysis suggests in a one-shot crisis bargaining scenario,
increased economic dependence should invariably promote peace, despite a higher
likelihood of deception. Importantly, this result unites the two primary theories in
the field and shows that the coercive and signaling channels of commercial peace can
work in parallel.
Building on this understanding, chapter 3 examines how the two parallel mecha-
nisms interact beyond the stage of conflict onset. The analysis suggests when we
include the impact of time, the relationship between trade and conflict becomes
more complicated. In particular, the impact of economic dependence on conflict
termination is conditional: when the issue salience is sufficiently high, the signaling
mechanism can dominate resulting in a lower incentive to quit conflict despite higher
economic costs. In other words, while increased economic dependence shortens low-
salient conflicts, it can prolong high-salient conflicts due to the signaling effects of
economic attrition.
The above two chapters examine trade’s impact from an opportunity costs per-
spective. However, they neglect the potential benefits of trade, i.e. trade can enrich
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and empower states over time. The latter perspective implies another mechanism
where even when states are not troubled by asymmetric information, their tensions
with and worries about potential rivals can still drive them into bloodshed. Assuming
away the complications of deception and attrition, chapter 4 examines this mechanism
and show that as trade empowers states unevenly, the existing power balance could
be shifted toward a dangerous zone where both sides find it optimal to use force. In
this scenario, increased economic dependence can exacerbate commitment problems
resulting in a higher likelihood of costly conflict.
That said, this dissertation is only one rationalist perspective on commercial liber-
alism. There are several additional areas that deserve further investigation, as noted
in previous chapters. I would like to conclude by highlighting two important areas.
First, throughout the paper I assume states are rational unitary actors. Though neces-
sary for theoretical simplification and construction, further studies should investigate
how varying domestic interests and institutional structures complicate the strategic
interactions. Second, the micro-foundations between trade and power should be fur-
ther examined. For instance, how does trade affect the guns-verse-butter tradeoff?
How does conflict involvement affect states’ ability to gain from trade? As states ben-
efit more from trade, do they have stronger incentives to project their power oversea?
Theses are all relevant questions that speak to the analysis in this dissertation, which
hopefully can serve as a stepping stone in unifying existing theories and identifying
mechanisms for further investigation.
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A.1 Equilibria of the Model
In this section, I present a general model and its proof where states have the choice
of imposing different degrees of economic costs (m). Note that the model present
in the paper is a special case of this general model, where m = 1. For readers only
interested in the proof of this special case, please skip to section A.1.2. In the paper, I
also discuss the possibility of the war outcome wiping out all economic benefits while
the economic costs for BD can be proportionally smaller. I show proof for such a
possibility in section A.1.3.







E 1 F (pv1 − c1 −mb1,−pv2 − c2 −mb2)
F̃
(−mb1 − r1,−mb2)
For ease of interpretation, write v∗1 and v∗2 as the benchmark that state 1 and
2 are resolved. Specifically, if v1 > v∗1, state 1 prefers war to concession (F̃ ). If
v2 > v
∗
2, state 2 prefers war to concession (Ẽ). Mathematically, v∗1 = (c1 − r1)/p and
v∗2 = (c2 + mb2 − r2)/(1− p). Importantly, while the signaler’s resolve is immune to
the change of escalation (m), the target state’s resolve is open to the signaling state’s
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manipulation. As the level of escalation increases, the benchmark for state 2 rises as
well, meaning she would be less likely to prefer war.
Write v̂1 and v̂2 as the benchmark for state 1’s and 2’s escalation strategy. That
is, if v1 > v̂1, state 1 provokes with m. Otherwise, he opts to not provoke. If v2 > v̂2,
state 2 further escalates the conflict. Otherwise, she concedes. Write the cumulative
distribution function for state 1’s and 2’s valuations as F1 and F2 respectively. Denote
state 2’s belief that state 1 is resolved after observing provocation as α. By Bayesian
rules, α = (1− F1(v∗1))/(1− F1(v̂1)).
Conditioned on the posterior belief, state 2’s payoff for choosing further escalation
(E) is α(−pv2 − c2 − mb2) + (1 − α)(−mb2), while her payoff for concession (Ẽ) is
−v2 − r2. Her strategy is to choose the benchmark value v̂2 such that α(−pv̂2 −
c2 − mb2) + (1 − α)(−mb2) = −v̂2 − r2. By simple rearrangement, we have v̂2 =
(αc2 +mb2 − r2)/(1− pα).
Based on state 2’s strategy, an irresolute state 1 obtains a payoff of F2(v̂2)(v1) +
(1−F2(v̂2))(−mb1− r1) for provocation and 0 for restraint. With similar logic, state
1 chooses the strategy of provocation by v̂1 = ((1− F2(v̂2))/F2(v̂2)) · (mb1 + r1).
To sum up, the signaler’s strategy is essentially choosing the optimal level of esca-
lation (m). That is, once a specific level of escalation is chosen, the other parameters
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Adopting such a strategy, the most resolute type of state 1 obtains a payoff of
L ≡ F2(v̂2)(v̄1) + (1− F2(v̂2))(pv̄1 − c1 −mb1) (A.2)
where v̄1 denotes the highest valuation possible. By the Intuitive Criterion (Cho
and Kreps, 1987), the most resolute type’s strategy (essentially the level of escalation
m he chooses) will be copied by other types willing to provoke. The intuition is
simple: if the other resolved types escalate at a different level, the most resolute
type can always deviate to his optimal choice, signaling he is resolute for sure and
minimizing the opponent’s odds of retaliation. The other resolved types have no
choice but to follow this level of escalation, for otherwise the opponent will see them
as irresolute and fights back for sure.
That said, I follow the assumption from Fearon (1997); Slantchev (2011) and
assume that v̄1 can be arbitrarily high. This assumption, unlike the assumption of
arbitrary high trade costs, is not too heroic. Substantially, it means that there is
a possibility (however small) that the signaling state can value the disputed goods
really high. Otherwise, the opponent will be sure that her adversary only values the
goods lightly, which is unlikely in real world crisis.
Under the above assumption, L will be increasing in F2(v̂2) and m. If there is
no restriction on m, the optimal level of escalation is obtained at F2(v̂2)’s maximum,
F2(v∗2). In this case, m∗ = ((F2(v∗2)/(1 − F2(v∗2))) · v∗1 − r1)/b1. Note that F2(v∗2) is
also a function of m∗ and the solution to the function is not explicit.
However, the maximal level of escalation is m = 1. That is, the highest possible
signal that state 1 can send is to cut off the trade completely. In this regard, we need
to examine whether m∗ is greater or smaller than 1.
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A.1.1 Separating Equilibrium
If m∗ ≤ 1, then the resolute states can categorically signal their resolve. Note that
m∗ = 1 is a knife-edge requirement and is usually ignored in applied work as it is
highly sensitive to any slight deviation of other parameters (a tiny disturbance of v∗1
for instance). Regardless, in this case there is no bluffing, as α is always 1. Also,
v̂1 = v∗1, meaning only the resolute types escalate.
Importantly, there are two sets of comparative statics to analyze. First, the like-
lihood that state 2 will further escalate the conflict is 1 − F2(v∗2), suggesting it is
negatively related with v∗2. Note that v∗2 is also negatively related with the odds of
war as well. Second, while the likelihood of deception is constant, the level of provo-
cation m∗ changes accordingly. Therefore, we need to examine the partial derivatives
of v∗2 and m∗ with respective to b1 and b2.





Also, we know v∗2 =
c2 +m∗b2 − r2
1− p . Therefore, we have the following two implicit
functions:
G1(m∗, v∗2; b1, b2) ≡ (
1
F2(v∗2)
− 1)(m∗b1 + r1)− v∗1 = 0
G2(m∗, v∗2; b1, b2) ≡
c2 +m∗b2 − r2




Write the probability density function of F2 as f2. By definition,f2 is positive.














































1− pb2 − (1− F2(v
∗
2))2b1)
In this regard, the sign of the Jacobian depends on the ratio between b1 and b2.
Write b∗ ≡ (1 − F2(v∗2))2(1 − p)/(f2v∗1), we have |J | > 0 if
b2
b1




To solve for the partial derivative of m∗ and v∗2 with respect to b1 and b2, we have


































































































































If m∗ > 1, then bluffing is a possibility. To see that, observe that L is also increasing
in m under that assumption that v̄1 can be sufficiently high. If so, the best choice
for the most resolved type is to cut of the trade relation (m = 1). In this case, the
likelihood that state 1 is bluffing is (F1(v∗1)−F1(v̂1))/F1(v∗1), suggesting it is negatively
related to v̂1. The likelihood that he provokes is 1− F1(v̂1), which is also negatively
related to v̂1.
State 2’s belief that state 1 is resolved is α = (1 − F1(v∗1)/(1 − F1(v̂1)), which is
positively related with v̂1. The likelihood that state 2 further escalate the conflicts is
1− F2(v̂2), while the probability of war is (1− F1(v∗1))× (1− F2(v̂2)). These two are
both negatively related with v̂2. Therefore, we need to examine the partial derivatives
of v̂1 and v̂2 with respective to b1 and b2.
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To analyze these comparative statics, let m∗ = 1. The following equations can be






αc2 + b2 − r2
1− pα




which gives us the following two implicit functions (for simplicity we refer them as
G1 and G2 respectively):
G1(v̂1, v̂2; b1, b2) ≡ (
1
F2(v̂2)
− 1)(b1 + r1)− v̂1 = 0
G2(v̂1, v̂2; b1, b2) ≡ (1− F1(v∗1))(c2 + pv̂2) + (1− F1(v̂1))(b2 − r2 − v̂2) = 0
(A.4)
Write the probability density function of F1 and F2 as f1 and f2 respectively. By
definition, f1 and f2 are both positive. The partial derivatives for G1 and G2 with





= −(b1 + r1)f2(F2(v̂2))2
∂G2
∂v̂1
= −f1(b2 − r2 − v̂2)
∂G2
∂v̂2
= p(1− F1(v∗1))− (1− F1(v̂1))
Note that by definition −b2 should be greater than −r2 − v̂2. If not, the payoffs for
those types of state 2 that opt to further escalate the conflict are strictly lower than
that of compliance in the first place. That is a contradiction. Therefore, we know































To solve for the partial derivative of v̂1 and v̂2 with respect to b1 and b2, we have







































































































A.1.3 A Different Model







E 1 F (pv1 − c1 − b1,−pv2 − c2 − b2)
F̃
(−mb1 − r1,−mb2)
In this section, I present a slightly different model where the war outcome can wipe
out all economic benefits. That is, the payoffs of war are changed to (pv1 − c1 −
b1,−pv2 − c2 − b2), as shown in Figure A.2. The same reasonings like the previous
sections still apply. For brevity, I will lay out the main changes and show how the
comparative statics still does not change.






αc2 + (m− αm+ α)b2 − r2
1− pα
v∗1 =
c1 + (1−m)b1 + r1
p
v∗2 =
c2 + b2 − r2
1− p






αc2 + b2 − r2
1− pα






G1(v̂1, v̂2; b1, b2) ≡ (
1
F2(v̂2)
− 1)(b1 + r1)− v̂1 = 0












which leads to the same comparative statics.1
A.2 Data Description
In this section, I describe the data and their sources. Further details for how I compile
the data can be found in my R code.
A.2.1 Dependent Variables
The four different outcomes are status quo (SQ), concession by the target (CD),
backing down by the signaler (BD), and war (WAR). For the MID data, I code an
outcome as SQ when the hostility level is 1 and war when the hostility level reaches 5.
CD is generated when the opponent is the initiator of conflict and the state yields.2
For BD cases, they are a bit complicated. To be sure, I should take into account of
cases where the initiator yields in the end. But there is also a substantial amount
1∂G2
∂v̂1
= −f1(b2 − r2 − (1− p)v̂2) = f1αc2 > 0.
2I make this choice because it is possible for both sides to be the initiators in
a conflict. Therefore, if I assign by a different way, say, when the actor is not the













Figure A.3: Data description for the dependent variables. The outcomes are sq
("Status quo"), acq ("Concession by the target"), bd ("Backing down by the signaler"),
and war ("War").
of cases where the conflict ends up in a stalemate. That is, there is no war and the
initiator does not yield either. I opt to count those cases as backing down because
essentially the initiator does not follow through his threat by war when the opponent
resists. This tallies with the idea of being "irresolute". These dependent variables are
summarized in Figure A.3.
I also vary the dependent variables by using a different SQ. I follow one of the
choices by Whang, McLean and Kuberski (2013) and generate status quo data by the
political affinity between states.3 States are most likely to be involved in a dispute
when their policy preference differs sharply. As such I generate status quo cases when
their political affinity score is below the 1st percentile.4
3Complied by Eric Gartzke. See dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/htmlpages/data.
html
4I exclude cases when a dyad is involved in any war or coercion behavior. The
sender for the status quo cases is assigned randomly. One justification for this choice
is that the status quo cases are not of primary interest in this paper and have been
shown to not affect the general results Whang, McLean and Kuberski (2013).
118
Last, I also compile two different sets of dependent variables using the ICB data.
SQ are identified by the above two approaches respectively. For the rest of variables,
I first identify an initiator by using the triggering entity variable. One tricky issue is
the possibility of crisis initiated by a group of countries (coded as 997).5. In this case,
I count it target state as not an initiator and all the other challengers as challengers.
I then code the outcomes by using both the violence associated with crisis actor
and the content of crisis outcome variables. When the violence level reaches 4, it
counts as war. For other cases, when the crisis outcome is defeat, defined as "the
crisis actor yielded or surrendered when an adversary threatened basic values" by the
code book, it counts as CD. The rest of cases count as BD.
A.2.2 Independent Variables
The trade data is taken from the Correlates of War project (Barbieri, Keshk and
Pollins, 2009; Barbieri and Keshk, 2012), which covers a long span of time (1870-2014)
and appears to have fewer problems in their treatment of missing values (Boehmer,
Jungblut and Stoll, 2011). For GDP data, I use the nominal GDP data from World
Bank (World Development Indicator) because COW’s data also reports nominal value.
The distribution of the economic dependence variables are shown in Figure A.4 which
is highly right-skewed.
For the control variables, I use Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2002)6
to measure the level of democracy, a proxy for the audience cost Fearon (1994a);
Schultz (2001b). I use COW’s data on alliance (Gibler, 2009),7 contiguity(Stinnett
5I exclude 995 and 996 because they are either internally triggered or by a non-
state entity
6http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.
7Correlates of War Project. Formal Alliance, 1816-2012. Version 4.1. I calculate













Figure A.4: Data description for the independent variables. This is the density plot
for the challenger’s and the target’s economic dependence.
et al., 2002),8, and power ratio (Singer, 1988; Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972).9 to
measure the probability of winning and costs of war.10 In addition, alliance, contigu-
ity, and major power status are included in measuring how a state values the status
quo while power ratio affects its attitude toward concession.11
adversary should they have one, to measure the help and costs he can expect in times
of war.
8Correlates of War Project. Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2016. Version 3.2.
9Correlates of War Project. National Material Capabilities, 1816-2012. Version
5.0.
10When evaluating the payoffs of war, I tweak the alliance factor to only reflect
the number of defense pack a country has outside the dyad because I do not expect
alliance status affect the payoffs of two allies fighting each other.
11For major power status, see Correlates of War Project. 2017. "State System Mem-
bership List, v2016." Online, http://correlatesofwar.org. This choice is largely
informed by the concern of the trade share measurement does not fully taken into
account a country’s size (Xiang, Xu and Keteku, 2007; Hegre, 2009). Note that I
include it only in the conflict initiation stage because when it comes to the brink of
war the power ratio variable can better capture the impact of power difference. That
is, while it may be attractive or unattractive to challenge a major power, when a
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A.2.3 Summary Statistics
In this section, I present the summary statistics. Table A.1 presents the results
when using no militarized action (MID hostility level is 1) as status quo. Table A.2
presents the results for the alternative status quo (using affinity). The sample size and
missingness vary across the two. Trade Dependence1(2).net and Trade Share1(2).net
are the variables weighted by the closeness measurement.
Table A.1: Summary Statistics Using No Militarized Action as SQ.
Median Mean S.D. #ofNA #ofValues
SQ 0.0000 0.2199 0.41 0 3202
CD 0.0000 0.0831 0.28 0 3202
BD 1.0000 0.5575 0.50 0 3202
WAR 0.0000 0.1396 0.35 0 3202
Trade Dependence1 0.0030 0.0171 0.04 1894 1308
Trade Dependence2 0.0023 0.0172 0.04 1863 1339
Trade Share1 0.0121 0.0611 0.13 914 2288
Trade Share2 0.0120 0.0627 0.13 904 2298
Trade Dependence1.net 0.0009 0.0057 0.02 1894 1308
Trade Dependence2.net 0.0008 0.0055 0.01 1863 1339
Trade Share1.net 0.0041 0.0279 0.08 914 2288
Trade Share2.net 0.0042 0.0276 0.07 904 2298
Power Ratio 0.4765 0.4853 0.34 0 3202
Contiguity 1.0000 0.5968 0.49 0 3202
Defense1 1.0000 8.6071 11.74 0 3202
Defense2 1.0000 8.7951 11.96 0 3202
Alliance 0.0000 0.2605 0.44 0 3202
Democracy1 -2.0000 -0.5286 7.19 111 3091
Democracy2 -3.0000 -0.8337 7.15 70 3132
Major1 0.0000 0.2580 0.44 0 3202
Major2 0.0000 0.2864 0.45 0 3202
war actually breaks out what really matters is the power difference, instead of the
reputation of being a major power.
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics Using Affinity as SQ.
Median Mean S.D. #ofNA #ofValues
SQ 1.0000 0.7022 0.46 0 8387
CD 0.0000 0.0317 0.18 0 8387
BD 0.0000 0.2128 0.41 0 8387
WAR 0.0000 0.0533 0.22 0 8387
Trade Dependence1 0.0007 0.0272 0.07 4155 4232
Trade Dependence2 0.0006 0.0273 0.08 4099 4288
Trade Share1 0.0033 0.0473 0.11 2266 6121
Trade Share2 0.0030 0.0491 0.11 2258 6129
Trade Dependence1.net 0.0002 0.0098 0.03 4155 4232
Trade Dependence2.net 0.0001 0.0097 0.03 4099 4288
Trade Share1.net 0.0010 0.0188 0.05 2266 6121
Trade Share2.net 0.0009 0.0195 0.05 2258 6129
Power Ratio 0.4992 0.4984 0.40 452 7935
Contiguity 0.0000 0.2069 0.41 0 8387
Defense1 7.0000 15.1344 19.21 0 8387
Defense2 9.0000 15.5036 19.29 0 8387
Alliance 0.0000 0.1387 0.35 0 8387
Democracy1 3.0000 1.2185 7.63 954 7433
Democracy2 3.0000 1.1664 7.66 853 7534
Major1 0.0000 0.2540 0.44 0 8387
Major2 0.0000 0.2528 0.43 0 8387
A.3 Model Specification
For simplicity, I write SQi, CDi, BDi,WARi where i ∈ (1, 2) for the outcomes of sta-
tus quo, concession by the target, backing down by the initiator, and war respectively.
The details of each function are shown as follows.
I include each side’ economic dependence in their own decision node. That is,
state 1’s dependence is included when he has to choose whether or not to change the
status quo (SQ1), whether or not to back down when the opponent resists his threat
(BD1), and player 2’s dependence is included in her choice over concession or further
escalation (CD2).
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Table A.3: Model specification.
Player Outcome Variables
1 SQ Economic Dependence of State 1, Alliance, Contiguity,
Major Power Status of State 1, Major Power Status of State 2
1 CD Power Ratio
1 BD Economic Dependence of State 1, Democracy of State 1
1 WAR Power Ratio, Contiguity, Defense Pacts of State 1
2 CD Economic Dependence of State 2, Democracy of State 2
2 WAR Power Ratio, Contiguity, Defense Pacts of State 2
Democracy is included whenever a player has to worry about audience costs
(BD1, CD2). The payoff of war (WAR1,WAR2) is determined by power ratio, con-
tiguity, and outside defense pacts. The payoff of concession to the signaler (CD1)
is affected by the two countries’ power ratio. Ideally, I should also include it in the
target’s concession payoff function (CD2). However, that would violate the require-
ment for identification (See Whang, McLean and Kuberski, 2013, for details). For
the status quo (SQ1) function, I also include alliance between the two states and
contiguity. Note that the alliance variable captures the total number of alliance pacts
between the two countries, which differs from the defense variable that sums the total
number of defense pacts outside the dyad.
Starting Points and the Maximum Likelihood Estimation
The structural estimation in Whang, McLean and Kuberski (2013) requires a set
of "starting points" for the parameter estimates. That is, before searching for the
estimates that maximize the likelihood of observing the data, we need to specify a
vector of coefficient estimates to start the search. Intuitively, this choice may dictate
the results. However, Whang, McLean and Kuberski (2013) do not lay down explicitly
how to specify them.
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In this paper, I use two methods to explicitly specify and evaluate the estimates.
First, I start by using the estimates from simply running the logistic regressions of the
outcome variables on the related regressors. Given the values in the structural estima-
tion model are normalized between 0 and 1, I shrink these values by 0.01 (shrinking
them to be smaller values also works, though that may take more computation time).
Second, following Whang, McLean and Kuberski (2013) I use the new coefficient es-
timates to loop through the maximum likelihood estimation for a sufficient number
of times (with the maximum set at 20). The final set of estimates is selected when
the improvement in log-likelihood is only marginal, i.e., smaller than 1, or when the
number of loop has reached the maximum. Admittedly, these choices are somewhat
arbitrary and may over-fit the data. But given the purpose of this paper, I opt to
focus more on bias reduction.
A.4 Trade Network Measurement
In this section, I show additional plots of the closeness meansure of trade networks
weighted by trade volume. Further details can be found in my R code.
A.4.1 Dealing with the Problem of Disconnected Components
Another challenge is to deal with problem of disconnected trade network. Without
accounting this possibility, the closeness measurement may falsely predict a state to
be highly integrated, while in fact it is simply because it is relatively cut off from
the global economy. As an illustration, Figure A.5 (b) plots the integration level of
the U.S. and China without accounting this possibility. Oddly, it declines over time.
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(b) Without Accounting for Disconnected Components
Figure A.5: Closeness Level with and without Accounting Disconnected Components.
In comparison, the measurement I use in the paper accounts for the possibility of
disconnectedness. I plot the closeness level of the U.S. accounting this possibility in
Figure A.5 (a). It increases over time and drops sharply during the two world war.
Both stands in stark contrast to Figure A.5 (b). Given that this tallies better with
reality, I opt to use such a measurement throughout the paper.
A.4.2 Plots of Some Relatively Small yet Highly Integrated Economies
In this section, I demonstrate the closeness values and rankings of Japan, Singapore,
and South Korea. We can see that the values of all three countries are around 1.5









1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000









1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
(b) Ranking: Japan−Singapore−South Korea
Figure A.6: Level of Closeness Using Dyadic Trade.
A.4.3 Plots of Some Autarkic States
In this section, I demonstrate the closeness values and rankings of North Korea and
Afghanistan. We can see that although the two countries’ closeness values do increase
after the 1960s the rates plateau in recent decades. Their relative positions compared
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(b) Ranking: Afghanistan−North Korea
Figure A.7: Level of Closeness Using Dyadic Trade.
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A.5 Structural Estimation Results Using MID
In this section, I present the tables and graphs of all the models using the MID data.
A.5.1 Trade Dependence with Network
This is the main model (model 1) used in the paper.
Table A.4: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 −0.34 (−3.44, 2.75)
SQ1:Alliance −0.03 (−0.13, 0.07)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.55∗∗∗ (−0.77, −0.32)
SQ1:Major1 −0.003 (−0.12, 0.12)
SQ1:Major2 −0.04 (−0.16, 0.09)
CD1:Constant −0.74 (−5.17, 3.69)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.17 (−3.59, 3.93)
BD1:Constant 0.32∗ (−0.04, 0.69)
BD1:TradeDepend1 0.14 (−3.83, 4.12)
BD1:Democracy1 0.02∗ (−0.001, 0.03)
War1:Constant 0.13 (−0.39, 0.64)
War1:PowerRatio 0.12 (−0.10, 0.34)
War1:Contiguity −0.45∗ (−0.92, 0.03)
War1:Defense1 −0.0004 (−0.003, 0.002)
CD2:Constant −0.06∗ (−0.12, 0.003)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.60∗∗∗ (0.35, 0.85)
CD2:Democracy −0.001 (−0.004, 0.002)
War2:Constant 0.27 (−1.42, 1.97)
War2:PowerRatio 0.67 (−0.66, 2.00)
War2:Contiguity 0.18 (−0.50, 0.86)
War2:Defense2 0.02 (−0.01, 0.04)
Observations 1041
Log-likelihood 830.64
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Figure A.8: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.5.2 Alternative SQ and Trade Dependence with Network
This is model 3 in the paper. The key coefficient estimates and plots are similar to
thereof the main model.
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Table A.5: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.15 (−1.95, 2.24)
SQ1:Alliance 0.01 (−0.06, 0.08)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.56∗∗∗ (−0.78, −0.34)
SQ1:Major1 0.36∗∗∗ (0.16, 0.55)
SQ1:Major2 0.12∗ (−0.002, 0.24)
CD1:Constant −0.55∗∗ (−0.99, −0.10)
CD1:PowerRatio −0.15 (−1.26, 0.96)
BD1:Constant −0.22∗ (−0.46, 0.03)
BD1:TradeDepend1 0.03 (−5.02, 5.09)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.03∗∗∗ (−0.04, −0.02)
War1:Constant −0.07 (−0.37, 0.24)
War1:PowerRatio 0.04 (−0.14, 0.22)
War1:Contiguity −0.48∗∗∗ (−0.71, −0.25)
War1:Defense1 0.003 (−0.001, 0.01)
CD2:Constant −0.01∗∗∗ (−0.01, −0.003)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.03∗∗∗ (0.01, 0.05)
CD2:Democracy 0.0003∗ (−0.0000, 0.001)
War2:Constant 0.42∗ (−0.06, 0.90)
War2:PowerRatio 0.42 (−0.16, 1.00)
War2:Contiguity 1.38∗∗∗ (0.98, 1.78)
War2:Defense2 −0.02∗∗∗ (−0.03, −0.01)
Observations 3256
Log-likelihood 1496.83





























Figure A.9: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.5.3 Trade Share with Network
This model uses the trade share measurement weighted by the level of closeness.
Most coefficient estimates and plots are similar to thereof the main model. But one
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important exception is the plot for deception, possibly driven the relatively large
coefficient estimate of BD1:TradeDepend1.
Table A.6: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.40 (−0.85, 1.65)
SQ1:Alliance 0.02 (−0.07, 0.11)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.28∗∗∗ (−0.40, −0.16)
SQ1:Major1 −0.21∗∗ (−0.37, −0.04)
SQ1:Major2 0.12∗∗ (0.01, 0.22)
CD1:Constant 0.18 (−1.83, 2.18)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.03 (−1.44, 1.50)
BD1:Constant 0.54∗∗∗ (0.32, 0.76)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.61 (−1.86, 0.64)
BD1:Democracy1 0.004 (−0.005, 0.01)
War1:Constant 0.02 (−1.23, 1.27)
War1:PowerRatio 0.03 (−0.08, 0.15)
War1:Contiguity −0.18 (−0.51, 0.15)
War1:Defense1 −0.002 (−0.005, 0.001)
CD2:Constant −0.18∗∗∗ (−0.27, −0.08)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.19∗∗ (0.04, 0.35)
CD2:Democracy −0.001 (−0.002, 0.0003)
War2:Constant −0.10 (−0.84, 0.65)
War2:PowerRatio 0.0002 (−0.58, 0.58)
War2:Contiguity −0.34 (−0.76, 0.08)
War2:Defense2 0.01∗ (−0.001, 0.02)
Observations 2170
Log-likelihood 2054.67
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Figure A.10: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
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A.5.4 Alternative SQ and Trade Share with Network
This is a model using the alternative SQ data (political affinity data for status quo
outcome). The key coefficient estimates and plots are similar to the main model
thereof, though the uncertainty is higher.
Table A.7: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 1.30∗∗∗ (0.41, 2.19)
SQ1:Alliance −0.19∗∗∗ (−0.28, −0.09)
SQ1:Contiguity −1.50∗∗∗ (−1.79, −1.20)
SQ1:Major1 −0.04 (−0.11, 0.02)
SQ1:Major2 −0.23∗∗∗ (−0.35, −0.12)
CD1:Constant −1.23∗∗ (−2.21, −0.25)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.17 (−0.40, 0.74)
BD1:Constant −0.62∗∗∗ (−0.97, −0.28)
BD1:TradeDepend1 2.77∗∗∗ (1.34, 4.21)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.01∗∗∗ (−0.02, −0.003)
War1:Constant −0.38 (−0.84, 0.08)
War1:PowerRatio 0.36∗∗∗ (0.13, 0.58)
War1:Contiguity −1.34∗∗∗ (−1.81, −0.87)
War1:Defense1 −0.01∗∗∗ (−0.02, −0.01)
CD2:Constant −0.0001 (−0.0003, 0.0002)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.0001 (−0.0002, 0.0003)
CD2:Democracy −0.0000 (−0.0000, 0.0000)
War2:Constant 0.63∗∗∗ (0.41, 0.85)
War2:PowerRatio −0.10 (−0.34, 0.14)
War2:Contiguity 1.22∗∗∗ (1.04, 1.40)
War2:Defense2 −0.01∗∗∗ (−0.02, −0.01)
Observations 5520
Log-likelihood -3021.78
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Figure A.11: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.5.5 Trade Dependence without Network
This is a model using the trade dependence measurement without weighing by close-
ness. Most key coefficient estimates and plots are similar to thereof the main model,
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though the uncertainty is higher and the impact much smaller. But one important
exception is the plot for deception, possibly driven the relatively large coefficient
estimate of BD1:TradeDepend1.
Table A.8: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.13 (−0.87, 1.13)
SQ1:Alliance 0.03 (−0.03, 0.09)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.76∗∗∗ (−1.01, −0.51)
SQ1:Major1 0.03 (−0.05, 0.10)
SQ1:Major2 −0.07 (−0.22, 0.08)
CD1:Constant 1.45 (−3.92, 6.82)
CD1:PowerRatio 5.16 (−2.96, 13.28)
BD1:Constant −0.03 (−0.34, 0.28)
BD1:TradeDepend1 0.41 (−1.01, 1.83)
BD1:Democracy1 0.01 (−0.01, 0.02)
War1:Constant −0.30 (−1.00, 0.40)
War1:PowerRatio 0.04 (−0.05, 0.14)
War1:Contiguity −0.41 (−1.16, 0.33)
War1:Defense1 −0.0001∗∗∗ (−0.0001, −0.0001)
CD2:Constant −0.03∗∗ (−0.06, −0.005)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.01 (−0.07, 0.08)
CD2:Democracy −0.0001 (−0.0005, 0.0004)
War2:Constant 0.78∗∗ (0.09, 1.48)
War2:PowerRatio 0.49∗ (−0.04, 1.03)
War2:Contiguity 0.16 (−0.11, 0.42)
War2:Defense2 −0.0003 (−0.003, 0.002)
Observations 1041
Log-likelihood 818.15





























Figure A.12: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
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A.5.6 Alternative SQ and Trade Dependence without Network
This is a model using the trade dependence measurement without weighing by close-
ness and the alternative SQ data. The main result is of the opposite sign. But the
uncertainty is high.
Table A.9: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 2.58 (−1.38, 6.53)
SQ1:Alliance −0.08 (−0.23, 0.07)
SQ1:Contiguity −2.45∗∗∗ (−2.74, −2.17)
SQ1:Major1 0.36∗∗∗ (0.11, 0.60)
SQ1:Major2 0.21∗∗ (0.05, 0.37)
CD1:Constant 1.18 (−4.42, 6.78)
CD1:PowerRatio 1.15 (−4.63, 6.93)
BD1:Constant −1.27∗∗∗ (−1.62, −0.93)
BD1:TradeDepend1 0.65 (−3.37, 4.67)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.002 (−0.01, 0.01)
War1:Constant −0.95 (−1.15, −0.74)
War1:PowerRatio −0.25∗∗ (−0.48, −0.03)
War1:Contiguity −1.05∗∗∗ (−1.24, −0.86)
War1:Defense1 −0.01 (−0.01, 0.001)
CD2:Constant −0.004 (−0.02, 0.01)
CD2:TradeDepend2 −0.01 (−0.14, 0.11)
CD2:Democracy 0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000, 0.0000)
War2:Constant 1.53∗∗∗ (0.99, 2.07)
War2:PowerRatio −0.69∗∗ (−1.31, −0.07)
War2:Contiguity 0.33 (−0.13, 0.79)
War2:Defense2 0.003 (−0.005, 0.01)
Observations 3256
Log-likelihood 1250.38
























0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
(d) War
Figure A.13: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.5.7 Trade Share without Network
This is model 4 used in the paper.
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Table A.10: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.15 (−0.18, 0.48)
SQ1:Alliance 0.01 (−0.05, 0.06)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.31∗∗∗ (−0.44, −0.18)
SQ1:Major1 −0.10 (−0.23, 0.03)
SQ1:Major2 0.03 (−0.03, 0.09)
CD1:Constant 0.51 (−0.81, 1.83)
CD1:PowerRatio −0.24 (−1.10, 0.62)
BD1:Constant 0.44∗∗∗ (0.25, 0.63)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.54∗∗ (−1.04, −0.03)
BD1:Democracy1 0.01∗ (−0.001, 0.02)
War1:Constant 0.04 (−0.44, 0.52)
War1:PowerRatio 0.08 (−0.03, 0.19)
War1:Contiguity −0.28∗∗ (−0.50, −0.06)
War1:Defense1 −0.003∗∗ (−0.01, −0.0004)
CD2:Constant −0.12∗∗∗ (−0.13, −0.11)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.09∗∗ (0.01, 0.16)
CD2:Democracy −0.002∗∗∗ (−0.002, −0.002)
War2:Constant 0.21 (−0.15, 0.56)
War2:PowerRatio 0.12 (−0.32, 0.56)
War2:Contiguity −0.16 (−0.39, 0.06)
War2:Defense2 0.01∗∗∗ (0.004, 0.02)
Observations 2170
Log-likelihood -2048.66
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Figure A.14: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.5.8 Alternative SQ and Trade Share without Network
This is a model using the trade share measurement without weighing by closeness
and the alternative SQ data. The main result is of the opposite sign, which is also
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marginally significant. However, as the plots show, the level of uncertainty widens
signficantly as the trade share variable rises.
Table A.11: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.01 (−0.10, 0.11)
SQ1:Alliance 0.004 (−0.02, 0.03)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.01 (−0.08, 0.07)
SQ1:Major1 −0.03 (−0.08, 0.02)
SQ1:Major2 −0.002 (−0.03, 0.03)
CD1:Constant 0.003 (−0.18, 0.18)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.005 (−0.15, 0.16)
BD1:Constant −0.01 (−0.06, 0.04)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.04 (−0.39, 0.31)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.03∗∗∗ (−0.03, −0.02)
War1:Constant −0.07 (−0.21, 0.07)
War1:PowerRatio −0.02 (−0.07, 0.04)
War1:Contiguity 0.07 (−0.04, 0.18)
War1:Defense1 −0.004 (−0.01, 0.002)
CD2:Constant −0.001∗∗∗ (−0.001, −0.001)
CD2:TradeDepend2 −0.01∗ (−0.02, 0.001)
CD2:Democracy 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0001, 0.0001)
War2:Constant 0.28∗∗ (0.06, 0.50)
War2:PowerRatio −0.02 (−0.28, 0.24)
War2:Contiguity 0.02 (−0.16, 0.19)
War2:Defense2 0.09∗∗∗ (0.08, 0.09)
Observations 5520
Log-likelihood -5017.41
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Figure A.15: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.6 Structural Estimation Results Using ICB
In this section, I present the tables and graphs of all the models using the ICB dataset.
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A.6.1 Trade Dependence with Network
This is model 2 in the paper. The key coefficient estimates are highly significant,
resulting in extremely small range of uncertainty in the plots.
Table A.12: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 3.19 (−4.70, 11.08)
SQ1:Alliance 0.04 (−0.07, 0.15)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.23 (−0.64, 0.17)
SQ1:Major1 0.27 (−0.06, 0.60)
SQ1:Major2 0.14 (−0.12, 0.41)
CD1:Constant −0.11 (−3.26, 3.03)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.18 (−2.59, 2.96)
BD1:Constant −1.03∗∗∗ (−1.71, −0.34)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −4.62 (−20.06, 10.81)
BD1:Democracy1 0.01∗∗ (0.001, 0.03)
War1:Constant −0.25∗ (−0.54, 0.04)
War1:PowerRatio 0.20 (−0.07, 0.48)
War1:Contiguity −0.36∗∗ (−0.70, −0.02)
War1:Defense1 0.002 (−0.001, 0.01)
CD2:Constant −0.16∗∗∗ (−0.17, −0.15)
CD2:TradeDepend2 1.22∗∗∗ (1.20, 1.23)
CD2:Democracy 0.01∗ (−0.002, 0.03)
War2:Constant 1.08 (−0.54, 2.69)
War2:PowerRatio −0.43 (−2.28, 1.42)
War2:Contiguity −0.37 (−1.04, 0.30)
War2:Defense2 0.04∗ (−0.004, 0.08)
Observations 800
Log-likelihood 599.07
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Figure A.16: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.6.2 Alternative SQ and Trade Dependence with Network
This model uses a different SQ data. The key coefficient estimates and plots all point
to the opposite direction. But the uncertianty is high.
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Table A.13: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 1.57 (−5.69, 8.83)
SQ1:Alliance −0.10 (−0.27, 0.08)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.74∗∗∗ (−1.20, −0.27)
SQ1:Major1 0.88∗∗∗ (0.44, 1.31)
SQ1:Major2 0.03 (−0.15, 0.20)
CD1:Constant −0.71∗ (−1.55, 0.13)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.28 (−1.32, 1.87)
BD1:Constant −1.12∗∗∗ (−1.61, −0.63)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.68 (−28.27, 26.91)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.01 (−0.03, 0.01)
War1:Constant −0.57∗ (−1.20, 0.07)
War1:PowerRatio −0.13 (−0.54, 0.28)
War1:Contiguity −0.20 (−0.92, 0.52)
War1:Defense1 0.005 (−0.002, 0.01)
CD2:Constant −0.21∗∗∗ (−0.21, −0.21)
CD2:TradeDepend2 −0.59 (−2.48, 1.30)
CD2:Democracy 0.02∗∗∗ (0.02, 0.02)
War2:Constant −0.11 (−1.07, 0.85)
War2:PowerRatio 0.17 (−0.99, 1.34)
War2:Contiguity 1.40∗∗∗ (0.73, 2.06)
War2:Defense2 −0.0002 (−0.01, 0.01)
Observations 2659
Log-likelihood 642.65
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Figure A.17: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
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A.6.3 Trade Share with Network
This model uses the trade share measurement weighing by closeness. The key co-
efficient estimates and the plot of concession point to the opposite direction. The
likelihood of war is still reduced in this model.
Table A.14: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 1.47∗∗∗ (0.62, 2.33)
SQ1:Alliance −0.10∗∗ (−0.18, −0.02)
SQ1:Contiguity 0.08∗∗∗ (0.07, 0.08)
SQ1:Major1 −0.13∗∗∗ (−0.22, −0.04)
SQ1:Major2 0.07∗ (−0.0002, 0.14)
CD1:Constant 1.69 (1.49, 1.90)
CD1:PowerRatio 1.40 (1.18, 1.62)
BD1:Constant −0.74∗∗∗ (−0.98, −0.50)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.03 (−0.80, 0.74)
BD1:Democracy1 0.002∗∗∗ (0.002, 0.003)
War1:Constant −0.38∗∗∗ (−0.51, −0.25)
War1:PowerRatio −0.09∗ (−0.20, 0.01)
War1:Contiguity −0.26 (−0.45, −0.06)
War1:Defense1 −0.001∗∗ (−0.001, −0.0001)
CD2:Constant −0.57∗∗∗ (−0.61, −0.53)
CD2:TradeDepend2 −0.68∗∗∗ (−1.04, −0.32)
CD2:Democracy −0.004∗∗∗ (−0.01, −0.001)
War2:Constant 0.54 (0.28, 0.79)
War2:PowerRatio −0.28∗ (−0.60, 0.04)
War2:Contiguity −0.64∗∗∗ (−0.94, −0.34)
War2:Defense2 −0.0000 (−0.003, 0.003)
Observations 1864
Log-likelihood -1849.79

























Figure A.18: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.6.4 Alternative SQ and Trade Share with Network
This model uses the trade share measurement weighted by closeness and the alterna-
tive SQ data. Restuls are similiar to thereof the main model, though less significant.
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Table A.15: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 2.01∗ (−0.03, 4.05)
SQ1:Alliance −0.34∗∗∗ (−0.51, −0.18)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.84∗∗∗ (−1.02, −0.66)
SQ1:Major1 −0.14∗∗∗ (−0.25, −0.04)
SQ1:Major2 0.09 (−0.02, 0.19)
CD1:Constant −0.89∗∗∗ (−1.31, −0.47)
CD1:PowerRatio −0.09 (−0.78, 0.60)
BD1:Constant −1.49∗∗∗ (−1.63, −1.34)
BD1:TradeDepend1 3.08∗∗∗ (0.91, 5.25)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.04∗∗∗ (−0.05, −0.03)
War1:Constant −0.55∗∗ (−1.03, −0.08)
War1:PowerRatio −0.28∗ (−0.59, 0.03)
War1:Contiguity −0.18 (−0.75, 0.38)
War1:Defense1 −0.02∗∗∗ (−0.03, −0.01)
CD2:Constant −0.68∗∗∗ (−0.90, −0.46)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.28 (−0.15, 0.70)
CD2:Democracy 0.05∗∗∗ (0.04, 0.06)
War2:Constant −0.62∗∗ (−1.10, −0.13)
War2:PowerRatio 0.64∗∗∗ (0.22, 1.06)
War2:Contiguity 0.14 (−0.17, 0.46)
War2:Defense2 −0.004 (−0.01, 0.01)
Observations 4569
Log-likelihood -2065.35
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Figure A.19: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
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A.6.5 Trade Dependence without Network
This model uses the trade depedence measurement without closeness. The key coef-
ficent estimates are of the same direction, though not significnat. Plots of the results
indicate possible signs of separation.
Table A.16: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 4.88 (−1.20, 10.95)
SQ1:Alliance 0.01 (−0.03, 0.05)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.30∗ (−0.66, 0.05)
SQ1:Major1 0.08 (−0.08, 0.25)
SQ1:Major2 0.02 (−0.08, 0.12)
CD1:Constant −0.63 (−1.95, 0.69)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.37 (−0.84, 1.57)
BD1:Constant −1.10∗∗ (−2.12, −0.07)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −2.54 (−13.30, 8.22)
BD1:Democracy1 0.01 (−0.01, 0.02)
War1:Constant 0.05 (−0.10, 0.20)
War1:PowerRatio −0.05 (−0.23, 0.13)
War1:Contiguity −0.31∗ (−0.68, 0.05)
War1:Defense1 −0.0001 (−0.002, 0.002)
CD2:Constant −0.14 (−0.39, 0.11)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.68 (−3.33, 4.68)
CD2:Democracy 0.01 (−0.01, 0.02)
War2:Constant 0.83∗ (−0.02, 1.67)
War2:PowerRatio 0.32 (−0.30, 0.95)
War2:Contiguity −0.39 (−0.92, 0.14)
War2:Defense2 0.01 (−0.004, 0.03)
Observations 800
Log-likelihood 582.17
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Figure A.20: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
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A.6.6 Alternative SQ and Trade Dependence without Network
This model uses the trade depedence measurement without closeness and the alter-
native SQ data. The key coefficent estimates are of the opposite direction, though
not significnat. Plots of the results indicate possible signs of separation.
Table A.17: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.53 (−1.76, 2.82)
SQ1:Alliance −0.15∗∗ (−0.28, −0.02)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.23 (−0.81, 0.34)
SQ1:Major1 0.70∗∗∗ (0.29, 1.12)
SQ1:Major2 0.50∗∗∗ (0.15, 0.85)
CD1:Constant −0.70∗∗∗ (−1.10, −0.31)
CD1:PowerRatio −0.47 (−1.41, 0.47)
BD1:Constant −0.57 (−1.27, 0.13)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.05 (−4.31, 4.22)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.03∗∗∗ (−0.04, −0.01)
War1:Constant 0.12 (−0.40, 0.65)
War1:PowerRatio 0.33∗∗ (0.03, 0.63)
War1:Contiguity −0.47∗∗∗ (−0.81, −0.13)
War1:Defense1 0.003∗∗∗ (0.003, 0.003)
CD2:Constant −0.15∗∗∗ (−0.21, −0.10)
CD2:TradeDepend2 −0.39 (−3.30, 2.53)
CD2:Democracy 0.01∗∗∗ (0.01, 0.02)
War2:Constant −0.20 (−1.02, 0.62)
War2:PowerRatio −0.02 (−0.79, 0.74)
War2:Contiguity 1.56∗∗∗ (0.91, 2.22)
War2:Defense2 −0.01∗∗∗ (−0.01, −0.002)
Observations 2659
Log-likelihood 620.47
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Figure A.21: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
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A.6.7 Trade Share without Network
This model uses the trade share measurement without weighing by closeness. The
key coefficient estimates point to the opposite direction. The likelihood of war is still
reduced in this model.
Table A.18: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.54∗ (−0.04, 1.11)
SQ1:Alliance −0.09∗ (−0.19, 0.01)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.11∗ (−0.24, 0.02)
SQ1:Major1 −0.05∗ (−0.12, 0.01)
SQ1:Major2 0.004 (−0.03, 0.04)
CD1:Constant −0.25 (−1.64, 1.14)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.76 (−0.23, 1.76)
BD1:Constant −0.83∗∗∗ (−1.01, −0.64)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.18 (−0.96, 0.61)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.02∗∗∗ (−0.03, −0.01)
War1:Constant −0.12 (−0.30, 0.07)
War1:PowerRatio −0.06 (−0.17, 0.04)
War1:Contiguity −0.26∗∗∗ (−0.46, −0.06)
War1:Defense1 −0.001 (−0.004, 0.001)
CD2:Constant −0.06∗∗∗ (−0.07, −0.05)
CD2:TradeDepend2 −0.49∗∗∗ (−0.83, −0.15)
CD2:Democracy −0.01∗∗ (−0.01, −0.001)
War2:Constant 1.39∗∗∗ (1.08, 1.69)
War2:PowerRatio −0.19 (−0.56, 0.17)
War2:Contiguity −0.31∗∗ (−0.55, −0.07)
War2:Defense2 0.001 (−0.01, 0.01)
Observations 1864
Log-likelihood -1847.04
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Figure A.22: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.6.8 Alternative SQ and Trade Share without Network
This model uses the trade share measurement weighing by closeness and the alterna-
tive SQ data. The results and plots are similar to those of the main model.
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Table A.19: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.28 (−0.58, 1.14)
SQ1:Alliance −0.58∗∗∗ (−0.78, −0.38)
SQ1:Contiguity −1.98∗∗∗ (−2.43, −1.53)
SQ1:Major1 −0.48∗∗∗ (−0.66, −0.30)
SQ1:Major2 −0.59∗∗∗ (−0.82, −0.37)
CD1:Constant 10.60∗∗∗ (6.06, 15.14)
CD1:PowerRatio −4.24∗∗∗ (−6.74, −1.75)
BD1:Constant −3.52∗∗∗ (−4.34, −2.70)
BD1:TradeDepend1 1.04∗∗ (0.22, 1.86)
BD1:Democracy1 0.01∗∗ (0.001, 0.02)
War1:Constant −3.46∗∗∗ (−4.30, −2.62)
War1:PowerRatio −0.14∗∗ (−0.28, −0.01)
War1:Contiguity −0.12 (−0.27, 0.03)
War1:Defense1 −0.01∗∗∗ (−0.01, −0.002)
CD2:Constant −0.13∗∗∗ (−0.19, −0.06)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.04∗∗ (0.01, 0.08)
CD2:Democracy −0.01∗∗∗ (−0.01, −0.003)
War2:Constant 0.71∗∗∗ (0.49, 0.93)
War2:PowerRatio −0.45∗∗∗ (−0.65, −0.26)
War2:Contiguity 0.22∗∗∗ (0.10, 0.35)
War2:Defense2 0.01∗∗∗ (0.002, 0.01)
Observations 4569
Log-likelihood -1759.64



























Figure A.23: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.7 Structural Estimation Results Including GDP and Closeness as
Controls
In this section, I present the results of models including GDP and closeness as controls.
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A.7.1 Trade Dependence
This model uses the trade dependence measurement weighted by my closeness data.
The pattern of relation is similar but weaker.
Table A.20: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.21 (−1.55, 1.96)
SQ1:GDP1 −0.01 (−0.05, 0.02)
SQ1:Closeness1 0.14 (−0.29, 0.56)
SQ1:Alliance −0.005 (−0.03, 0.02)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.16∗ (−0.34, 0.01)
SQ1:Major1 0.002 (−0.03, 0.04)
SQ1:Major2 0.01 (−0.04, 0.06)
CD1:Constant −0.09 (−3.54, 3.35)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.26 (−1.17, 1.69)
BD1:Constant −0.15 (−0.73, 0.42)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.02 (−5.29, 5.24)
BD1:GDP1 0.08 (−0.03, 0.19)
BD1:Closeness1 −0.09 (−1.21, 1.02)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.01 (−0.02, 0.01)
War1:Constant −0.09 (−0.56, 0.37)
War1:PowerRatio 0.03 (−0.11, 0.16)
War1:Contiguity −0.18∗ (−0.39, 0.02)
War1:Defense1 0.0001 (−0.001, 0.001)
CD2:Constant −0.24 (−0.56, 0.08)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.40 (−1.16, 1.95)
CD2:GDP2 −0.02 (−0.05, 0.02)
CD2:Closeness2 0.25 (−0.10, 0.60)
CD2:Democracy −0.003 (−0.01, 0.001)
War2:Constant 0.06 (−3.13, 3.24)
War2:PowerRatio 0.01 (−1.98, 2.00)
Observations 1041
Log-likelihood 830.13
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Figure A.24: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.7.2 Alernative SQ and Trade Dependence
This model uses the trade dependence measurement weighted by my closeness data
and the alternative SQ data. The pattern of relation is similar but weaker.
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Table A.21: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.12 (−5.17, 5.41)
SQ1:GDP1 0.06 (−0.02, 0.13)
SQ1:Closeness1 0.03 (−0.71, 0.76)
SQ1:Alliance 0.10 (−0.05, 0.25)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.79∗∗∗ (−1.05, −0.53)
SQ1:Major1 0.04 (−0.17, 0.24)
SQ1:Major2 0.01 (−0.19, 0.21)
CD1:Constant −0.12 (−0.82, 0.59)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.15 (−1.74, 2.03)
BD1:Constant 0.05 (−0.60, 0.70)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.11 (−4.43, 4.21)
BD1:GDP1 −0.01 (−0.09, 0.07)
BD1:Closeness1 0.16 (−0.52, 0.83)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.01 (−0.02, 0.002)
War1:Constant 0.02 (−1.09, 1.14)
War1:PowerRatio 0.21 (−0.13, 0.55)
War1:Contiguity −0.48∗∗ (−0.93, −0.04)
War1:Defense1 0.004 (−0.001, 0.01)
CD2:Constant −0.11 (−0.32, 0.10)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.22 (−1.78, 2.23)
CD2:GDP2 −0.001 (−0.02, 0.02)
CD2:Closeness2 0.03 (−0.21, 0.27)
CD2:Democracy 0.003 (−0.001, 0.01)
War2:Constant 0.10 (−1.19, 1.39)
War2:PowerRatio 0.12 (−0.75, 1.00)
Observations 3256
Log-likelihood 1438.54























Figure A.25: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.7.3 Trade Dependence without Network
This model uses the trade dependence measurement without weighing by my closeness
data. The pattern of relation is similar but weaker.
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Table A.22: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.03 (−0.48, 0.55)
SQ1:GDP1 0.0000 (−0.002, 0.002)
SQ1:Closeness1 0.002 (−0.13, 0.13)
SQ1:Alliance −0.02 (−0.05, 0.02)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.05 (−0.22, 0.12)
SQ1:Major1 −0.01 (−0.06, 0.03)
SQ1:Major2 −0.004 (−0.04, 0.03)
CD1:Constant −0.14 (−1.92, 1.64)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.13 (−1.17, 1.43)
BD1:Constant 0.02 (−0.50, 0.53)
BD1:TradeDepend1 0.16 (−1.64, 1.96)
BD1:GDP1 0.05 (−0.03, 0.14)
BD1:Closeness1 0.03 (−0.84, 0.91)
BD1:Democracy1 0.005 (−0.01, 0.02)
War1:Constant −0.02 (−0.37, 0.33)
War1:PowerRatio 0.02 (−0.07, 0.11)
War1:Contiguity −0.06 (−0.24, 0.11)
War1:Defense1 −0.0004 (−0.001, 0.001)
CD2:Constant −0.02 (−0.24, 0.20)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.09 (−0.62, 0.80)
CD2:GDP2 −0.01 (−0.04, 0.02)
CD2:Closeness2 0.02 (−0.31, 0.35)
CD2:Democracy −0.0002 (−0.004, 0.003)
War2:Constant −0.09 (−3.87, 3.70)
War2:PowerRatio −0.03 (−1.93, 1.87)
Observations 1041
Log-likelihood 858.59





























Figure A.26: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.7.4 Alernative SQ and Trade Dependence without Network
This model uses the trade dependence measurement without weighing by my closeness
data and the alternative SQ data. The pattern of relation is similar but weaker.
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Table A.23: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 −0.13 (−0.95, 0.69)
SQ1:GDP1 0.06∗ (−0.001, 0.11)
SQ1:Closeness1 0.18 (−0.26, 0.62)
SQ1:Alliance −0.19∗∗ (−0.35, −0.02)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.63∗∗∗ (−0.84, −0.41)
SQ1:Major1 0.03 (−0.07, 0.14)
SQ1:Major2 0.08 (−0.09, 0.24)
CD1:Constant 0.04 (−0.67, 0.75)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.14 (−0.94, 1.21)
BD1:Constant 0.04 (−0.45, 0.52)
BD1:TradeDepend1 0.24 (−1.09, 1.57)
BD1:GDP1 0.01 (−0.06, 0.09)
BD1:Closeness1 0.03 (−0.63, 0.70)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.02∗∗∗ (−0.03, −0.01)
War1:Constant −0.05 (−0.59, 0.49)
War1:PowerRatio 0.10 (−0.15, 0.34)
War1:Contiguity −0.13 (−0.54, 0.27)
War1:Defense1 0.002 (−0.001, 0.005)
CD2:Constant −0.26∗∗∗ (−0.40, −0.13)
CD2:TradeDepend2 −0.02 (−0.51, 0.47)
CD2:GDP2 −0.002 (−0.01, 0.01)
CD2:Closeness2 0.11 (−0.03, 0.24)
CD2:Democracy 0.01∗∗∗ (0.004, 0.01)
War2:Constant 0.06 (−0.79, 0.91)
War2:PowerRatio 0.13 (−0.57, 0.83)
Observations 3256
Log-likelihood 1512.83
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Figure A.27: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.8 Structural Estimation Results Separating Trade, GDP, and
Closeness
In this section, I present the results separating trade share, GDP, and closeness.
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A.8.1 Trade Share without Network
This model uses the trade share measurement.12 The pattern of relation is similar,
though the uncertainty expands a bit.
Table A.24: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.24 (−0.28, 0.75)
SQ1:GDP1 −0.07∗∗∗ (−0.07, −0.06)
SQ1:Closeness1 0.59∗∗∗ (0.19, 1.00)
SQ1:Alliance −0.01 (−0.10, 0.09)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.46∗∗∗ (−0.70, −0.23)
SQ1:Major1 −0.12 (−0.30, 0.06)
SQ1:Major2 0.03 (−0.13, 0.18)
CD1:Constant −0.50 (−8.24, 7.24)
CD1:PowerRatio −0.73 (−5.86, 4.41)
BD1:Constant 0.05 (−0.67, 0.76)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.27 (−1.00, 0.46)
BD1:GDP1 0.01 (−0.09, 0.10)
BD1:Closeness1 0.23 (−0.83, 1.30)
BD1:Democracy1 0.01 (−0.01, 0.02)
War1:Constant 0.09 (−0.66, 0.85)
War1:PowerRatio 0.08 (−0.19, 0.35)
War1:Contiguity −0.40∗ (−0.86, 0.07)
War1:Defense1 −0.002 (−0.01, 0.002)
CD2:Constant 0.02 (−0.21, 0.24)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.16 (−0.07, 0.40)
CD2:GDP2 0.03∗∗∗ (0.02, 0.03)
CD2:Closeness2 −0.37∗∗∗ (−0.59, −0.16)
CD2:Democracy −0.002 (−0.01, 0.003)
War2:Constant 0.11 (−1.66, 1.87)
War2:PowerRatio 0.80 (−0.80, 2.39)
Observations 1041
Log-likelihood -825.65
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
12When adding controls for the weighted trade share, the structural estimation runs
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Figure A.28: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
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A.8.2 Trade Share with Alternative SQ
This model uses the trade share measurement weighted by trade networks. The
relation is nil. This could be attributed to the correlation between the weighted trade
share and the controls.
Table A.25: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.01 (−0.20, 0.21)
SQ1:GDP1 0.05∗∗∗ (0.05, 0.05)
SQ1:Closeness1 −0.0005 (−0.19, 0.19)
SQ1:Alliance 0.01 (−0.04, 0.05)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.01 (−0.10, 0.07)
SQ1:Major1 0.01 (−0.05, 0.07)
SQ1:Major2 −0.02 (−0.11, 0.06)
CD1:Constant −0.002 (−0.10, 0.10)
CD1:PowerRatio −0.0002 (−0.58, 0.58)
BD1:Constant −0.002 (−0.18, 0.17)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.005 (−1.61, 1.60)
BD1:GDP1 0.01 (−0.18, 0.20)
BD1:Closeness1 0.04 (−0.08, 0.15)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.02∗∗∗ (−0.02, −0.01)
War1:Constant −0.01 (−0.20, 0.19)
War1:PowerRatio −0.001 (−0.22, 0.22)
War1:Contiguity −0.01 (−0.12, 0.09)
War1:Defense1 0.0002 (−0.001, 0.001)
CD2:Constant −0.06 (−0.26, 0.13)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.002 (−0.21, 0.21)
CD2:GDP2 −0.002 (−0.21, 0.20)
CD2:Closeness2 0.01 (−0.02, 0.05)
CD2:Democracy 0.005∗∗∗ (0.003, 0.01)
War2:Constant 0.01 (−0.03, 0.06)
War2:PowerRatio 0.04 (−0.15, 0.24)
Observations 3256
Log-likelihood -1989.14





























Figure A.29: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.8.3 Alernative SQ and Trade Share without Network
This model uses the trade share measurement and the alternative SQ data. The
pattern of relation is similar, though the uncertainty expands a bit.
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Table A.26: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.16 (−0.56, 0.87)
SQ1:GDP1 0.05 (−0.02, 0.12)
SQ1:Closeness1 0.04 (−0.50, 0.58)
SQ1:Alliance 0.05 (−0.07, 0.17)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.65∗∗∗ (−0.85, −0.45)
SQ1:Major1 0.04 (−0.10, 0.17)
SQ1:Major2 −0.05 (−0.20, 0.10)
CD1:Constant −0.06 (−0.68, 0.57)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.002 (−1.67, 1.67)
BD1:Constant 0.10 (−0.44, 0.65)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.04 (−0.81, 0.72)
BD1:GDP1 0.004 (−0.08, 0.09)
BD1:Closeness1 −0.14 (−0.81, 0.54)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.01∗ (−0.02, 0.0000)
War1:Constant 0.05 (−0.88, 0.98)
War1:PowerRatio 0.08 (−0.16, 0.31)
War1:Contiguity −0.40∗∗ (−0.76, −0.05)
War1:Defense1 0.002 (−0.002, 0.01)
CD2:Constant −0.01 (−0.29, 0.26)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.13 (−0.12, 0.37)
CD2:GDP2 −0.01 (−0.04, 0.02)
CD2:Closeness2 0.01 (−0.35, 0.36)
CD2:Democracy 0.003 (−0.002, 0.01)
War2:Constant 0.17 (−1.46, 1.79)
War2:PowerRatio 0.53 (−0.32, 1.37)
Observations 3256
Log-likelihood -1498.95
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Figure A.30: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.9 Using Eigenvector Centrality




This model uses the trade dependence measurement weighted by the eigenvector
centrality measure. The coefficient estimates point to the opposite direction.
Table A.27: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 1.36∗ (−0.04, 2.77)
SQ1:Alliance 0.02 (−0.03, 0.06)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.59∗∗∗ (−0.83, −0.36)
SQ1:Major1 −0.05 (−0.13, 0.03)
SQ1:Major2 −0.06 (−0.14, 0.02)
CD1:Constant 1.30 (−3.93, 6.54)
CD1:PowerRatio 1.91 (−0.79, 4.62)
BD1:Constant 0.13 (−0.18, 0.44)
BD1:TradeDepend1 0.81 (−1.13, 2.75)
BD1:Democracy1 0.01 (−0.003, 0.03)
War1:Constant −0.52 (−1.40, 0.36)
War1:PowerRatio 0.12∗ (−0.02, 0.27)
War1:Contiguity −0.33∗∗ (−0.59, −0.06)
War1:Defense1 −0.0004 (−0.002, 0.001)
CD2:Constant −0.06∗∗ (−0.12, −0.01)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.01 (−0.11, 0.13)
CD2:Democracy 0.0001 (−0.001, 0.001)
War2:Constant 0.13 (−0.91, 1.17)
War2:PowerRatio 0.64 (−0.17, 1.45)
War2:Contiguity 0.27 (−0.14, 0.68)
War2:Defense2 −0.0001 (−0.003, 0.003)
Observations 1041
Log-likelihood 827.01
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Figure A.31: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
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A.9.2 Trade Dependence with Alternative SQ
This model uses the trade dependence measurement weighted by the eigenvector
centrality measure and the alternative SQ data. The coefficient estimates point to
the same direction, though not significantly.
Table A.28: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 2.79 (−0.66, 6.23)
SQ1:Alliance −0.39∗∗∗ (−0.54, −0.23)
SQ1:Contiguity −2.60∗∗∗ (−2.89, −2.31)
SQ1:Major1 −0.05 (−0.19, 0.08)
SQ1:Major2 0.01 (−0.12, 0.13)
CD1:Constant 2.50∗∗∗ (1.32, 3.68)
CD1:PowerRatio 1.37∗∗ (0.01, 2.72)
BD1:Constant −1.77∗∗∗ (−2.05, −1.49)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.60 (−5.48, 4.29)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.02∗∗∗ (−0.03, −0.005)
War1:Constant −1.96∗∗∗ (−2.46, −1.45)
War1:PowerRatio 0.47∗∗∗ (0.14, 0.80)
War1:Contiguity −1.51∗∗∗ (−2.49, −0.52)
War1:Defense1 −0.02∗∗∗ (−0.02, −0.02)
CD2:Constant −0.01∗∗∗ (−0.01, −0.01)
CD2:TradeDepend2 −0.11 (−0.30, 0.09)
CD2:Democracy −0.002∗∗∗ (−0.002, −0.001)
War2:Constant 0.46∗∗∗ (0.13, 0.79)
War2:PowerRatio 0.72∗∗∗ (0.37, 1.07)
War2:Contiguity 0.59∗∗∗ (0.29, 0.89)
War2:Defense2 0.005 (−0.002, 0.01)
Observations 3256
Log-likelihood 1227.19
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Figure A.32: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are




This model uses the trade share measurement weighted by the eigenvector centrality
measure. The coefficient estimates point to the same direction. The plots demonstrate
the same pattern as the paper’s.
Table A.29: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.21 (−0.13, 0.55)
SQ1:Alliance −0.01 (−0.08, 0.05)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.36∗∗∗ (−0.49, −0.24)
SQ1:Major1 −0.11∗ (−0.21, 0.0004)
SQ1:Major2 0.02 (−0.04, 0.08)
CD1:Constant 0.02 (−0.91, 0.95)
CD1:PowerRatio 1.35∗ (−0.25, 2.96)
BD1:Constant 0.40∗∗∗ (0.26, 0.53)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.50∗∗∗ (−0.86, −0.15)
BD1:Democracy1 0.01∗∗∗ (0.004, 0.01)
War1:Constant 0.16 (−0.05, 0.36)
War1:PowerRatio 0.03 (−0.07, 0.12)
War1:Contiguity −0.28∗∗∗ (−0.42, −0.13)
War1:Defense1 −0.002∗∗ (−0.004, −0.0003)
CD2:Constant −0.12∗∗∗ (−0.18, −0.07)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.08 (−0.01, 0.17)
CD2:Democracy −0.002∗∗ (−0.003, −0.0001)
War2:Constant −0.03 (−0.61, 0.56)
War2:PowerRatio 0.48∗ (−0.06, 1.01)
War2:Contiguity −0.35∗∗ (−0.63, −0.08)
War2:Defense2 0.02∗∗∗ (0.01, 0.03)
Observations 2170
Log-likelihood -2047.26
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Figure A.33: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.9.4 Trade Share with Alternative SQ
This model uses the trade share measurement weighted by the eigenvector centrality
measure and the alternative SQ data. The coefficient estimates point to the same
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direction, though not significantly. The plots demonstrate a similar pattern as the
paper’s.
Table A.30: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.48 (0.27, 0.68)
SQ1:Alliance −0.29∗∗∗ (−0.40, −0.18)
SQ1:Contiguity −2.47∗∗∗ (−2.56, −2.37)
SQ1:Major1 −0.13∗∗∗ (−0.21, −0.06)
SQ1:Major2 −0.38∗∗∗ (−0.47, −0.28)
CD1:Constant 1.36∗∗∗ (1.16, 1.55)
CD1:PowerRatio 3.13∗∗∗ (1.63, 4.64)
BD1:Constant −1.63 (−1.83, −1.43)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.82 (−1.01, −0.62)
BD1:Democracy1 0.003∗∗∗ (0.002, 0.004)
War1:Constant −1.65 (−1.85, −1.44)
War1:PowerRatio 0.24 (0.05, 0.43)
War1:Contiguity −0.85 (−1.05, −0.66)
War1:Defense1 −0.01 (−0.23, 0.22)
CD2:Constant −0.10∗∗∗ (−0.13, −0.07)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.14∗∗∗ (0.09, 0.20)
CD2:Democracy −0.001∗∗ (−0.003, −0.0001)
War2:Constant −0.49 (−0.74, −0.24)
War2:PowerRatio 0.90∗∗∗ (0.63, 1.16)
War2:Contiguity 0.67∗∗∗ (0.54, 0.81)
War2:Defense2 0.03∗∗∗ (0.02, 0.04)
Observations 5520
Log-likelihood -2708.71



























Figure A.34: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.10 Using Kinne2012’s Closeness Data
In this section, I present the tables and graphs of all the models using Kinne (2012)’s
closeness data. Three out of four models have null results
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A.10.1 Trade Dependence
This model uses the trade dependence measurement weighted by Kinne’s closeness
data. The coefficient estimates point to the opposite direction, though not signifi-
cantly.
Table A.31: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.23 (−0.97, 1.42)
SQ1:Alliance 0.01 (−0.03, 0.05)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.47∗∗∗ (−0.69, −0.25)
SQ1:Major1 0.01 (−0.05, 0.06)
SQ1:Major2 −0.02 (−0.08, 0.04)
CD1:Constant 1.26 (−3.20, 5.72)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.75 (−2.18, 3.68)
BD1:Constant 0.08 (−0.15, 0.30)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −1.19 (−4.88, 2.51)
BD1:Democracy1 0.01∗ (−0.002, 0.03)
War1:Constant −0.43 (−0.96, 0.09)
War1:PowerRatio 0.20∗∗ (0.01, 0.38)
War1:Contiguity −0.34∗∗∗ (−0.58, −0.10)
War1:Defense1 −0.001 (−0.002, 0.0004)
CD2:Constant −0.09∗∗ (−0.17, −0.01)
CD2:TradeDepend2 −0.07 (−0.43, 0.29)
CD2:Democracy −0.0003 (−0.001, 0.001)
War2:Constant 0.40 (−0.46, 1.26)
War2:PowerRatio 0.58 (−0.26, 1.41)
War2:Contiguity 0.14 (−0.18, 0.47)
War2:Defense2 −0.003 (−0.01, 0.004)
Observations 747
Log-likelihood 678.95
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Figure A.35: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
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A.10.2 Trade Dependence with Alternative SQ
This model uses the trade dependence measurement weighted by Kinne’s closeness
data and the alternative SQ data. The coefficient estimates point to the opposite
direction, though not significantly.
Table A.32: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 2.92∗∗ (0.13, 5.71)
SQ1:Alliance −0.12∗∗ (−0.24, −0.001)
SQ1:Contiguity −2.23∗∗∗ (−2.54, −1.91)
SQ1:Major1 0.46∗∗∗ (0.29, 0.62)
SQ1:Major2 −0.003 (−0.12, 0.12)
CD1:Constant 4.23∗∗∗ (1.25, 7.21)
CD1:PowerRatio −2.17 (−5.93, 1.59)
BD1:Constant −1.26∗∗∗ (−1.53, −1.00)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.56 (−3.48, 2.36)
BD1:Democracy1 0.01∗∗ (0.002, 0.02)
War1:Constant −1.43∗∗∗ (−1.79, −1.08)
War1:PowerRatio 0.63∗∗∗ (0.29, 0.98)
War1:Contiguity −0.86∗∗∗ (−1.07, −0.65)
War1:Defense1 0.0002 (−0.002, 0.002)
CD2:Constant −0.002 (−0.01, 0.01)
CD2:TradeDepend2 −0.27 (−0.80, 0.26)
CD2:Democracy −0.002∗∗ (−0.003, −0.0003)
War2:Constant 0.86∗∗∗ (0.34, 1.37)
War2:PowerRatio 0.28 (−0.24, 0.80)
War2:Contiguity 0.50∗∗∗ (0.12, 0.88)
War2:Defense2 −0.01∗ (−0.01, 0.001)
Observations 1841
Log-likelihood 873.8
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Figure A.36: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.10.3 Trade Share
This model uses the trade share measurement weighted by Kinne’s closeness data.
The coefficient estimates point to the opposite direction, though not significantly.
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Table A.33: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.26 (−0.63, 1.14)
SQ1:Alliance 0.04 (−0.06, 0.15)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.55 (−1.24, 0.14)
SQ1:Major1 0.07 (−0.08, 0.21)
SQ1:Major2 −0.16 (−0.41, 0.09)
CD1:Constant 8.42 (−15.40, 32.24)
CD1:PowerRatio 2.65 (−8.77, 14.08)
BD1:Constant −0.33 (−1.60, 0.95)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −1.02 (−3.85, 1.81)
BD1:Democracy1 0.03 (−0.02, 0.07)
War1:Constant −1.74 (−4.78, 1.30)
War1:PowerRatio 0.40 (−0.16, 0.96)
War1:Contiguity −0.44 (−1.21, 0.32)
War1:Defense1 −0.001 (−0.004, 0.002)
CD2:Constant −0.05∗∗ (−0.08, −0.01)
CD2:TradeDepend2 −0.07 (−0.19, 0.04)
CD2:Democracy −0.0004 (−0.001, 0.0003)
War2:Constant 1.05∗∗∗ (0.57, 1.54)
War2:PowerRatio 0.18 (−0.28, 0.64)
War2:Contiguity −0.04 (−0.23, 0.15)
War2:Defense2 0.001 (−0.002, 0.004)
Observations 1333
Log-likelihood -1185.89
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Figure A.37: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
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A.10.4 Trade Share with Alternative SQ
This model uses the trade share measurement weighted by Kinne’s closeness data and
the alternative SQ data. The coefficient estimates are signigicant and in the same
direction as the paper’s. The plots show a similar pattern.
Table A.34: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 −0.15 (−1.79, 1.50)
SQ1:Alliance 0.19∗∗ (0.04, 0.34)
SQ1:Contiguity −1.50∗∗∗ (−1.79, −1.20)
SQ1:Major1 −0.14∗ (−0.30, 0.03)
SQ1:Major2 0.45∗∗∗ (0.25, 0.65)
CD1:Constant −0.18 (−2.44, 2.08)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.24 (−4.61, 5.09)
BD1:Constant −0.83∗∗∗ (−1.00, −0.66)
BD1:TradeDepend1 0.63 (−1.49, 2.75)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.01∗∗∗ (−0.02, −0.004)
War1:Constant −0.80∗∗ (−1.53, −0.08)
War1:PowerRatio −0.39 (−1.04, 0.25)
War1:Contiguity −0.53∗ (−1.15, 0.09)
War1:Defense1 −0.01∗ (−0.02, 0.001)
CD2:Constant −0.004 (−0.04, 0.03)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.04∗∗ (0.01, 0.07)
CD2:Democracy 0.0003∗∗∗ (0.0003, 0.0003)
War2:Constant 1.43∗∗∗ (1.01, 1.86)
War2:PowerRatio 1.04∗∗∗ (0.50, 1.58)
War2:Contiguity −0.39∗∗∗ (−0.65, −0.13)
War2:Defense2 −0.001 (−0.01, 0.01)
Observations 3542
Log-likelihood -2013.83
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Figure A.38: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.11 Using Kinne’s Data with Alternative Weighing Scheme
In this section, I present the tables and graphs of all the models using Kinne (2012)’s
closeness data. I also adjust the weighing scheme from trade dependence * exp(-closeness)
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to trade dependence * exp(cut-closeness), where cut is the eightieth percentile
of the closeness values.
A.11.1 Trade Dependence
This model uses the trade dependence measurement weighted by Kinne’s data with
alternative weighing scheme. The results are more significant than the paper’s.
Table A.35: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.49 (−1.02, 2.01)
SQ1:Alliance 0.01 (−0.05, 0.07)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.46∗∗∗ (−0.67, −0.25)
SQ1:Major1 0.08 (−0.09, 0.25)
SQ1:Major2 −0.03 (−0.14, 0.08)
CD1:Constant −0.35 (−3.58, 2.87)
CD1:PowerRatio −0.27 (−3.39, 2.84)
BD1:Constant 0.28∗ (−0.002, 0.56)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.13 (−1.95, 1.69)
BD1:Democracy1 0.02∗∗ (0.003, 0.03)
War1:Constant 0.05 (−0.29, 0.39)
War1:PowerRatio 0.16 (−0.13, 0.45)
War1:Contiguity −0.41∗∗∗ (−0.70, −0.12)
War1:Defense1 0.001 (−0.002, 0.003)
CD2:Constant −0.05∗ (−0.10, 0.001)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.18∗∗∗ (0.16, 0.19)
CD2:Democracy −0.002 (−0.01, 0.002)
War2:Constant 0.68 (−0.71, 2.07)
War2:PowerRatio 0.32 (−0.89, 1.53)
War2:Contiguity 0.04 (−0.52, 0.61)
War2:Defense2 0.01 (−0.01, 0.03)
Observations 747
Log-likelihood 676.61
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Figure A.39: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.11.2 Trade Dependence with Alternative SQ
This model uses the trade dependence measurement weighted by Kinne’s data with
alternative weighing scheme and the alternative SQ data. The coefficient estimates
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point to the same direction, though not significantly. The plots demonstrate a similar
pattern as the paper’s.
Table A.36: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.08 (−0.63, 0.78)
SQ1:Alliance 0.005 (−0.04, 0.05)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.10 (−0.23, 0.03)
SQ1:Major1 0.22∗∗ (0.03, 0.42)
SQ1:Major2 0.07 (−0.04, 0.18)
CD1:Constant −0.27∗∗ (−0.49, −0.05)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.07 (−0.25, 0.39)
BD1:Constant −0.08 (−0.22, 0.06)
BD1:TradeDepend1 0.01 (−1.50, 1.52)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.04∗∗∗ (−0.05, −0.03)
War1:Constant −0.09 (−0.27, 0.10)
War1:PowerRatio 0.09 (−0.03, 0.20)
War1:Contiguity −0.08 (−0.22, 0.06)
War1:Defense1 −0.0002 (−0.003, 0.002)
CD2:Constant −0.09∗∗∗ (−0.10, −0.08)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.04 (−0.01, 0.08)
CD2:Democracy 0.01∗∗∗ (0.01, 0.01)
War2:Constant 0.06 (−0.65, 0.77)
War2:PowerRatio 0.04 (−0.63, 0.72)
War2:Contiguity 0.25 (−0.15, 0.64)
War2:Defense2 −0.03∗∗∗ (−0.04, −0.02)
Observations 1841
Log-likelihood 1203.01
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Figure A.40: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are




This model uses the trade share measurement weighted by Kinne’s data with alter-
native weighing scheme. The coefficient estimates point to the opposite direction,
though not significantly.
Table A.37: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.06 (−0.08, 0.21)
SQ1:Alliance 0.002 (−0.01, 0.01)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.37∗∗∗ (−0.55, −0.18)
SQ1:Major1 0.03 (−0.01, 0.06)
SQ1:Major2 −0.01 (−0.03, 0.02)
CD1:Constant 0.55 (−2.20, 3.29)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.07 (−0.66, 0.81)
BD1:Constant 0.32∗∗∗ (0.12, 0.53)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.23 (−0.62, 0.15)
BD1:Democracy1 0.004 (−0.002, 0.01)
War1:Constant −0.11 (−0.42, 0.21)
War1:PowerRatio 0.07∗∗ (0.004, 0.14)
War1:Contiguity −0.33∗∗∗ (−0.54, −0.11)
War1:Defense1 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0001, 0.0001)
CD2:Constant −0.16∗∗∗ (−0.24, −0.07)
CD2:TradeDepend2 −0.001 (−0.04, 0.03)
CD2:Democracy −0.0003 (−0.001, 0.0005)
War2:Constant 0.12 (−0.59, 0.83)
War2:PowerRatio 0.41 (−0.16, 0.98)
War2:Contiguity −0.11 (−0.45, 0.23)
War2:Defense2 −0.002 (−0.01, 0.002)
Observations 1333
Log-likelihood -1191.87
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Figure A.41: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.11.4 Trade Share with Alternative SQ
This model uses the trade share measurement weighted by Kinne’s data with al-
ternative weighing scheme and the alternative SQ data. The coefficient estimate is
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significant and points to the same direction. The plots demonstrate a similar pattern
as the paper’s.
Table A.38: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 −0.001 (−0.20, 0.20)
SQ1:Alliance 0.02 (−0.03, 0.07)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.02 (−0.11, 0.08)
SQ1:Major1 −0.01 (−0.09, 0.06)
SQ1:Major2 0.11∗∗ (0.01, 0.21)
CD1:Constant −0.03 (−0.31, 0.25)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.02 (−0.24, 0.29)
BD1:Constant −0.03 (−0.11, 0.05)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.01 (−0.37, 0.35)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.02∗∗∗ (−0.02, −0.01)
War1:Constant −0.06 (−0.20, 0.07)
War1:PowerRatio 0.01 (−0.10, 0.13)
War1:Contiguity 0.03 (−0.06, 0.12)
War1:Defense1 −0.005∗ (−0.01, 0.0001)
CD2:Constant −0.003∗∗∗ (−0.005, −0.001)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.004∗∗ (0.0002, 0.01)
CD2:Democracy 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0001, 0.0001)
War2:Constant 0.02 (−0.45, 0.48)
War2:PowerRatio 0.03 (−0.33, 0.38)
War2:Contiguity −0.02 (−0.31, 0.27)
War2:Defense2 0.06∗∗∗ (0.05, 0.07)
Observations 3542
Log-likelihood -3156.1


























Figure A.42: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.12 Weighing Trade Networks by Trade Dependence
In this section, I present the tables and graphs of all the models using the alternative
weighing scheme: trade networks weighted by target states’ trade dependence.
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A.12.1 Trade Dependence
This model uses the trade dependence measurement weighted by an alternative close-
ness measurement generated from trade networks weigted by trade dependence. The
coefficient estimates point to the same direction, though not significantly. The plots
demonstrate a similar pattern as the paper’s.
Table A.39: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 −0.51 (−5.08, 4.05)
SQ1:Alliance 0.05 (−0.10, 0.21)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.52∗∗∗ (−0.72, −0.32)
SQ1:Major1 −0.02 (−0.23, 0.19)
SQ1:Major2 −0.08 (−0.29, 0.12)
CD1:Constant 0.36 (−6.88, 7.59)
CD1:PowerRatio −0.30 (−7.34, 6.73)
BD1:Constant 0.38∗∗ (0.07, 0.68)
BD1:TradeDepend1 0.32 (−4.71, 5.36)
BD1:Democracy1 0.02 (−0.004, 0.04)
War1:Constant −0.02 (−0.63, 0.60)
War1:PowerRatio 0.27 (−0.08, 0.63)
War1:Contiguity −0.28 (−0.73, 0.16)
War1:Defense1 −0.002 (−0.01, 0.002)
CD2:Constant −0.03∗ (−0.07, 0.004)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.66 (−0.67, 1.98)
CD2:Democracy −0.001∗∗∗ (−0.001, −0.001)
War2:Constant 0.92 (−0.22, 2.06)
War2:PowerRatio 0.62 (−0.42, 1.66)
War2:Contiguity −0.12 (−0.61, 0.37)
War2:Defense2 0.01 (−0.01, 0.03)
Observations 1041
Log-likelihood 831.32
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Figure A.43: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
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A.12.2 Trade Dependence with Alternative SQ
This model uses the trade dependence measurement weighted by an alternative close-
ness measurement and the alternative SQ data. The coefficient estimates point to
the same direction, though not significantly.
Table A.40: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.18 (−2.35, 2.71)
SQ1:Alliance 0.07∗∗ (0.01, 0.14)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.20∗∗∗ (−0.33, −0.06)
SQ1:Major1 0.23∗∗∗ (0.08, 0.37)
SQ1:Major2 0.18∗∗∗ (0.06, 0.29)
CD1:Constant −0.18 (−0.51, 0.16)
CD1:PowerRatio −0.05 (−0.52, 0.42)
BD1:Constant −0.18∗∗ (−0.33, −0.03)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.14 (−3.67, 3.39)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.05∗∗∗ (−0.06, −0.04)
War1:Constant −0.14 (−0.38, 0.09)
War1:PowerRatio 0.12 (−0.04, 0.29)
War1:Contiguity −0.11 (−0.25, 0.04)
War1:Defense1 −0.004∗∗∗ (−0.01, −0.001)
CD2:Constant −0.08∗∗∗ (−0.11, −0.05)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.06 (−0.32, 0.43)
CD2:Democracy 0.01∗∗∗ (0.004, 0.01)
War2:Constant 0.03 (−0.67, 0.73)
War2:PowerRatio 0.11 (−0.58, 0.80)
War2:Contiguity 0.94∗∗∗ (0.36, 1.52)
War2:Defense2 −0.02∗∗∗ (−0.03, −0.01)
Observations 3256
Log-likelihood 1776.62
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Figure A.44: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are




This model uses the trade share measurement weighted by an alternative closeness
measure. The coefficient estimate points to the opposite direction, though not signif-
icantly.
Table A.41: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.43 (−0.82, 1.69)
SQ1:Alliance −0.02 (−0.14, 0.11)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.54∗∗ (−1.00, −0.07)
SQ1:Major1 0.03 (−0.15, 0.21)
SQ1:Major2 −0.22∗ (−0.48, 0.04)
CD1:Constant 3.35 (−12.61, 19.31)
CD1:PowerRatio 3.31 (−6.19, 12.82)
BD1:Constant 0.16 (−0.56, 0.88)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.04 (−1.36, 1.29)
BD1:Democracy1 0.01 (−0.01, 0.04)
War1:Constant −0.36 (−1.92, 1.19)
War1:PowerRatio 0.13 (−0.12, 0.38)
War1:Contiguity −0.29 (−0.85, 0.27)
War1:Defense1 −0.0004 (−0.003, 0.002)
CD2:Constant −0.03∗∗ (−0.06, −0.003)
CD2:TradeDepend2 −0.05 (−0.17, 0.07)
CD2:Democracy −0.001 (−0.002, 0.0004)
War2:Constant 1.20∗∗∗ (0.62, 1.78)
War2:PowerRatio −0.01 (−0.57, 0.54)
War2:Contiguity −0.05 (−0.39, 0.28)
War2:Defense2 0.01 (−0.004, 0.01)
Observations 1529
Log-likelihood -1220.78
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Figure A.45: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
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A.12.4 Trade Share with Alternative SQ
This model uses the trade share measurement weighted by an alternative closeness
measure and the alternative SQ data. The coefficient estimates point to the opposite
direction, though not significantly.
Table A.42: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.01 (−0.60, 0.63)
SQ1:Alliance −0.002 (−0.06, 0.06)
SQ1:Contiguity 0.002 (−0.08, 0.09)
SQ1:Major1 0.01 (−0.06, 0.07)
SQ1:Major2 0.06∗ (−0.01, 0.14)
CD1:Constant −0.01 (−0.17, 0.16)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.005 (−0.15, 0.16)
BD1:Constant −0.01 (−0.10, 0.07)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.01 (−1.29, 1.27)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.02∗∗∗ (−0.03, −0.01)
War1:Constant −0.03 (−0.26, 0.21)
War1:PowerRatio −0.01 (−0.15, 0.13)
War1:Contiguity 0.002 (−0.10, 0.11)
War1:Defense1 −0.01 (−0.03, 0.003)
CD2:Constant −0.002 (−0.01, 0.001)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.01 (−0.004, 0.01)
CD2:Democracy 0.0002∗∗∗ (0.0001, 0.0002)
War2:Constant −0.004 (−0.30, 0.29)
War2:PowerRatio −0.01 (−0.35, 0.33)
War2:Contiguity 0.002 (−0.25, 0.26)
War2:Defense2 0.06∗∗∗ (0.05, 0.07)
Observations 4432
Log-likelihood -4065.29
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Figure A.46: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
A.13 Weighing Trade Networks by Trade Dependence with
Alternative Weighing Scheme
In this section, I present the results of models using the alternative weighing scheme.
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A.13.1 Trade Dependence
This model uses the trade dependence measurement weighted by an alternative close-
ness measurement generated from trade networks weigted by trade dependence.13
The results are similar to though less significant than the paper’s.
Table A.43: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.16 (−0.16, 0.47)
SQ1:Alliance −0.05 (−0.19, 0.08)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.52∗∗∗ (−0.72, −0.33)
SQ1:Major1 −0.08 (−0.31, 0.15)
SQ1:Major2 −0.08 (−0.28, 0.12)
CD1:Constant 0.02 (−4.87, 4.90)
CD1:PowerRatio −0.13 (−4.97, 4.70)
BD1:Constant 0.33∗∗ (0.05, 0.60)
BD1:TradeDepend1 0.05 (−0.25, 0.35)
BD1:Democracy1 0.01 (−0.004, 0.03)
War1:Constant −0.08 (−1.00, 0.83)
War1:PowerRatio 0.13 (−0.15, 0.41)
War1:Contiguity −0.42 (−0.94, 0.10)
War1:Defense1 −0.003 (−0.01, 0.002)
CD2:Constant −0.10∗ (−0.22, 0.01)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.06 (−0.06, 0.18)
CD2:Democracy −0.002 (−0.01, 0.001)
War2:Constant 0.26 (−1.82, 2.34)
War2:PowerRatio 0.73 (−1.19, 2.64)
War2:Contiguity −0.69 (−2.00, 0.63)
War2:Defense2 0.02 (−0.01, 0.04)
Observations 1041
Log-likelihood 832.97
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
13Trade networks weighted by target states’ trade dependence. I also ad-
just the weighing scheme from trade dependence * exp(-closeness) to trade
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Figure A.47: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
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A.13.2 Trade Dependence with Alternative SQ
This model uses the trade dependence measurement weighted by an alternative close-
ness measurement and the alternative SQ data. The coefficient estimates point to
the opposite direction, though not significantly.
Table A.44: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.29 (−0.11, 0.69)
SQ1:Alliance −0.26∗∗ (−0.52, −0.005)
SQ1:Contiguity −2.82∗∗∗ (−3.29, −2.35)
SQ1:Major1 0.63∗∗∗ (0.34, 0.91)
SQ1:Major2 0.30 (−0.11, 0.71)
CD1:Constant 6.22∗∗ (0.45, 11.98)
CD1:PowerRatio 0.75 (−10.25, 11.76)
BD1:Constant −1.69∗∗∗ (−2.40, −0.99)
BD1:TradeDepend1 0.03∗∗∗ (0.03, 0.03)
BD1:Democracy1 0.001 (−0.001, 0.003)
War1:Constant −3.32∗∗∗ (−4.07, −2.56)
War1:PowerRatio 0.62∗∗∗ (0.45, 0.79)
War1:Contiguity 0.12 (−0.18, 0.42)
War1:Defense1 0.0004 (−0.001, 0.001)
CD2:Constant −0.13 (−0.30, 0.04)
CD2:TradeDepend2 −0.005 (−0.04, 0.03)
CD2:Democracy −0.004∗∗∗ (−0.01, −0.002)
War2:Constant −1.34 (−4.07, 1.38)
War2:PowerRatio 2.49∗∗ (0.46, 4.52)
War2:Contiguity 0.36 (−0.26, 0.98)
War2:Defense2 −0.01∗∗∗ (−0.01, −0.01)
Observations 3256
Log-likelihood 1148.79
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Figure A.48: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are




This model uses the trade share measurement weighted by an alternative closeness
measure. The coefficient estimate is significant and points to the same direction. The
plots demonstrate a similar pattern as the paper’s.
Table A.45: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 0.05 (−0.06, 0.15)
SQ1:Alliance 0.01 (−0.15, 0.16)
SQ1:Contiguity −0.36∗∗ (−0.70, −0.01)
SQ1:Major1 −0.07 (−0.30, 0.16)
SQ1:Major2 −0.05 (−0.25, 0.15)
CD1:Constant −1.78 (−14.18, 10.62)
CD1:PowerRatio 1.19 (−5.37, 7.76)
BD1:Constant 0.65∗∗ (0.08, 1.22)
BD1:TradeDepend1 0.01 (−0.08, 0.09)
BD1:Democracy1 0.004 (−0.01, 0.02)
War1:Constant −0.27 (−4.57, 4.04)
War1:PowerRatio 0.16 (−0.49, 0.81)
War1:Contiguity −0.33 (−1.53, 0.86)
War1:Defense1 0.0004 (−0.003, 0.004)
CD2:Constant −0.22∗∗∗ (−0.30, −0.13)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.02∗ (−0.003, 0.04)
CD2:Democracy −0.002∗ (−0.01, 0.0005)
War2:Constant −0.57 (−1.99, 0.85)
War2:PowerRatio 1.10 (−0.41, 2.60)
War2:Contiguity −0.90∗ (−1.84, 0.04)
War2:Defense2 0.004 (−0.01, 0.02)
Observations 1529
Log-likelihood -1241
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Figure A.49: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are
held as noncontiguous major powers. Other continuous variables are held at their median
values.
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A.13.4 Trade Share with Alternative SQ
This model uses the trade share measurement weighted by an alternative closeness
measure and the alternative SQ data. The coefficient estimates point to the same
direction, though not significantly.
Table A.46: Structural Estimation Results.
Payoff
SQ1:TradeDepend1 −0.02 (−0.06, 0.03)
SQ1:Alliance 0.22∗∗∗ (0.06, 0.38)
SQ1:Contiguity −1.39∗∗∗ (−1.57, −1.21)
SQ1:Major1 0.62∗∗∗ (0.46, 0.78)
SQ1:Major2 1.09∗∗∗ (0.90, 1.28)
CD1:Constant −2.14∗∗∗ (−2.73, −1.55)
CD1:PowerRatio −0.68∗∗∗ (−1.02, −0.34)
BD1:Constant 0.51 (0.32, 0.71)
BD1:TradeDepend1 −0.01∗ (−0.02, 0.0003)
BD1:Democracy1 −0.003∗∗∗ (−0.01, −0.001)
War1:Constant −0.72 (−0.92, −0.51)
War1:PowerRatio 0.01 (−0.06, 0.08)
War1:Contiguity −0.22∗∗∗ (−0.30, −0.13)
War1:Defense1 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0004, 0.002)
CD2:Constant −0.06∗∗∗ (−0.07, −0.06)
CD2:TradeDepend2 0.001 (−0.001, 0.002)
CD2:Democracy 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0005, 0.001)
War2:Constant −0.58∗∗∗ (−0.66, −0.50)
War2:PowerRatio 0.12∗ (−0.004, 0.24)
War2:Contiguity 1.44∗∗∗ (1.17, 1.72)
War2:Defense2 0.001 (−0.001, 0.002)
Observations 4432
Log-likelihood -1999.82
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Figure A.50: Impact of the Target’s Economic Dependence. This plot is composed by
varying State 2’s dependence from its minimum to the 90th percentile. The two states are




Binding Time verse Timely Retreat
B.1 Proof of the Attrition Model
Recall, the first order condition (FOC) for State i is





Given that Pj follows an exponential distribution 1 − exp(−θj/σj), we have P
′
j =




Since θi ≡ Φi, this equation can be rewritten as
ΦiΦ
′
j = biσj (F1)
Analogously, if we solve the FOC for State j, we have
ΦjΦ
′
i = bjσi (F2)





j = 0 (F3)
From Equation (F1), we have Φi = biσj/Φ
′
j. From Equation (F2), we have Φ
′
i =
















i = 0 (D1)
where α = bi/bj, β = σj/σi.
The question of optimal timing to quit for State i degenerates to the issue of solving






To be sure, this equation has an uninteresting solution where v = 0, meaning

















= ln |v|+ C∫
−αβΦi
= −αβ ln |Φi|+ C
′
where C and C ′ are arbitrary constants. Note that Φi > 0 (since θi > 0). Also,
we assume the higher the resolve, the longer states hold out. That is, s′i > 0. Since,
Φ′i = 1/s
′
i, we have Φ
′
i > 0. Therefore, we have
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ln v = −αβ ln Φi + C∗
where C∗ is an arbitrary constant. Further simplification gives us
v = AΦ−αβi















Adsi = Asi +B
′






where B∗ is an arbitrary constant. Note that by assumption si(0) = 0. We













A(αβ + 1)2 ((αβ + 1) ln θi − 1) (CS1)
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B.2 Additional Plots and Tables
In this section, I present additional plots and table for the paper. As a side note, I
present Kaplan–Meier when I use a new dataset or a new categorization of high vs.
low issue salience.
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Figure B.1: Plots of Kaplan–Meier Survival Curve. The x-axis denotes days in conflict
while the y-axis denotes the probability of survival. The cost ratio variable in panel
(b) is dichotomized by 1 (i.e. cost ratio greater than 1 counted as high).
B.2.2 Censor and Outliers
I use the outfor and outevl variables in ICB to code the dependent variables. The
outfor variable captures the form of outcome and has 16 different categories. These
include: (1) Formal agreement (voluntary); (2) Semi-formal agreement (voluntary);
(3) Tacit understanding; (4) Unilateral (self); (5) Unilateral (ally); (6) Unilateral
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(adversary); (7) Compliance; (8) Imposed (imposer); (9) Imposed (imposee); (10)
Spillover; (11) Other (global organization intervention); (12) Other (ally); (13) Other
(internal or non-state actor); (14) Other (misc.); (15) Faded; (99) Missing data.
The outevl variable captures the extent of satisfaction an actor has toward the
outcome. It includes 5 different categories: (1) All parties satisfied with content of
outcome; (2) Crisis actor satisfied, adversaries dissatisfied; (3) Adversaries satisfied,
crisis actor dissatisfied; (4) All parties dissatisfied; (9) Cannot be determined, missing
data.
An outcome is coded as states intentionally choosing to quit if (1) the outfor
variable is compliance (code 7) or (2) if the outfor variable is voluntary agreement or
tacit understanding (code 1, 2, or 3) and the outevl variable is dissatisfaction (code
3 or 4). The rest of cases are coded as censored given we cannot observe whether a
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Figure B.2: Plots of censorship. Data are coded as 0 if they are censored. The left
panel plots the level of censorship for the full dataset, while the right one plots that































































































Schoenfeld Individual Test p: 1e−04
Figure B.3: Plots of outliers. This is taken from the Schoenfeld test without time
transformation, which incorrectly suggests there is no violation of the proportional
hazard assumption (p value larger than the conventional 0.05 benchmark). Compare
this with the following section where I present tables of Schoenfeld tests with time
transformation. In addition, the grey dots in the right are outliers, which represent
some crises that last extremely long.
B.2.3 Schoenfeld Tests
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests. The last column denotes p
value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark indicate possible violation of
the proportional hazard assumption.
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Table B.1: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1308 2.8001 0.0943
Salience -0.1141 2.5357 0.1113
Joint Democracy -0.1164 1.4783 0.2240
Contiguity 0.3085 34.9407 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.0778 0.7447 0.3882
Defense Ratio 0.1771 8.9981 0.0027
Cost x Salience 0.2790 14.8184 0.0001
GLOBAL 41.5877 0.0000
Table B.2: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1689 4.6661 0.0308
Salience -0.0867 1.4644 0.2262
Joint Democracy -0.1169 1.4894 0.2223
Contiguity 0.2609 24.9901 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.0130 0.0208 0.8853
Defense Ratio 0.1096 3.4478 0.0633
Cost x Salience 0.2378 10.7718 0.0010
GLOBAL 34.0984 0.0000
B.2.4 Schoenfeld Tests after Time Interaction
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests after taking the time interac-
tion. The last column denotes p value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark
indicate possible violation of the proportional hazard assumption.
B.3 Trade Network Measurement Using Comtrade Data
Zeng (2019) show that using the operationlization of taking the product of trade value
and the exponential of the negative value of closeness (trade*exp(-closeness)) can
account for the importance of the volume of trade and states’ integration levels.
Taking the exponential of the negative values of closeness results in bounded weights.
In our case, if a country is isolated (closeness = 0), then the respective commodity
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Table B.3: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1454 4.0658 0.0438
Salience -0.2292 13.5269 0.0002
Joint Democracy -0.3273 12.5965 0.0004
Contiguity 0.2453 59.3672 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.3816 21.5233 0.0000
Defense Ratio 0.4329 64.6381 0.0000
Time x Contiguity -0.1582 20.1633 0.0000
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.4718 121.2178 0.0000
Cost x Salience -0.3662 50.0181 0.0000
GLOBAL 323.0513 0.0000
Table B.4: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.2231 9.5656 0.0020
Salience -0.2379 14.5780 0.0001
Joint Democracy -0.2983 10.4622 0.0012
Contiguity 0.3205 101.3406 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.3484 17.9346 0.0000
Defense Ratio 0.4058 56.7973 0.0000
Time x Contiguity -0.2480 49.5714 0.0000
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.4849 128.0373 0.0000
Cost x Salience -0.3781 53.3217 0.0000
GLOBAL 327.9363 0.0000
is assigned with full weight (exp(-0) = 1). If a country is very integrated, say
its closeness value is 1.2, then it will discount the respective costs by around 70%
(exp(-1.2) = .3).
In this section, I present four plots of my trade network measurement. I show
results for exports and imports of strategic commodities and nonstrategic commodi-
ties thereof. Following Zeng (2019), I compare the results for four countries: China,
the U.S., Belgium, and Bahamas. Readers interested in examining other countries
can consult the replication file. As a side note, the values and ranking of Belgium
are too low before the 1990s, which can be attributed to its lack of reporting be-
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fore 2000. That aside, the general trends appear to capture the economic status and


































Figure B.4: Value and Ranking of the Closeness Measure. x-axis denotes time, while
y-axis denotes the value or ranking of the closeness centrality measure in a given year. In
the upper (lower) panels, the yellow solid line denotes the rankings of China (Belgium) over



































Figure B.5: Value and Ranking of the Closeness Measure. x-axis denotes time, while
y-axis denotes the value or ranking of the closeness centrality measure in a given year. In
the upper (lower) panels, the yellow solid line denotes the rankings of China (Belgium) over



































Figure B.6: Value and Ranking of the Closeness Measure. x-axis denotes time, while
y-axis denotes the value or ranking of the closeness centrality measure in a given year. In
the upper (lower) panels, the yellow solid line denotes the rankings of China (Belgium) over



































Figure B.7: Value and Ranking of the Closeness Measure. x-axis denotes time, while
y-axis denotes the value or ranking of the closeness centrality measure in a given year. In
the upper (lower) panels, the yellow solid line denotes the rankings of China (Belgium) over
time, while the grey dashed line denotes the U.S. (Bahamas) thereof.
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B.4 Model Using MID
In this section, I present results for the model using MID. I use the a version of
the MID data (Gibler, Miller and Little, 2016), which corrects some mistakes of the
original Correlates of War’s data. To be sure, my focus is on a state’s intentional
choice to quit. But this can be censored by the opponent’s winning or losing on the
battlefield. Therefore, I first code whether the observation is censored or not by a
MID’s outcome. Specifically, I code a state as quitting a conflict if the outcome is
3 (yield by side A), 4 (yield by side B), 6 (both yield), or 7 (release).1 I exclude
outcomes that are unclear or missing. The rest of observations are coded as censored,
since we can’t tell when states that win (or lose) on the battlefield or are in a stalemate
will quit a conflict. This way, I compile a list of state-conflict, with the censorship of
outcomes. I then code the days before a state quit a conflict by the MaxDur variable
which records the maximum duration of dispute.2
When a state is of a revisionist type or that the opponent is of revisionist type
territory (code 1) or regime/government (3), the issue is coded as high salience. The
results are substantially similar to the model’s.
1If the outcome is 3, then side A is coded as quitting, while the observation for side
B is coded as censored. For a release outcome, Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996) code
it as "whenever the seizure of material or personnel culminates with their release from
captivity". Hence, I find it reasonable to count release as quitting. Since the release
outcome does not specify which state quits, I code it by the which side initiates the
conflict. For instance, if state A is the initiator and the outcome is release, I code it
as state A quitting the conflict.
2I choose the maximum duration since its difference with the minimum duration
variable is small. Hence, I do not expect the results to differ much.
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B.4.1 Kaplan–Meier Survival Curve
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Figure B.8: Plots of Kaplan–Meier Survival Curve. The x-axis denotes days in conflict
while the y-axis denotes the probability of survival. The cost ratio variable in panel
(b) is dichotomized by 1 (i.e. cost ratio greater than 1 counted as high).
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B.4.2 Table of Regression Results
Table B.5: Cox Regression Results with 95% Confidence Interval, 1962-2010
Days before Quitting
Adjusted Models Original Models
(1) (2) (3)
Cost Ratio 0.025 0.002 0.009
(−0.335, 0.386) (−0.348, 0.352) (−0.342, 0.361)
Salience −0.547∗∗ −0.554∗∗ −0.549∗∗
(−1.058, −0.037) (−1.033, −0.075) (−1.036, −0.062)
Cost × Salience 7.103∗∗∗ −1.281 −0.118
(4.420, 9.787) (−3.010, 0.447) (−0.614, 0.378)








Joint Democracy 1.070∗∗∗ 1.088∗∗∗ 1.084∗∗∗
(0.529, 1.611) (0.552, 1.624) (0.542, 1.626)
Contiguity 0.214 0.295 0.273
(−0.222, 0.650) (−0.147, 0.736) (−0.161, 0.707)
Power Ratio −0.001 −0.013 −0.008
(−0.068, 0.067) (−0.080, 0.053) (−0.074, 0.058)
Defense Ratio −0.037 −0.025 −0.043
(−0.168, 0.095) (−0.151, 0.102) (−0.169, 0.083)
Adjusted Method Time Interaction tt No
BIC 4530.34 4591.77 4590.25
Observations 4,225 4,225 4,225
Log Likelihood −2,241.868 −2,272.580 −2,274.734
Wald Test 64.240∗∗∗ (df = 8) 38.200∗∗∗ (df = 8) 36.390∗∗∗ (df = 7)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure B.10: Survival Curve When Switching the Cost Ratio from .5 to 2.
228
B.4.5 Schoenfeld Tests
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests. The last column denotes p
value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark indicate possible violation of
the proportional hazard assumption.
Table B.6: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.0861 5.0234 0.0250
Salience 0.1083 13.7057 0.0002
Joint Democracy 0.0154 0.3648 0.5459
Contiguity -0.0548 4.5551 0.0328
Power Ratio 0.0931 3.1887 0.0742
Defense Ratio -0.0901 0.8240 0.3640
Cost x Salience 0.0466 1.9272 0.1651
GLOBAL 43.3066 0.0000
Table B.7: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1432 13.8871 0.0002
Salience 0.1605 30.1063 0.0000
Joint Democracy 0.0680 7.1174 0.0076
Contiguity -0.0810 9.9393 0.0016
Power Ratio 0.1380 7.0016 0.0081
Defense Ratio -0.1095 1.2159 0.2702
Cost x Salience 0.0478 2.0329 0.1539
GLOBAL 87.1736 0.0000
B.4.6 Schoenfeld Tests after Time Interaction
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests after taking the time interac-
tion. The last column denotes p value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark
indicate possible violation of the proportional hazard assumption.
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Table B.8: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.0734 4.3928 0.0361
Salience 0.1460 28.3022 0.0000
Joint Democracy 0.0062 0.0624 0.8028
Contiguity -0.0496 4.0886 0.0432
Power Ratio 0.1550 11.2111 0.0008
Defense Ratio -0.1856 5.2473 0.0220
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.0439 2.3355 0.1265
Cost x Salience -0.0158 0.2879 0.5916
GLOBAL 141.7861 0.0000
Table B.9: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1399 15.9541 0.0001
Salience 0.2079 57.3698 0.0000
Joint Democracy 0.0624 6.4087 0.0114
Contiguity -0.0818 11.1300 0.0008
Power Ratio 0.2226 23.1172 0.0000
Defense Ratio -0.2109 6.7778 0.0092
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience -0.0105 0.1325 0.7159
Cost x Salience 0.0461 2.4385 0.1184
GLOBAL 247.6340 0.0000
B.5 Model Using MID and Including Military Losses
In this section, I present results for the model using MID while controlling for military
losses (named as ‘Loss Ratio’). I control for the military costs because the severity of
a conflict affects both the economic costs and the duration of a conflict. Specifically,
I use the MID dataset to record the precise fatalities of a state engaging in a conflict.
I then weigh the fatalities by the state’s size of military personnel from the National
Material Capabilities dataset (Singer, 1988; Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972). Fi-
nally, I divide the two sides’ weighted military costs using contest success function
(with the denominator added by 1 to avoid 0) to generate a variable of loss ratio. It
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should be noted that Model 2 which uses ‘tt’ to adjust has different results than the
main model’s.
B.5.1 Table of Regression Results
Table B.10: Cox Regression Results with 95% Confidence Interval, 1962-2010
Days before Quitting
Adjusted Models Original Models
(1) (2) (3)
Cost Ratio −0.070 −0.084 −0.079
(−0.471, 0.330) (−0.470, 0.301) (−0.470, 0.312)
Salience −0.581∗ −0.512∗ −0.560∗
(−1.203, 0.041) (−1.081, 0.057) (−1.150, 0.030)
Cost × Salience 9.679∗∗∗ −5.151∗∗∗ −0.242
(5.866, 13.491) (−8.859, −1.443) (−0.862, 0.379)
Time × Cost Ratio × Salience −1.834∗∗∗
(−2.566, −1.102)
tt(Cost Ratio × Salience) 0.965∗∗∗
(0.260, 1.670)
Joint Democracy 0.789∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗
(0.339, 1.239) (0.278, 1.155) (0.298, 1.191)
Contiguity 0.190 0.196 0.199
(−0.295, 0.676) (−0.264, 0.656) (−0.271, 0.670)
Power Ratio −0.047 −0.041 −0.046
(−0.128, 0.033) (−0.117, 0.035) (−0.122, 0.031)
Defense Ratio 0.030 0.006 0.009
(−0.126, 0.187) (−0.147, 0.159) (−0.144, 0.163)
Loss Ratio −112.120∗ −179.742∗∗ −28.848
(−244.369, 20.130) (−344.125, −15.360) (−68.282, 10.586)
Time × Loss Ratio 15.474
(−9.160, 40.108)
tt(Cost Ratio × Salience) 27.283∗∗
(1.995, 52.570)
Adjusted Method Time Interaction tt No
BIC 3383.22 3426.39 3428.96
Observations 2,175 2,175 2,175
Log Likelihood −1,663.656 −1,685.242 −1,692.114
Wald Test 55.360∗∗∗ (df = 10) 48.350∗∗∗ (df = 10) 32.910∗∗∗ (df = 8)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure B.12: Survival Curve When Switching the Cost Ratio from .5 to 2.
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B.5.4 Schoenfeld Tests
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests. The last column denotes p
value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark indicate possible violation of
the proportional hazard assumption.
Table B.11: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1090 6.2862 0.0122
Salience 0.0450 1.6148 0.2038
Joint Democracy 0.0623 2.3793 0.1230
Contiguity 0.0046 0.0210 0.8849
Power Ratio 0.0664 0.8429 0.3586
Defense Ratio -0.0469 0.2622 0.6086
Loss Ratio 0.0884 9.1784 0.0024
Cost x Salience 0.1289 11.5190 0.0007
GLOBAL 51.6936 0.0000
Table B.12: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1298 8.9180 0.0028
Salience 0.0904 6.5176 0.0107
Joint Democracy 0.1088 7.2439 0.0071
Contiguity -0.0305 0.9074 0.3408
Power Ratio 0.0840 1.3480 0.2456
Defense Ratio -0.0196 0.0457 0.8308
Loss Ratio 0.0815 7.8051 0.0052
Cost x Salience 0.1068 7.9091 0.0049
GLOBAL 67.7936 0.0000
B.5.5 Schoenfeld Tests after Time Interaction
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests after taking the time interac-
tion. The last column denotes p value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark
indicate possible violation of the proportional hazard assumption.
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Table B.13: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1337 9.8967 0.0017
Salience 0.0264 0.6534 0.4189
Joint Democracy 0.1079 7.6180 0.0058
Contiguity 0.0367 1.4245 0.2327
Power Ratio 0.0283 0.2105 0.6464
Defense Ratio -0.0073 0.0062 0.9373
Loss Ratio 0.2962 6.9838 0.0082
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.0782 4.5255 0.0334
Time x Loss Ratio -0.1033 2.4468 0.1178
Cost x Salience -0.0345 0.8262 0.3634
GLOBAL 159.2596 0.0000
Table B.14: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1621 14.5427 0.0001
Salience 0.0810 6.1559 0.0131
Joint Democracy 0.1654 17.8809 0.0000
Contiguity -0.0101 0.1087 0.7417
Power Ratio 0.0704 1.3007 0.2541
Defense Ratio 0.0305 0.1087 0.7416
Loss Ratio 0.2528 5.0869 0.0241
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience -0.0119 0.1040 0.7471
Time x Loss Ratio -0.0832 1.5882 0.2076
Cost x Salience 0.0550 2.1012 0.1472
GLOBAL 184.2161 0.0000
B.6 Model Using MID (Territory Only)
In this section, I present results for the model using MID. When the revisionist type
is territory for either side, the issue is coded as high salience. The survival curves
are similar to the models, though their difference is less obvious. In addition, the
Schenfeld tests with rank transformation indicate no violation of the proportional
hazard assumption after interacting with time. That said, the first difference plot is
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quite different from the model’s, though the effect is not statistically significant. It
should be also noted that Model 2 also has different results than the main model’s.
B.6.1 Kaplan–Meier Survival Curve
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Figure B.13: Plots of Kaplan–Meier Survival Curve. The x-axis denotes days in
conflict while the y-axis denotes the probability of survival. The cost ratio variable
in panel (b) is dichotomized by 1 (i.e. cost ratio greater than 1 counted as high).
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Table B.15: Cox Regression Results with 95% Confidence Interval, 1962-2010
Days before Quitting
Adjusted Models Original Models
(1) (2) (3)
Cost Ratio 0.012 −0.013 −0.002
(−0.317, 0.341) (−0.334, 0.308) (−0.326, 0.321)
Salience −0.467∗ −0.486∗∗ −0.475∗∗
(−0.945, 0.012) (−0.938, −0.034) (−0.934, −0.016)
Cost × Salience 6.293∗∗∗ −1.616∗ −0.100
(3.764, 8.822) (−3.414, 0.183) (−0.588, 0.388)








Joint Democracy 1.093∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗∗ 1.098∗∗∗
(0.541, 1.645) (0.555, 1.649) (0.543, 1.652)
Contiguity 0.247 0.317 0.290
(−0.197, 0.690) (−0.129, 0.764) (−0.152, 0.731)
Power Ratio −0.001 −0.017 −0.008
(−0.069, 0.067) (−0.084, 0.050) (−0.075, 0.059)
Defense Ratio −0.039 −0.018 −0.042
(−0.171, 0.092) (−0.142, 0.106) (−0.168, 0.083)
Adjusted Method Time Interaction tt No
BIC 4548.26 4597.19 4598.69
Observations 4,225 4,225 4,225
Log Likelihood −2,250.826 −2,275.291 −2,278.954
Wald Test 56.810∗∗∗ (df = 8) 33.620∗∗∗ (df = 8) 31.950∗∗∗ (df = 7)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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B.6.2 Table of Regression Results
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Figure B.15: Survival Curve When Switching the Cost Ratio from .5 to 2.
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B.6.5 Schoenfeld Tests
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests. The last column denotes p
value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark indicate possible violation of
the proportional hazard assumption.
Table B.16: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.0943 5.9577 0.0147
Salience 0.0752 6.4202 0.0113
Joint Democracy -0.0087 0.1250 0.7236
Contiguity -0.0525 4.3286 0.0375
Power Ratio 0.0805 2.3579 0.1246
Defense Ratio -0.0947 0.8984 0.3432
Cost x Salience 0.0887 7.2246 0.0072
GLOBAL 39.9398 0.0000
Table B.17: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1568 16.4667 0.0000
Salience 0.1332 20.1322 0.0000
Joint Democracy 0.0440 3.1965 0.0738
Contiguity -0.0879 12.1494 0.0005
Power Ratio 0.1278 5.9387 0.0148
Defense Ratio -0.1138 1.2980 0.2546
Cost x Salience 0.0859 6.7715 0.0093
GLOBAL 80.0858 0.0000
B.6.6 Schoenfeld Tests after Time Interaction
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests after taking the time interac-
tion. The last column denotes p value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark
indicate possible violation of the proportional hazard assumption.
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Table B.18: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.0850 5.8479 0.0156
Salience 0.0979 12.1795 0.0005
Joint Democracy -0.0209 0.7709 0.3799
Contiguity -0.0466 3.7512 0.0528
Power Ratio 0.1401 8.0688 0.0045
Defense Ratio -0.1828 4.8861 0.0271
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.0579 3.9962 0.0456
Cost x Salience -0.0206 0.4743 0.4910
GLOBAL 126.8378 0.0000
Table B.19: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1574 20.0498 0.0000
Salience 0.1632 33.8541 0.0000
Joint Democracy 0.0347 2.1328 0.1442
Contiguity -0.0873 13.1890 0.0003
Power Ratio 0.2072 17.6441 0.0000
Defense Ratio -0.2070 6.2658 0.0123
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.0049 0.0281 0.8669
Cost x Salience 0.0401 1.7949 0.1803
GLOBAL 219.6220 0.0000
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B.7 Model without Control Variables
In this section, I present results for the model without control variables. The results
are substantially similar to the main model’s.
B.7.1 Table of Regression Results
Table B.20: Cox Regression Results with 95% Confidence Interval, 1962-2014
Days before Quitting
Adjusted Models Original Models
(1) (2) (3)
Cost Ratio 0.518 0.487 0.481
(−0.370, 1.407) (−0.381, 1.354) (−0.388, 1.350)
Salience 1.086∗∗ 1.009∗∗ 1.000∗∗
(0.112, 2.060) (0.055, 1.963) (0.045, 1.956)
Cost × Salience 4.675∗∗∗ −0.595 −1.011∗
(2.530, 6.821) (−3.546, 2.355) (−2.078, 0.056)




tt(Cost × Salience) −0.097
(−0.708, 0.515)
Adjusted Method Time Interaction tt No
BIC 1009.69 1042.7 1038.43
Observations 865 865 865
Log Likelihood −495.824 −512.328 −512.449
Wald Test 36.210∗∗∗ (df = 4) 5.590 (df = 4) 5.340 (df = 3)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure B.17: Survival Curve When Switching the Cost Ratio from .5 to 2.
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B.7.4 Schoenfeld Tests
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests. The last column denotes p
value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark indicate possible violation of
the proportional hazard assumption.
Table B.21: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.2135 10.3795 0.0013
Salience -0.0598 0.8336 0.3612
Cost x Salience 0.2345 11.7383 0.0006
GLOBAL 14.3325 0.0025
Table B.22: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.2539 14.6820 0.0001
Salience -0.0634 0.9361 0.3333
Cost x Salience 0.2155 9.9185 0.0016
GLOBAL 16.1709 0.0010
B.7.5 Schoenfeld Tests after Time Interaction
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests after taking the time interac-
tion. The last column denotes p value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark
indicate possible violation of the proportional hazard assumption.
Table B.23: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.2368 13.7974 0.0002
Salience -0.1006 2.4409 0.1182
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.5362 74.3026 0.0000
Cost x Salience -0.2793 15.8360 0.0001
GLOBAL 129.2824 0.0000
242
Table B.24: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.2761 18.7574 0.0000
Salience -0.1093 2.8777 0.0898
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.4906 62.2131 0.0000
Cost x Salience -0.2297 10.7051 0.0011
GLOBAL 115.7551 0.0000
B.8 Model with Refined Economic Costs
In this section, I present results with refined economic costs.
B.8.1 Table of Regression Results
Table B.25: Cox Regression Results with 95% Confidence Interval, 1962-2014
Days before Quitting
Adjusted Models Original Models
(1) (2) (3)
Cost Ratio 0.221 0.344 0.311
(−0.602, 1.043) (−0.447, 1.135) (−0.491, 1.112)
Salience 0.879∗ 0.761∗ 0.817∗
(−0.002, 1.760) (−0.079, 1.602) (−0.014, 1.647)
Cost × Salience 3.030∗∗ −0.325 −0.937∗
(0.249, 5.811) (−2.979, 2.329) (−1.892, 0.019)
Time × Cost Ratio × Salience −0.811∗∗∗
(−1.415, −0.206)
tt(Cost × Salience) −0.139
(−0.697, 0.420)
Joint Democracy −1.069 −1.153 −1.128
(−3.164, 1.027) (−3.478, 1.172) (−3.399, 1.143)
Contiguity 6.180∗∗ −2.686∗ 0.491
(1.430, 10.930) (−5.402, 0.031) (−0.314, 1.297)
Power Ratio −0.272∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗
(−0.464, −0.080) (−0.417, −0.028) (−0.439, −0.065)
Defense Ratio −0.367 −0.363 −0.352
(−1.283, 0.549) (−1.339, 0.613) (−1.309, 0.604)




Adjusted Method Time Interaction tt No
BIC 766.16 807.13 808.93
Observations 667 667 667
Log Likelihood −363.652 −384.136 −389.354
Wald Test 50.360∗∗∗ (df = 9) 43.390∗∗∗ (df = 9) 29.830∗∗∗ (df = 7)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
243
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Figure B.19: Survival Curve When Switching the Cost Ratio from .5 to 2.
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B.8.4 Schoenfeld Tests
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests. The last column denotes p
value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark indicate possible violation of
the proportional hazard assumption.
Table B.26: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1276 2.5643 0.1093
Salience -0.1115 2.4241 0.1195
Joint Democracy -0.1178 1.5086 0.2194
Contiguity 0.3105 35.3054 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.0787 0.7652 0.3817
Defense Ratio 0.1797 9.2442 0.0024
Cost x Salience 0.2819 14.8682 0.0001
GLOBAL 41.7513 0.0000
Table B.27: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1663 4.3565 0.0369
Salience -0.0834 1.3565 0.2441
Joint Democracy -0.1185 1.5262 0.2167
Contiguity 0.2623 25.2065 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.0135 0.0226 0.8805
Defense Ratio 0.1116 3.5649 0.0590
Cost x Salience 0.2392 10.7054 0.0011
GLOBAL 33.9798 0.0000
B.8.5 Schoenfeld Tests after Time Interaction
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests after taking the time interac-
tion. The last column denotes p value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark
indicate possible violation of the proportional hazard assumption.
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Table B.28: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1402 3.6099 0.0574
Salience -0.2259 13.0584 0.0003
Joint Democracy -0.3257 12.4874 0.0004
Contiguity 0.2485 61.0731 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.3863 22.3248 0.0000
Defense Ratio 0.4360 66.1787 0.0000
Time x Contiguity -0.1613 20.9975 0.0000
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.4695 123.5295 0.0000
Cost x Salience -0.3678 53.2642 0.0000
GLOBAL 327.7206 0.0000
Table B.29: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.2186 8.7793 0.0030
Salience -0.2330 13.9007 0.0002
Joint Democracy -0.2964 10.3447 0.0013
Contiguity 0.3230 103.1711 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.3530 18.6452 0.0000
Defense Ratio 0.4088 58.1690 0.0000
Time x Contiguity -0.2506 50.6634 0.0000
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.4820 130.1833 0.0000
Cost x Salience -0.3798 56.7741 0.0000
GLOBAL 331.6812 0.0000
B.9 Model with Economic Costs Using Filled Comtrade Data
Trade partners with 0 economic costs can be attributed to either no trade or lack of
reports. One may be concerned about the amount of 0 values caused by underreport-
ing. To alleviate this concern, I use a different version of Comtrade data that fills
unreported or under-reported trade with partners’ reports. The data are from “The
Atlas of Economic Complexity," Center for International Development at Harvard
University, http://www.atlas.cid.harvard.edu. These data adjust the difference
between costs of freight and insurance (CIF) and free on board (FOB) and estimates
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trade values by considering complementary reports (e.g. State A’s import report vs.
State B’s export report), conditional on each reporter’s reliability. Density Plots of
Economic Costs and Cost Ratio, which still show many zero values, are shown here.
It should also be noted that this filling method can introduce further issues, such
as the difference between export and import reporting standards and the additional
uncertainty introduced by the estimation.
In this section, I present results for the model with economic costs from filled
Comtrade Data. The results are substantially similar to the main model’s, except
model 3 which does not include time interaction.




















Figure B.20: Density Plots of Economic Costs and Cost Ratio. The x-axis denotes
the values of the respective variable while the y-axis denotes its density.
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B.9.2 Table of Regression Results
Table B.30: Cox Regression Results with 95% Confidence Interval, 1962-2014
Days before Quitting
Adjusted Models Original Models
(1) (2) (3)
Cost Ratio 0.094 0.149 0.141
(−0.386, 0.575) (−0.275, 0.572) (−0.295, 0.577)
Salience 0.447 0.301 0.267
(−0.351, 1.246) (−0.429, 1.032) (−0.466, 1.000)
Cost × Salience 1.951∗∗∗ 0.395 0.057
(0.827, 3.076) (−0.371, 1.161) (−0.385, 0.500)




tt(Cost × Salience) −0.093
(−0.222, 0.037)
Joint Democracy −1.131 −1.118 −1.178
(−3.227, 0.965) (−3.377, 1.142) (−3.392, 1.036)
Contiguity 9.650∗∗∗ −1.804 0.862∗
(3.716, 15.584) (−5.040, 1.432) (−0.002, 1.725)
Power Ratio −0.151 −0.125 −0.161
(−0.383, 0.081) (−0.366, 0.115) (−0.392, 0.071)
Defense Ratio −0.440 −0.292 −0.218
(−1.424, 0.544) (−1.336, 0.753) (−1.236, 0.801)




Adjusted Method Time Interaction tt No
BIC 726.11 807.12 811.4
Observations 667 667 667
Log Likelihood −343.629 −384.133 −390.589
Wald Test 77.860∗∗∗ (df = 9) 56.520∗∗∗ (df = 9) 25.720∗∗∗ (df = 7)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
248
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Figure B.22: Survival Curve When Switching the Cost Ratio from .5 to 2.
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B.9.5 Schoenfeld Tests
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests. The last column denotes p
value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark indicate possible violation of
the proportional hazard assumption.
Table B.31: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.2105 22.9479 0.0000
Salience -0.1454 3.3096 0.0689
Joint Democracy -0.1229 1.5858 0.2079
Contiguity 0.2853 18.7760 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.2416 8.4406 0.0037
Defense Ratio 0.1512 4.6912 0.0303
Cost x Salience 0.1710 14.1445 0.0002
GLOBAL 62.9003 0.0000
Table B.32: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.2759 39.4447 0.0000
Salience -0.1731 4.6880 0.0304
Joint Democracy -0.1411 2.0918 0.1481
Contiguity 0.2431 13.6351 0.0002
Power Ratio -0.2157 6.7297 0.0095
Defense Ratio 0.0732 1.1003 0.2942
Cost x Salience 0.2322 26.0814 0.0000
GLOBAL 73.9305 0.0000
B.9.6 Schoenfeld Tests after Time Interaction
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests after taking the time interac-
tion. The last column denotes p value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark
indicate possible violation of the proportional hazard assumption.
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Table B.33: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1532 35.2152 0.0000
Salience -0.0744 2.7949 0.0946
Joint Democracy -0.3001 9.8195 0.0017
Contiguity 0.1869 64.8226 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.2548 10.6181 0.0011
Defense Ratio 0.2158 15.0522 0.0001
Time x Contiguity -0.1358 32.1860 0.0000
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience -0.1674 34.5868 0.0000
Cost x Salience 0.1770 57.7085 0.0000
GLOBAL 236.0550 0.0000
Table B.34: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.2587 100.4407 0.0000
Salience -0.1573 12.4888 0.0004
Joint Democracy -0.3013 9.9038 0.0016
Contiguity 0.2731 138.3818 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.2469 9.9721 0.0016
Defense Ratio 0.1007 3.2785 0.0702
Time x Contiguity -0.2349 96.2279 0.0000
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience -0.2589 82.7318 0.0000
Cost x Salience 0.2742 138.4968 0.0000
GLOBAL 284.5481 0.0000
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B.10 Model with Economic Costs Prior to Conflict
One may also be concerned that conflict can cause lack of report for both sides. As
such, I also rerun the estimation using cost ratio 1 year prior to conflict in the next
section. The results are substantially similar to the main model’s.
B.10.1 Table of Regression Results
Table B.35: Cox Regression Results with 95% Confidence Interval, 1962-2014
Days before Quitting
Adjusted Models Original Models
(1) (2) (3)
Cost Ratio 0.445 0.700 0.616
(−0.534, 1.424) (−0.205, 1.605) (−0.300, 1.532)
Salience 1.196∗∗∗ 1.155∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗
(0.378, 2.014) (0.359, 1.952) (0.405, 1.963)
Cost × Salience 2.899∗ −0.864 −1.411∗∗∗
(−0.455, 6.253) (−3.949, 2.221) (−2.448, −0.373)
Time × Cost Ratio × Salience −0.870∗∗
(−1.601, −0.139)
tt(Cost × Salience) −0.134
(−0.795, 0.526)
Joint Democracy −0.925 −1.067 −1.004
(−3.031, 1.181) (−3.436, 1.302) (−3.300, 1.292)
Contiguity 5.544∗∗ −2.787∗ 0.395
(1.287, 9.802) (−5.706, 0.132) (−0.422, 1.213)
Power Ratio −0.298∗∗∗ −0.237∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗
(−0.504, −0.092) (−0.436, −0.038) (−0.464, −0.083)
Defense Ratio −0.244 −0.264 −0.240
(−1.298, 0.810) (−1.367, 0.840) (−1.323, 0.843)




Adjusted Method Time Interaction tt No
BIC 665.1 696.79 697.97
Observations 642 642 642
Log Likelihood −313.766 −329.610 −334.375
Wald Test 53.100∗∗∗ (df = 9) 52.200∗∗∗ (df = 9) 42.530∗∗∗ (df = 7)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure B.24: Survival Curve When Switching the Cost Ratio from .5 to 2.
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B.10.4 Schoenfeld Tests
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests. The last column denotes p
value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark indicate possible violation of
the proportional hazard assumption.
Table B.36: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1727 5.5095 0.0189
Salience -0.1347 2.1661 0.1411
Joint Democracy -0.1085 1.1610 0.2813
Contiguity 0.3089 29.0114 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.1542 2.7324 0.0983
Defense Ratio 0.1556 6.6850 0.0097
Cost x Salience 0.3487 16.9244 0.0000
GLOBAL 40.6055 0.0000
Table B.37: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.2187 8.8376 0.0030
Salience -0.0518 0.3204 0.5714
Joint Democracy -0.0927 0.8479 0.3572
Contiguity 0.2356 16.8752 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.0714 0.5860 0.4440
Defense Ratio 0.0608 1.0204 0.3124
Cost x Salience 0.2756 10.5766 0.0011
GLOBAL 32.0107 0.0000
B.10.5 Schoenfeld Tests after Time Interaction
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests after taking the time interac-
tion. The last column denotes p value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark
indicate possible violation of the proportional hazard assumption.
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Table B.38: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.2153 11.1654 0.0008
Salience -0.2751 11.9735 0.0005
Joint Democracy -0.3142 11.0913 0.0009
Contiguity 0.2338 31.9241 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.5100 52.7914 0.0000
Defense Ratio 0.4084 49.9562 0.0000
Time x Contiguity -0.0919 3.8593 0.0495
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.4945 128.2328 0.0000
Cost x Salience -0.3712 55.5527 0.0000
GLOBAL 320.6958 0.0000
Table B.39: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.2860 19.7103 0.0000
Salience -0.2502 9.9091 0.0016
Joint Democracy -0.2605 7.6246 0.0058
Contiguity 0.3092 55.8072 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.4579 42.5574 0.0000
Defense Ratio 0.3448 35.6104 0.0000
Time x Contiguity -0.1925 16.9228 0.0000
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.4813 121.4968 0.0000
Cost x Salience -0.3615 52.6800 0.0000
GLOBAL 293.4332 0.0000
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B.11 Model with Minimum Distance
In this section, I present results for the model using minimum distance instead of
contiguity. The results are similar to the model’s.
B.11.1 Table of Regression Results
Table B.40: Cox Regression Results with 95% Confidence Interval, 1962-2014
Days before Quitting
Adjusted Models Original Models
(1) (2) (3)
Cost Ratio 0.653 0.390 0.327
(−0.236, 1.541) (−0.442, 1.223) (−0.508, 1.162)
Salience 0.823∗ 0.787∗ 0.824∗
(−0.030, 1.676) (−0.053, 1.627) (−0.014, 1.662)
Cost × Salience 1.643 −1.754 −0.979∗
(−2.464, 5.750) (−5.868, 2.360) (−1.987, 0.029)
Time × Cost Ratio × Salience −0.540
(−1.280, 0.200)
tt(Cost × Salience) 0.158
(−0.626, 0.941)
Joint Democracy −1.307 −1.120 −1.082
(−3.700, 1.087) (−3.479, 1.239) (−3.361, 1.197)
Contiguity 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.0001
(0.002, 0.005) (0.001, 0.003) (−0.0002, 0.0001)
Power Ratio −0.169∗ −0.214∗∗ −0.243∗∗∗
(−0.338, 0.0001) (−0.392, −0.037) (−0.412, −0.074)
Defense Ratio −0.479 −0.389 −0.370
(−1.470, 0.511) (−1.360, 0.583) (−1.320, 0.580)




Adjusted Method Time Interaction tt No
BIC 739.63 797.97 807.2
Observations 660 660 660
Log Likelihood −350.386 −379.555 −388.487
Wald Test 75.070∗∗∗ (df = 9) 38.590∗∗∗ (df = 9) 21.860∗∗∗ (df = 7)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure B.26: Survival Curve When Switching the Cost Ratio from .5 to 2.
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B.11.4 Schoenfeld Tests
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests. The last column denotes p
value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark indicate possible violation of
the proportional hazard assumption.
Table B.41: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1548 3.9983 0.0455
Salience -0.0620 0.7132 0.3984
Joint Democracy -0.1039 1.1326 0.2872
Contiguity -0.3039 29.1219 0.0000
Power Ratio 0.0529 0.3744 0.5406
Defense Ratio 0.0227 0.0988 0.7533
Cost x Salience 0.2574 11.7391 0.0006
GLOBAL 38.0651 0.0000
Table B.42: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1842 5.6570 0.0174
Salience -0.0527 0.5154 0.4728
Joint Democracy -0.1143 1.3712 0.2416
Contiguity -0.3173 31.7383 0.0000
Power Ratio 0.1177 1.8545 0.1733
Defense Ratio -0.0388 0.2889 0.5909
Cost x Salience 0.2309 9.4487 0.0021
GLOBAL 43.2653 0.0000
B.11.5 Schoenfeld Tests after Time Interaction
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests after taking the time interac-
tion. The last column denotes p value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark
indicate possible violation of the proportional hazard assumption.
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Table B.43: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1359 4.3860 0.0362
Salience -0.0483 0.3571 0.5501
Joint Democracy -0.0997 1.1164 0.2907
Contiguity -0.0400 1.0240 0.3116
Power Ratio -0.1504 3.5352 0.0601
Defense Ratio 0.1435 5.5810 0.0182
Time x Contiguity 0.0533 1.7055 0.1916
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.1307 7.9448 0.0048
Cost x Salience -0.0732 2.9419 0.0863
GLOBAL 33.4736 0.0001
Table B.44: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.1777 7.4942 0.0062
Salience -0.0183 0.0513 0.8207
Joint Democracy -0.1272 1.8159 0.1778
Contiguity -0.0260 0.4326 0.5107
Power Ratio -0.1681 4.4195 0.0355
Defense Ratio 0.0899 2.1867 0.1392
Time x Contiguity 0.0450 1.2191 0.2695
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.1481 10.1993 0.0014
Cost x Salience -0.0900 4.4490 0.0349
GLOBAL 40.0826 0.0000
B.12 Model with A Different High Salience Coding
In this section, I present results for the model with a different high salience coding.
An issue is coded as high salience when the gravity variable is 4 (threat to influence
in the international system or regional ), 5 (threat of grave damage ), and 6 (threat to
existence). That is, I exclude 3 (territorial threat) which is included in the main model
since the ICB data stress “territorial threat can vary in its seriousness, depending on
state, region, and other circumstances." The results are substantially similar to the
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main model’s, except there seems to be some overlap for low salience’s survival curves
with time interaction (survival curve plot a1).
B.12.1 Kaplan–Meier Survival Curve
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Figure B.27: Plots of Kaplan–Meier Survival Curve. The x-axis denotes days in
conflict while the y-axis denotes the probability of survival. The cost ratio variable
in panel (b) is dichotomized by 1 (i.e. cost ratio greater than 1 counted as high).
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B.12.2 Table of Regression Results
Table B.45: Cox Regression Results with 95% Confidence Interval, 1962-2014
Days before Quitting
Adjusted Models Original Models
(1) (2) (3)
Cost Ratio −0.012 0.131 0.103
(−0.629, 0.604) (−0.504, 0.765) (−0.513, 0.718)
Salience 0.693∗ 0.732∗ 0.746∗
(−0.109, 1.494) (−0.122, 1.586) (−0.087, 1.579)
Cost × Salience 4.610∗∗∗ −0.069 −0.899∗
(2.322, 6.897) (−3.342, 3.204) (−1.875, 0.077)




tt(Cost × Salience) −0.190
(−0.926, 0.546)
Joint Democracy −1.031 −1.176 −1.202
(−3.129, 1.068) (−3.485, 1.133) (−3.465, 1.060)
Contiguity 6.968∗∗∗ −2.529∗ 0.598
(2.811, 11.125) (−5.368, 0.311) (−0.227, 1.422)
Power Ratio −0.271∗∗∗ −0.237∗∗ −0.271∗∗∗
(−0.459, −0.082) (−0.436, −0.038) (−0.463, −0.079)
Defense Ratio −0.377 −0.368 −0.353
(−1.305, 0.552) (−1.392, 0.656) (−1.343, 0.636)




Adjusted Method Time Interaction tt No
BIC 761.19 807.04 809.21
Observations 667 667 667
Log Likelihood −361.164 −384.092 −389.493
Wald Test 47.230∗∗∗ (df = 9) 40.450∗∗∗ (df = 9) 28.930∗∗∗ (df = 7)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure B.29: Survival Curve When Switching the Cost Ratio from .5 to 2.
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B.12.5 Schoenfeld Tests
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests. The last column denotes p
value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark indicate possible violation of
the proportional hazard assumption.
Table B.46: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.0548 0.4555 0.4997
Salience 0.0039 0.0038 0.9512
Joint Democracy -0.1151 1.4540 0.2279
Contiguity 0.3322 32.2806 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.0955 1.2001 0.2733
Defense Ratio 0.1372 5.8139 0.0159
Cost x Salience 0.1616 5.9892 0.0144
GLOBAL 35.2766 0.0000
Table B.47: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.0864 1.1352 0.2867
Salience 0.0715 1.2537 0.2629
Joint Democracy -0.1232 1.6636 0.1971
Contiguity 0.2993 26.2034 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.0375 0.1855 0.6667
Defense Ratio 0.0653 1.3163 0.2513
Cost x Salience 0.0921 1.9448 0.1631
GLOBAL 31.3427 0.0001
B.12.6 Schoenfeld Tests after Time Interaction
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests after taking the time interac-
tion. The last column denotes p value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark
indicate possible violation of the proportional hazard assumption.
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Table B.48: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio 0.0944 1.2693 0.2599
Salience 0.0319 0.2252 0.6351
Joint Democracy -0.3181 10.7235 0.0011
Contiguity 0.2261 38.4739 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.2248 5.8827 0.0153
Defense Ratio 0.3462 39.3318 0.0000
Time x Contiguity -0.1085 6.5998 0.0102
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.5196 63.0215 0.0000
Cost x Salience -0.3689 21.7541 0.0000
GLOBAL 258.6284 0.0000
Table B.49: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio 0.0307 0.1342 0.7141
Salience 0.0827 1.5168 0.2181
Joint Democracy -0.3058 9.9113 0.0016
Contiguity 0.2928 64.5362 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.2230 5.7866 0.0161
Defense Ratio 0.3118 31.9025 0.0000
Time x Contiguity -0.1919 20.6427 0.0000
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.4826 54.3755 0.0000
Cost x Salience -0.3209 16.4621 0.0000
GLOBAL 260.6324 0.0000
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B.13 Model with A Different Operationalization of Cost Ratio
In this section, I present results for the model using a different operationalization
of cost ratio. Specifically, I add 1 instead of double.eps to the denominator. The
results are similar to the model’s.
B.13.1 Table of Regression Results
Table B.50: Cox Regression Results with 95% Confidence Interval, 1962-2014
Days before Quitting
Adjusted Models Original Models
(1) (2) (3)
Cost Ratio 0.202 0.307 0.284
(−0.702, 1.105) (−0.574, 1.188) (−0.607, 1.175)
Salience 0.828∗ 0.699 0.763∗
(−0.089, 1.746) (−0.170, 1.569) (−0.092, 1.619)
Cost × Salience 3.584∗∗ −0.346 −0.952∗
(0.314, 6.855) (−3.243, 2.551) (−2.021, 0.116)
Time × Cost Ratio × Salience −0.923∗∗
(−1.627, −0.219)
tt(Cost × Salience) −0.133
(−0.745, 0.480)
Joint Democracy −1.089 −1.127 −1.104
(−3.180, 1.002) (−3.443, 1.189) (−3.368, 1.160)
Contiguity 6.168∗∗ −2.686∗ 0.476
(1.454, 10.883) (−5.423, 0.052) (−0.340, 1.291)
Power Ratio −0.269∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗ −0.250∗∗∗
(−0.461, −0.077) (−0.417, −0.027) (−0.440, −0.061)
Defense Ratio −0.373 −0.360 −0.349
(−1.288, 0.542) (−1.335, 0.614) (−1.304, 0.606)




Adjusted Method Time Interaction tt No
BIC 767 808.39 809.96
Observations 667 667 667
Log Likelihood −364.073 −384.765 −389.870
Wald Test 47.240∗∗∗ (df = 9) 42.600∗∗∗ (df = 9) 27.720∗∗∗ (df = 7)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure B.31: Survival Curve When Switching the Cost Ratio from .5 to 2.
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B.13.4 Schoenfeld Tests
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests. The last column denotes p
value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark indicate possible violation of
the proportional hazard assumption.
Table B.51: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.0556 0.3844 0.5353
Salience -0.0826 1.2980 0.2546
Joint Democracy -0.1334 1.9408 0.1636
Contiguity 0.3052 35.4068 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.0635 0.4969 0.4809
Defense Ratio 0.1869 9.9740 0.0016
Cost x Salience 0.2527 10.4660 0.0012
GLOBAL 40.2817 0.0000
Table B.52: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.0864 0.9266 0.3357
Salience -0.0511 0.4960 0.4813
Joint Democracy -0.1338 1.9500 0.1626
Contiguity 0.2574 25.1900 0.0000
Power Ratio 0.0023 0.0007 0.9792
Defense Ratio 0.1190 4.0400 0.0444
Cost x Salience 0.1970 6.3579 0.0117
GLOBAL 31.1850 0.0001
B.13.5 Schoenfeld Tests after Time Interaction
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests after taking the time interac-
tion. The last column denotes p value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark
indicate possible violation of the proportional hazard assumption.
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Table B.53: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.0315 0.1047 0.7463
Salience -0.1875 7.9418 0.0048
Joint Democracy -0.3162 12.1994 0.0005
Contiguity 0.2493 60.3957 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.3699 18.7149 0.0000
Defense Ratio 0.4462 70.6776 0.0000
Time x Contiguity -0.1595 19.9663 0.0000
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.4698 124.8942 0.0000
Cost x Salience -0.3737 61.3575 0.0000
GLOBAL 335.8077 0.0000
Table B.54: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.0804 0.6825 0.4087
Salience -0.1777 7.1387 0.0075
Joint Democracy -0.2877 10.0987 0.0015
Contiguity 0.3207 99.9849 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.3275 14.6714 0.0001
Defense Ratio 0.4225 63.3624 0.0000
Time x Contiguity -0.2462 47.5348 0.0000
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.4786 129.6203 0.0000
Cost x Salience -0.3889 66.4414 0.0000
GLOBAL 334.4284 0.0000
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B.14 Model Excluding the U.S.
In this section, I present results for the model excluding involvement of the U.S. The
results are substantially similar to the main model’s.
B.14.1 Table of Regression Results
Table B.55: Cox Regression Results with 95% Confidence Interval, 1962-2014
Days before Quitting
Adjusted Models Original Models
(1) (2) (3)
Cost Ratio 0.673 0.804 0.800
(−0.471, 1.818) (−0.214, 1.822) (−0.266, 1.866)
Salience 1.166∗∗ 0.935∗∗ 1.025∗∗
(0.153, 2.178) (0.047, 1.824) (0.117, 1.933)
Cost × Salience 1.653 −1.664 −1.589∗∗
(−1.357, 4.664) (−5.147, 1.819) (−2.836, −0.342)
Time × Cost Ratio × Salience −0.650∗
(−1.312, 0.012)
tt(Cost × Salience) 0.026
(−0.649, 0.700)
Joint Democracy −1.059 −1.140 −1.137
(−3.146, 1.029) (−3.618, 1.339) (−3.561, 1.287)
Contiguity 9.781∗∗∗ −2.397 0.388
(2.526, 17.036) (−5.579, 0.785) (−0.584, 1.359)
Power Ratio −0.196∗ −0.134 −0.153
(−0.419, 0.026) (−0.359, 0.090) (−0.370, 0.065)
Defense Ratio −0.378 −0.379 −0.385
(−1.293, 0.536) (−1.403, 0.644) (−1.384, 0.614)




Adjusted Method Time Interaction tt No
BIC 623.61 673.67 670.02
Observations 556 556 556
Log Likelihood −293.019 −318.050 −320.401
Wald Test 44.520∗∗∗ (df = 9) 25.940∗∗∗ (df = 9) 19.450∗∗∗ (df = 7)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure B.33: Survival Curve When Switching the Cost Ratio from .5 to 2.
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B.14.4 Schoenfeld Tests
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests. The last column denotes p
value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark indicate possible violation of
the proportional hazard assumption.
Table B.56: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.2634 14.1848 0.0002
Salience -0.1556 3.9646 0.0465
Joint Democracy -0.0927 0.8652 0.3523
Contiguity 0.2931 29.3493 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.0320 0.0996 0.7524
Defense Ratio 0.1797 7.5093 0.0061
Cost x Salience 0.3306 26.6978 0.0000
GLOBAL 44.8692 0.0000
Table B.57: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.3186 20.7544 0.0000
Salience -0.1668 4.5568 0.0328
Joint Democracy -0.1125 1.2745 0.2589
Contiguity 0.2550 22.2164 0.0000
Power Ratio 0.0115 0.0129 0.9097
Defense Ratio 0.1173 3.2002 0.0736
Cost x Salience 0.3379 27.8809 0.0000
GLOBAL 44.0522 0.0000
B.14.5 Schoenfeld Tests after Time Interaction
In this section, I present tables of the Schoenfeld Tests after taking the time interac-
tion. The last column denotes p value, where a value smaller than the 0.05 benchmark
indicate possible violation of the proportional hazard assumption.
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Table B.58: Schoenfeld Tests with Kaplan Meier Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.2577 35.3779 0.0000
Salience -0.2312 25.0448 0.0000
Joint Democracy -0.3481 11.7694 0.0006
Contiguity 0.2523 89.3938 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.3660 17.7257 0.0000
Defense Ratio 0.4114 77.5541 0.0000
Time x Contiguity -0.1881 41.6705 0.0000
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.5731 168.4010 0.0000
Cost x Salience -0.5283 64.0204 0.0000
GLOBAL 359.4890 0.0000
Table B.59: Schoenfeld Tests with Rank Transformation
rho chisq p
Cost Ratio -0.3283 57.4139 0.0000
Salience -0.2837 37.7280 0.0000
Joint Democracy -0.3314 10.6676 0.0011
Contiguity 0.3040 129.7299 0.0000
Power Ratio -0.2848 10.7338 0.0011
Defense Ratio 0.3988 72.8827 0.0000
Time x Contiguity -0.2507 73.9847 0.0000
Time x Cost Ratio x Salience 0.5492 154.6626 0.0000
Cost x Salience -0.4620 48.9642 0.0000
GLOBAL 359.1773 0.0000
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B.15 List of Countries Counted as Quitting
Table B.60: List of Country Counted as Quitting, ICB (1918-2015)
Crisno Crisname Year Country
6 HUNGARIAN WAR 1919 Hungary
9 FINNISH/RUSSIAN BDR. 1919 Finland
10 BESSARABIA 1919 Russia
15 AALAND ISLANDS 1920 Sweden
19 COSTA RICA/PANAMA BDR 1921 Panama
20 GERMAN REPARATIONS 1921 Germany
21 KARL’S RETURN HUNGARY 1921 Hungary
22 AUSTRIAN SEPARATISTS 1921 Austria
23 ALBANIAN FRONTIER 1921 Albania
24 BURGENLAND DISPUTE 1921 Hungary
27 RUHR I 1923 Germany
28 CORFU INCIDENT 1923 Greece
32 BULGARIA/GREEK FRONT 1925 Greece
37 CHACO I 1928 Paraguay
41 CHACO II 1932 Bolivia
42 LETICIA 1932 Peru
47 ETHIOPIAN WAR 1935 Ethiopia
55 AMUR RIVER INCIDENT 1937 Russia
56 MARCO POLO BRIDGE 1937 China
60 ANSCHLUSS 1938 Austria
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61 POLISH ULTIMATUM 1938 Lithuania
64 MUNICH 1938 Czechoslovakia
68 CZECH. ANNEXATION 1939 Czechoslovakia
72 NOMONHAN 1939 Japan
74 ENTRY WWII 1939 Poland
76 FINNISH WAR 1939 Finland
77 INVAS.-SCANDINAVIA 1940 Denmark
78 FALL OF WEST EUROPE 1940 Belgium
79 CLOSURE-BURMA ROAD 1940 United Kingdom
80 ROMANIAN TERRITORY 1940 Romania
82 E. AFRICA CAMPAIGN 1941 Italy
83 BALKAN INVASIONS 1940 United Kingdom
83 BALKAN INVASIONS 1941 United Kingdom
83 BALKAN INVASIONS 1940 Greece
83 BALKAN INVASIONS 1941 Greece
84 MID-EAST CAMPAIGN 1941 Iraq
86 ECUADOR/PERU BDR II 1941 Ecuador
88 PEARL HARBOR 1941 United Kingdom
88 PEARL HARBOR 1941 Netherlands
88 PEARL HARBOR 1941 Thailand
89 STALINGRAD 1942 Germany
90 EL ALAMEIN 1942 Germany
90 EL ALAMEIN 1942 Italy
91 FALL OF ITALY 1943 Italy
92 GERMAN OCCUP.-HUNGARY 1944 Hungary
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93 SOVIET OCCUP.-E. EUR 1944 Germany
93 SOVIET OCCUP.-E. EUR 1944 Hungary
94 D-DAY 1944 Germany
97 LEYTE CAMPAIGN 1944 Japan
99 LUZON 1945 Japan
100 FINAL SOVIET OFFENS. 1945 Germany
101 IWO JIMA 1945 Japan
102 COMMUNISM IN ROMANIA 1945 Romania
103 OKINAWA 1945 Japan
104 TRIESTE I 1945 Yugoslavia
105 FRENCH FORCES/SYRIA 1945 France
107 HIROSHIMA-NAGASAKI 1945 Japan
108 AZERBAIJAN 1946 Russia
109 INDONESIA INDEP. I 1945 Netherlands
109 INDONESIA INDEP. I 1945 Indonesia
113 COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY 1947 Hungary
115 MARSHALL PLAN 1947 Czechoslovakia
116 INDONESIA INDEP. II 1947 Netherlands
116 INDONESIA INDEP. II 1947 Indonesia
119 KASHMIR I 1947 Pakistan
120 PAL. PRT./ISRAEL IND. 1948 Egypt
120 PAL. PRT./ISRAEL IND. 1948 Syria
120 PAL. PRT./ISRAEL IND. 1948 Lebanon
120 PAL. PRT./ISRAEL IND. 1948 Jordan
121 COMMUNISM IN CZECH. 1948 Czechoslovakia
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123 BERLIN BLOCKADE 1948 Russia
127 INDONESIA INDEP. III 1948 Netherlands
128 SINAI INCURSION 1948 Israel
133 KOREAN WAR II 1950 North Korea
134 HULA DRAINAGE 1951 Israel
135 PUNJAB WAR SCARE I 1951 Pakistan
136 SUEZ CANAL 1951 United Kingdom
140 KOREAN WAR III 1953 South Korea
146 TAIWAN STRAIT I 1954 China
147 COSTA RICA/NIC. II 1955 Nicaragua
150 PUSHTUNISTAN II 1955 Afghanistan
152 SUEZ NATN.-WAR 1956 United Kingdom
152 SUEZ NATN.-WAR 1956 France
152 SUEZ NATN.-WAR 1956 Israel
156 MOCORON INCIDENT 1957 Honduras
169 MEX./GUAT. FISHING 1958 Guatemala
171 CHINA/INDIA BRD. I 1959 China
171 CHINA/INDIA BRD. I 1959 India
172 SHATT-AL-ARAB I 1959 Iran
172 SHATT-AL-ARAB I 1959 Iraq
185 BERLIN WALL 1961 United States
187 WEST IRIAN II 1961 Netherlands
194 CHINA/INDIA BDR. II 1962 India
195 YEMEN WAR I 1962 Egypt
195 YEMEN WAR I 1962 Saudi Arabia
276
195 YEMEN WAR I 1962 Yemen Arab Republic
196 CUBAN MISSILES 1962 Cuba
196 CUBAN MISSILES 1962 Russia
208 OGADEN I 1964 Somalia
209 YEMEN WAR II 1964 Egypt
209 YEMEN WAR II 1964 Saudi Arabia
209 YEMEN WAR II 1964 Yemen Arab Republic
212 YEMEN WAR III 1965 Egypt
212 YEMEN WAR III 1965 Saudi Arabia
212 YEMEN WAR III 1965 Yemen Arab Republic
219 YEMEN WAR IV 1966 Egypt
219 YEMEN WAR IV 1966 Saudi Arabia
219 YEMEN WAR IV 1966 Yemen Arab Republic
223 CYPRUS II 1967 Greece
231 USSURI RIVER 1969 China
234 SHATT-AL-ARAB II 1969 Iraq
235 FOOTBALL WAR 1969 El Salvador
243 CHAD/LIBYA I 1971 Libya
246 VIETNAM PORTS MINING 1972 Vietnam
247 TANZANIA/UGANDA II 1972 Tanzania
249 CHRISTMAS BOMBING 1972 Vietnam
255 OCTOBER-YOM KIPPUR WAR 1973 Syria
258 FINAL N. VIETNAM OFF. 1975 Cambodia
258 FINAL N. VIETNAM OFF. 1974 Vietnam
259 MAYAGUEZ 1975 Cambodia
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281 EGYPT/LIBYA CLASHES 1977 Libya
281 EGYPT/LIBYA CLASHES 1977 Egypt
282 OGADEN II 1978 Somalia
288 CHAD/LIBYA II 1978 Chad
288 CHAD/LIBYA II 1978 Libya
293 AIR RHODESIA INCDNT. 1978 Zambia
311 RAID ON GAFSA 1980 Libya
325 ESSEQUIBO II 1981 Guyana
327 AL-BIQA MISSILES I 1981 Israel
328 CAMEROON/NIGERIA I 1981 Cameroon
342 CHAD/LIBYA VI 1983 France
342 CHAD/LIBYA VI 1983 Chad
357 AL-BIQA MISSILES II 1985 Syria
367 MOZAMBIQUE ULTIMATUM 1986 Malawi
370 CHAD/LIBYA VIII 1987 Libya
376 AEGEAN SEA III 1987 Turkey
385 IRAQ RECAPTURE-AL-FAW 1988 Iran
396 GHANA/TOGO BORDER II 1991 Ghana
397 YUGOSLAVIA I: CROATIA-SLOVENIA 1991 Croatia
397 YUGOSLAVIA I: CROATIA-SLOVENIA 1991 Yugoslavia
406 IRAQ NO-FLY ZONE 1992 Iraq
407 GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA 1992 Georgia
412 IRAQ DEPLOY./KUWAIT 1994 Iraq
418 OPRN GRAPES OF WRATH 1996 Lebanon
419 DESERT STRIKE 1996 United States
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419 DESERT STRIKE 1996 Iraq
430 KOSOVO 1999 Yugoslavia
433 CASPIAN SEA 2001 Azerbaijan
436 KALUCHAK 2002 India
436 KALUCHAK 2002 Pakistan
438 PARSLEY ISLAND 2002 Morocco
466 SUDAN-SOUTH SUDAN 2011 South Sudan
470 SYRIA CHEMICAL WEAPONS 2013 United States
470 SYRIA CHEMICAL WEAPONS 2013 Syria
471 CRIMEA-DONBASS 2014 Ukraine
B.16 List of Trade Partners with Zero Cost Ratio
Table B.61: Trade Partners with Zero Cost Ratio, 1962-2014
Country1 Country2 Year
1 Haiti Dominican Republic 1962
2 Dominican Republic Haiti 1962
3 Kenya Somalia 1962
4 Egypt Israel 1963
5 Syria Israel 1963
6 Lebanon Israel 1963
7 Jordan Israel 1963
8 Israel Lebanon 1963
9 Israel Jordan 1963
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10 Israel Syria 1963
11 Israel Egypt 1963
12 Burundi Rwanda 1963
13 Rwanda Burundi 1963
14 Somalia Ethiopia 1963
15 Ethiopia Somalia 1963
16 Egypt Saudi Arabia 1963
17 Saudi Arabia Egypt 1963
18 Saudi Arabia Yemen Arab Republic 1963
19 Yemen Arab Republic Saudi Arabia 1963
20 United States Vietnam 1963
21 Vietnam United States 1963
22 United States Russia 1963
23 Belgium Russia 1963
24 Russia United States 1963
25 Russia Belgium 1963
26 Russia Congo - Brazzaville 1963
27 Saudi Arabia Yemen Arab Republic 1964
28 Yemen Arab Republic Saudi Arabia 1964
29 United States Vietnam 1964
30 Vietnam United States 1964
31 Saudi Arabia Yemen Arab Republic 1965
32 Yemen Arab Republic Saudi Arabia 1965
33 Jordan Israel 1965
34 Israel Jordan 1965
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35 Bolivia Cuba 1966
36 United States Russia 1966
37 Russia United States 1966
38 Egypt Israel 1966
39 Syria Israel 1966
40 Jordan Israel 1966
41 Israel Jordan 1966
42 Israel Syria 1966
43 Israel Egypt 1966
44 Cyprus Turkey 1966
45 Turkey Cyprus 1966
46 United States North Korea 1967
47 North Korea South Korea 1967
48 North Korea United States 1967
49 South Korea North Korea 1967
50 United States Vietnam 1967
51 Jordan Israel 1967
52 Israel Jordan 1967
53 German Democratic Republic Czechoslovakia 1967
54 Poland Czechoslovakia 1967
55 Czechoslovakia German Democratic Republic 1967
56 Czechoslovakia Russia 1967
57 Czechoslovakia Bulgaria 1967
58 Czechoslovakia Poland 1967
59 Bulgaria Czechoslovakia 1967
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60 Russia Czechoslovakia 1967
61 Lebanon Israel 1967
62 United States Vietnam 1968
63 Russia China 1968
64 China Russia 1968
65 Russia Israel 1969
66 Egypt Israel 1968
67 Israel Russia 1969
68 Israel Egypt 1968
69 United States North Korea 1968
70 United States Vietnam 1969
71 Vietnam Philippines 1969
72 Vietnam Australia 1969
73 Vietnam United States 1969
74 Syria Israel 1969
75 Israel Syria 1969
76 United States Russia 1969
77 Vietnam Philippines 1970
78 Vietnam United States 1970
79 Vietnam Australia 1970
80 United States Vietnam 1971
81 Vietnam Australia 1971
82 Vietnam Philippines 1971
83 Vietnam United States 1971
84 Uganda Tanzania 1971
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85 Tanzania Uganda 1971
86 Yemen Arab Republic Yemen People’s Republic 1971
87 Yemen People’s Republic Yemen Arab Republic 1971
88 Israel Libya 1972
89 Israel Egypt 1972
90 United Kingdom Russia 1972
91 United States Russia 1972
92 Russia Israel 1972
93 Russia United States 1972
94 Egypt Israel 1972
95 Syria Israel 1972
96 Israel Syria 1972
97 Israel Iraq 1972
98 Israel Russia 1972
99 Israel Jordan 1972
100 Oman Yemen People’s Republic 1972
101 United States Russia 1974
102 Cuba Congo - Kinshasa 1974
103 Russia Zambia 1974
104 Russia Congo - Kinshasa 1974
105 Russia South Africa 1974
106 Russia United States 1974
107 Congo - Kinshasa Angola 1974
108 Congo - Kinshasa Cuba 1974
109 Congo - Kinshasa Russia 1974
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110 Angola Congo - Kinshasa 1974
111 Zambia Russia 1974
112 South Africa Russia 1974
113 Israel Syria 1975
114 Congo - Kinshasa Angola 1976
115 Angola Congo - Kinshasa 1976
116 Somalia Russia 1977
117 Somalia Cuba 1977
118 Somalia Ethiopia 1977
119 Ethiopia Somalia 1977
120 Lebanon Israel 1977
121 Belgium Angola 1977
122 Congo - Kinshasa Angola 1977
123 Angola Belgium 1977
124 Angola Congo - Kinshasa 1977
125 China Vietnam 1978
126 Vietnam China 1978
127 Yemen Arab Republic Yemen People’s Republic 1978
128 Yemen People’s Republic Yemen Arab Republic 1978
129 United States Russia 1978
130 Russia United States 1978
131 Russia Pakistan 1978
132 Pakistan Russia 1978
133 Morocco Algeria 1978
134 Algeria Morocco 1978
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135 German Democratic Republic Poland 1979
136 Poland Czechoslovakia 1979
137 Poland German Democratic Republic 1979
138 Poland Russia 1979
139 Czechoslovakia Poland 1979
140 Russia Poland 1979
141 Iran Iraq 1979
142 Iraq Iran 1979
143 Somalia Ethiopia 1979
144 Ethiopia Somalia 1979
145 Iraq Israel 1980
146 Syria Israel 1980
147 Israel Syria 1980
148 Russia Sweden 1980
149 Sweden Russia 1980
150 Iraq Iran 1981
151 Syria Israel 1981
152 Lebanon Israel 1981
153 Israel Syria 1981
154 Israel Lebanon 1981
155 Somalia Ethiopia 1981
156 Ethiopia Somalia 1981
157 Nigeria Chad 1982
158 Chad Nigeria 1982
159 Chad Libya 1982
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160 Libya Chad 1982
161 United States Cuba 1982
162 Russia United States 1982
163 Sudan Ethiopia 1982
164 Iran Iraq 1983
165 Iraq Iran 1983
166 China Vietnam 1983
167 Vietnam China 1983
168 United States Russia 1983
169 Syria Israel 1984
170 Israel Syria 1984
171 Mali Burkina Faso 1984
172 Burkina Faso Mali 1984
173 Iran Iraq 1985
174 Iraq Iran 1985
175 Chad Libya 1985
176 Libya Chad 1985
177 Uganda Sudan 1985
178 Chad Libya 1986
179 Libya Chad 1986
180 Morocco Algeria 1986
181 Algeria Morocco 1986
182 Iran Iraq 1987
183 Senegal Mauritania 1988
184 Mauritania Senegal 1988
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185 Iraq Belgium 1989
186 Iraq United Arab Emirates 1989
187 Iraq Niger 1989
188 Iraq Israel 1989
189 Iraq Syria 1989
190 Iraq Afghanistan 1989
191 Syria Iraq 1989
192 Israel Iraq 1989
193 United Arab Emirates Iraq 1989
194 Kuwait Iraq 1990
195 Iraq Russia 1991
196 Iraq United States 1991
197 Georgia Russia 1991
198 United States North Korea 1992
199 North Korea United States 1992
200 North Korea South Korea 1992
201 South Korea North Korea 1992
202 Israel Syria 1992
203 Cameroon Nigeria 1993
204 Nigeria Cameroon 1993
205 Iraq Kuwait 1993
206 Iraq Saudi Arabia 1993
207 Iraq United States 1993
208 Saudi Arabia Iraq 1993
209 Kuwait Iraq 1993
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210 China Taiwan 1994
211 Taiwan China 1994
212 Israel Syria 1995
213 United States Iraq 1995
214 Iraq United States 1995
215 North Korea South Korea 1995
216 South Korea North Korea 1995
217 Congo - Kinshasa Uganda 1997
218 Congo - Kinshasa Rwanda 1997
219 Uganda Congo - Kinshasa 1997
220 Uganda Namibia 1997
221 Uganda Angola 1997
222 Uganda Chad 1997
223 Rwanda Zimbabwe 1997
224 Rwanda Namibia 1997
225 Rwanda Chad 1997
226 Rwanda Congo - Kinshasa 1997
227 Rwanda Angola 1997
228 Angola Uganda 1997
229 Angola Rwanda 1997
230 Zimbabwe Rwanda 1997
231 Namibia Uganda 1997
232 Namibia Rwanda 1997
233 United States Yugoslavia 1998
234 Canada Yugoslavia 1998
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235 United Kingdom Yugoslavia 1998
236 Netherlands Yugoslavia 1998
237 Belgium Yugoslavia 1998
238 France Yugoslavia 1998
239 Spain Yugoslavia 1998
240 Portugal Yugoslavia 1998
241 Italy Yugoslavia 1998
242 Yugoslavia Italy 1998
243 Yugoslavia United States 1998
244 Yugoslavia Spain 1998
245 Yugoslavia United Kingdom 1998
246 Yugoslavia Netherlands 1998
247 Yugoslavia Belgium 1998
248 Yugoslavia Canada 1998
249 Yugoslavia France 1998
250 Yugoslavia Portugal 1998
251 United States North Korea 2001
252 North Korea United States 2001
253 Syria Israel 2002
254 Israel Syria 2002
255 Congo - Kinshasa Rwanda 2003
256 Rwanda Congo - Kinshasa 2003
257 United States North Korea 2005
258 North Korea United States 2005
259 Lebanon Israel 2005
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260 Israel Lebanon 2005
261 Chad Sudan 2006
262 Sudan Chad 2006
263 United States North Korea 2008
264 North Korea Japan 2008
265 North Korea South Korea 2008
266 North Korea United States 2008
267 South Korea North Korea 2008
268 Japan North Korea 2008
269 Chad Sudan 2008
270 Sudan Chad 2008
271 North Korea South Korea 2009
272 South Korea North Korea 2009
273 Libya Qatar 2010
274 Qatar Libya 2010
275 Sudan South Sudan 2010
276 South Sudan Sudan 2010
290
Appendix C
Trade and Shifting Power
C.1 Comparative Statics of Powell’s Model
In this section, I provide comparative statics of Powell (2004b)’s model. Specifically, I
add a parameter of bilateral trade into the model and show its effect on costly conflict.
The results in Krainin (2017) can be analyzed in the same way and are similar.
The inefficient condition in Powell (2004b) can be restated as follows.
M1,t > B − δM2,t+1 (C.1)
where M1,t =
(1− pt)(1− d)
1− δ , M2,t =
pt(1− d)
1− δ are state 1 and state 2’s payoff of
outside option respecitvely. pt denotes state 2’s probability of winning at time t, d
the costs of conflict, δ the discount factor, and B = 1/(1− δ) the total present value
of the disputed good.
To account for the impact of bilateral trade, I add a parameter b in the above
condition. That is, d is changed to d+ b and pt is a function of b. Equation (C.1) can
be rewritten as
(1− d− b)(1− pt + δpt+1) > 1 (C.2)
The value of pt can shift over time. Following Krainin (2017), write pt+1 = θ×pt >
pt for t ∈ {τ, τ+1, ...τ+T−1} where at τ+T the shift in power ends. Equation (C.2)




2− pt + pt+1
1− d− b > 0 (C.3)
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Under the war equilibrium, δθ > 1.1 Therefore, we have ∂pt
∂b
> 0. That is,
more bilateral trade can increase the likelihood of conflict when it increases a state’s
likelihood of winning by force.
C.2 With Yearly Fixed Effects
This section presents results for models including yearly fixed effects. Although the
coefficient estimates are less significant, the results as shown by the marginal effects




























Figure C.1: Marginal Effects of Relative Efficiency.
1For details, see Krainin (2017) Proposition 3.
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Table C.1: Logit Regression with 95% Confidence Intervals, 1962-2014
Costly Conflict
(1) (2) (3)
log Trade −0.620∗∗∗ −0.902∗∗∗ −0.663∗∗∗
(−0.859, −0.381) (−1.129, −0.675) (−0.838, −0.488)
log Trade × Efficiency −0.743 −1.315∗ −0.910∗
(−2.322, 0.836) (−2.862, 0.232) (−1.946, 0.126)
log Trade × Efficiencŷ 2 0.023 0.186 0.241
(−0.521, 0.568) (−0.349, 0.721) (−0.110, 0.592)
Efficiency 2.282∗∗ 1.233 10.942∗∗∗
(0.255, 4.309) (−0.777, 3.244) (9.296, 12.589)
Efficiencŷ 2 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.011, 0.030) (0.009, 0.029) (0.026, 0.040)
Power ratio 0.733∗∗∗ 1.090∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗
(0.345, 1.121) (0.709, 1.472) (0.544, 1.123)
GDPgr difference −0.192∗∗∗ −0.298∗∗∗ −0.263∗∗∗
(−0.336, −0.047) (−0.446, −0.151) (−0.371, −0.155)
Constant −0.456 0.042 −2.053∗∗∗
(−1.676, 0.765) (−1.156, 1.240) (−2.941, −1.164)
Observations 3,359 3,929 21,027
Log Likelihood −1,612.247 −1,655.226 −3,416.201
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,340.494 3,426.453 6,948.402
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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C.3 Without Leading the Outcome Variable
This section presents results for models without leading the outcome variable. The
results are similar to the paper’s.
Table C.2: Logit Regression with 95% Confidence Intervals, 1962-2014
Costly Conflict
(1) (2) (3)
log Trade −0.501∗∗∗ −0.790∗∗∗ −0.622∗∗∗
(−0.737, −0.266) (−1.014, −0.567) (−0.790, −0.453)
log Trade × Efficiency 0.559∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗
(0.173, 0.944) (0.561, 1.318) (0.469, 1.023)
log Trade × Efficiencŷ 2 −0.139∗ −0.254∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗
(−0.283, 0.006) (−0.402, −0.107) (−0.342, −0.137)
Efficiency 0.011 −0.621 −0.484
(−1.525, 1.547) (−2.121, 0.879) (−1.483, 0.515)
Efficiencŷ 2 −0.189 0.003 0.133
(−0.727, 0.348) (−0.524, 0.530) (−0.201, 0.466)
Power ratio 2.091∗∗ 0.783 11.189∗∗∗
(0.208, 3.975) (−1.066, 2.632) (9.669, 12.709)
GDPgr difference 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.012, 0.029) (0.012, 0.028) (0.028, 0.041)
Constant −0.893∗ −0.375 −2.560∗∗∗
(−1.855, 0.069) (−1.310, 0.560) (−3.211, −1.909)
Observations 3,359 3,929 21,031
Log Likelihood −1,715.936 −1,762.887 −3,601.311
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,447.873 3,541.773 7,218.622





























Figure C.2: Marginal Effects of Relative Efficiency.
C.4 Using ICB Data





























Figure C.3: Marginal Effects of Relative Efficiency.
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Table C.3: Logit Regression with 95% Confidence Intervals, 1962-2014
Costly Conflict
(1) (2) (3)
log Trade −0.962∗∗∗ −1.144∗∗∗ −0.929∗∗∗
(−1.533, −0.391) (−1.674, −0.613) (−1.379, −0.479)
log Trade × Efficiency 1.387∗∗∗ 1.623∗∗∗ 1.179∗∗∗
(0.466, 2.308) (0.747, 2.499) (0.473, 1.886)
log Trade × Efficiencŷ 2 −0.465∗∗∗ −0.538∗∗∗ −0.371∗∗∗
(−0.811, −0.120) (−0.874, −0.201) (−0.620, −0.122)
Efficiency −2.230 −2.510∗ −1.922∗
(−5.147, 0.686) (−5.350, 0.331) (−4.039, 0.195)
Efficiencŷ 2 0.739 0.819∗ 0.649∗∗
(−0.218, 1.695) (−0.113, 1.751) (0.010, 1.288)
Power ratio −3.179 −4.201 7.087∗∗∗
(−8.167, 1.808) (−9.216, 0.815) (2.604, 11.571)
GDPgr difference −0.012 −0.013 0.013
(−0.036, 0.012) (−0.038, 0.012) (−0.005, 0.031)
Constant −1.544 −1.287 −3.529∗∗∗
(−3.448, 0.360) (−3.130, 0.556) (−4.981, −2.076)
Observations 3,359 3,929 21,027
Log Likelihood −460.973 −464.830 −709.355
Akaike Inf. Crit. 937.946 945.661 1,434.711
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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C.5 Without Control Variables
This section presents results for models without control variables. The results are
similar to the paper’s.
Table C.4: Logit Regression with 95% Confidence Intervals, 1962-2014
Costly Conflict
(1) (2) (3)
log Trade −0.325∗∗∗ −0.527∗∗∗ −0.387∗∗∗
(−0.458, −0.192) (−0.649, −0.404) (−0.496, −0.278)
log Trade × Efficiency 0.293∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗
(0.116, 0.470) (0.329, 0.667) (0.227, 0.532)
log Trade × Efficiencŷ 2 −0.063∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗
(−0.110, −0.016) (−0.155, −0.062) (−0.139, −0.053)
Efficiency 0.293 −0.100 0.599∗
(−0.522, 1.109) (−0.911, 0.711) (−0.085, 1.283)
Efficiencŷ 2 −0.158 −0.071 −0.120
(−0.405, 0.088) (−0.319, 0.176) (−0.330, 0.090)
Power ratio −1.042∗∗∗ −0.658∗∗ −3.064∗∗∗
(−1.624, −0.460) (−1.229, −0.086) (−3.542, −2.585)
Observations 4,976 5,601 28,013
Log Likelihood −2,533.449 −2,584.425 −5,127.320
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,078.897 5,180.850 10,266.640



























Figure C.4: Marginal Effects of Relative Efficiency.
C.6 Using Trade/GDP



























Figure C.5: Marginal effects of relative efficiency. Note that I hold the weighted trade
value to be .05 for illustration purpose.
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Table C.5: Logit Regression with 95% Confidence Intervals, 1962-2014
Costly Conflict
(1) (2) (3)
Trade/GDP −17.110∗∗∗ −20.665∗∗∗ −9.739∗∗∗
(−21.606, −12.614) (−24.913, −16.418) (−12.825, −6.653)
Trade/GDP × Efficiency 22.749∗∗∗ 27.279∗∗∗ 11.210∗∗∗
(15.537, 29.962) (20.368, 34.191) (6.340, 16.081)
Trade/GDP × Efficiencŷ 2 −6.672∗∗∗ −8.016∗∗∗ −3.441∗∗∗
(−9.275, −4.070) (−10.560, −5.473) (−5.152, −1.730)
Efficiency −3.536∗∗∗ −4.095∗∗∗ −1.243∗
(−5.797, −1.275) (−6.328, −1.862) (−2.684, 0.197)
Efficiencŷ 2 0.833∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗ 0.327
(0.085, 1.581) (0.253, 1.727) (−0.122, 0.776)
Power ratio 2.160 1.114 9.558∗∗∗
(−0.915, 5.235) (−1.935, 4.163) (7.455, 11.661)
GDPgr difference 0.014∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.003, 0.024) (0.002, 0.023) (0.027, 0.043)
Constant 2.047∗∗∗ 2.553∗∗∗ −1.877∗∗∗
(0.560, 3.535) (1.083, 4.023) (−2.860, −0.894)
Observations 1,453 1,818 12,954
Log Likelihood −748.503 −774.076 −1,932.674
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,513.005 1,564.153 3,881.348
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
C.7 Weighing Efficiency by GDP Per Capita
This section presents results for models weighing efficiency by GDP per capita. The
results are mostly similar to the paper’s. Note that the support for hypothesis 2
becomes only marginally significant as shown in the marginal effects plot.
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Table C.6: Logit Regression with 95% Confidence Intervals, 1962-2014
Costly Conflict
(1) (2) (3)
log Trade −0.346∗∗∗ −0.457∗∗∗ −0.257∗∗∗
(−0.462, −0.230) (−0.558, −0.357) (−0.335, −0.179)
log Trade × Efficiency 0.145∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.071, 0.218) (0.126, 0.256) (0.041, 0.147)
log Trade × Efficiencŷ 2 −0.014∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(−0.022, −0.005) (−0.025, −0.010) (−0.015, −0.004)
Efficiency −0.309∗ −0.402∗∗ 0.051
(−0.637, 0.020) (−0.722, −0.083) (−0.197, 0.299)
Efficiencŷ 2 0.016 0.023 0.002
(−0.014, 0.046) (−0.006, 0.052) (−0.020, 0.024)
Power ratio 3.498∗∗ 1.503 9.856∗∗∗
(0.245, 6.752) (−1.759, 4.765) (7.643, 12.069)
GDPgr difference 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.004, 0.024) (0.002, 0.023) (0.026, 0.041)
Constant −0.108 0.185 −3.081∗∗∗
(−0.651, 0.436) (−0.338, 0.707) (−3.481, −2.680)
Observations 1,459 1,824 12,976
Log Likelihood −779.678 −814.643 −1,953.496
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,575.355 1,645.286 3,922.992



























Figure C.6: Marginal Effects of Relative Efficiency.
C.8 Using Efficiency without Weighing Trade Network Centrality
This section presents results for models weighing efficiency by GDP per capita. The
results are similar to the paper’s, though the uncertainty appears to be larger when


























Figure C.7: Marginal Effects of Relative Efficiency.
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Table C.7: Logit Regression with 95% Confidence Intervals, 1962-2014
Costly Conflict
(1) (2) (3)
log Trade −0.216∗∗∗ −0.344∗∗∗ −0.250∗∗∗
(−0.288, −0.144) (−0.410, −0.279) (−0.304, −0.195)
log Trade × Efficiency 0.057∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗
(0.019, 0.094) (0.070, 0.142) (0.007, 0.069)
log Trade × Efficiencŷ 2 −0.002 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.001
(−0.005, 0.002) (−0.008, −0.001) (−0.004, 0.002)
Efficiency −0.156∗ −0.262∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗
(−0.329, 0.016) (−0.430, −0.093) (−0.301, −0.032)
Efficiencŷ 2 0.001 0.009 0.003
(−0.015, 0.017) (−0.007, 0.024) (−0.010, 0.015)
Power ratio 1.831∗ 0.225 12.419∗∗∗
(−0.046, 3.707) (−1.618, 2.067) (10.897, 13.940)
GDPgr difference 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.009, 0.026) (0.010, 0.027) (0.024, 0.037)
Constant −0.711∗∗∗ −0.429∗∗ −2.441∗∗∗
(−1.053, −0.369) (−0.762, −0.096) (−2.700, −2.183)
Observations 3,183 3,753 19,958
Log Likelihood −1,632.305 −1,679.919 −3,396.208
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,280.609 3,375.839 6,808.417
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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